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Abstract 
Other people greatly influence behaviour – a phenomenon known as social influence. 
One reason people change their behaviour when others are present is to manage their 
reputation. Individuals with autism have social and communicative difficulties, 
which may result in difficulties in reputation management. This thesis aimed to 
examine reputation management in autistic individuals, the development of 
reputation management, and the cognitive mechanisms underpinning reputation 
management. In Chapter Two, autistic adults managed their reputation in a donation 
task when it was explicitly clear that they should manage it. Despite this ability, the 
autistic adults demonstrated a reduced propensity for reputation management, which 
results suggested was due to low expectations of reciprocity. In Chapters Three and 
Four, reputation management and potential mechanisms – theory of mind, social 
motivation, reciprocity, and inhibitory control – were examined in typical children 
aged 6 to 14. Two forms of reputation management were tested: an automatic or 
implicit form and a deliberate or explicit form. Implicit reputation management 
appeared in adolescence, while explicit reputation management occurred at 8-years-
old. Theory of mind and social motivation underpinned explicit reputation 
management. In Chapters Five and Six, autistic children did not implicitly manage 
their reputation, although some were able to do so explicitly. Autistic children who 
were fairer and more sensitive to reciprocity were more likely to explicitly manage 
reputation. None of the suggested mechanisms underpinned implicit reputation 
management in either typical or autistic children. Finally, semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with autistic adolescents and school staff (Chapter Seven). Thematic 
analysis showed that autistic adolescents were concerned about their reputation; 
however, many preferred to stay true to themselves rather than appear “cool”.  
Overall, this thesis noted autistic individuals do have the ability to manage 
reputation, yet there was variation in this ability, due to a number of factors. These 
results suggest autistic individuals are not completely immune to social influence.  
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1.1. What does it mean to be social?  
From infancy, human beings are thought to be inherently social, entering the world 
attuned with and interested in other people (Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 
1991; Reddy, 2008; Trevarthen, 2005). For example, faces – which can communicate 
a wealth of social information – are particularly potent stimuli for humans, even from 
a very young age (de Haan & Nelson, 1999). Human beings are social animals who 
spend a significant portion of their time within social situations. Several theorists 
(Adolphs, 2009; Dunbar, 1998, 2003; Frith, 2013) propose that the human brain has 
networks or regions dedicated to being social. Being social, therefore, is an important 
aspect of human life.   
There are numerous benefits to being social: better well-being for those with greater 
social engagement (Glass, Mendes de Leon, Bassuk & Berkman, 2006), foraging 
gains through cooperation that potentially aided the evolution of the human race 
(Tomasello, Melis, Tennie, Wyman & Herrmann, 2012), and being part of a social 
group can help motivate children’s learning (Master & Walton, 2013). Frith and Frith 
(2007) claim that humans are unique since a shared social world is created, with 
human beings above any other animal motivated to share and engage in each other’s 
worlds. Further, the cultural intelligence hypothesis (Herrmann, Call, Hernandez-
Lloreda, Hare & Tomasello, 2007) postulates that complex social life, underpinned 
by competition and cooperation, led to humans’ “ultra social” nature.  It seems, then, 
that considerable weight is applied to the notion of being social. 
Understanding this notion of being social is of particular import when attempting to 
appreciate the lives of individuals who have specific difficulties with social 
communication.  This thesis will look closely at the social behaviour, and its 
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underpinnings, of individuals with autism. Autism is a lifelong condition, best known 
for how it affects the way an individual interacts and communicates with others 
(American Psychiatric Association (APA), 2013) – although more research is needed 
to understand exactly why this is the case. One suggestion is that, in autism, social 
stimuli are processed differently in the brain (Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002; 
Critchley et al., 2000), and social information may not be given priority (Maestro et 
al., 2002), unlike individuals without autism who tend to highly prioritise social 
information.  
One way to consider why autistic
1
 individuals might process social information 
differently is to consider their propensity to social influence. Social influence is the 
susceptibility to the influence of others, and this thesis will focus on why people 
without autism appear to be remarkably susceptible to the influence of others, and 
why autistic individuals might not be, at different points in development – during 
childhood, adolescence and adulthood. Specifically, this thesis focuses on reputation 
management as a trigger for social influence: that a critical reason typical individuals 
change their behaviour when others are around is to maintain a certain reputation. 
The main aim of this thesis was to consider social influence in both typical and 
autistic individuals. Specifically, this thesis will consider whether children, 
adolescents, and adults with (and without) autism attempt to manage reputation.  
This thesis will also examine the mechanisms that may underlie reputation 
management, in order to enhance our understanding of how individuals manage their 
reputation. The current chapter will now consider the previous literature concerning 
                                                          
1
 The terms “autistic person” and “person with autism” are used interchangeably throughout this 
thesis to respect the wishes of all members of the autism community (see Sinclair, 1999)  
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social influence, reputation management, and the proposed mechanisms for 
reputation management, in both typical and autistic individuals.  
1.2. The history of social influence 
For decades, the effect of other people on behaviour has fascinated psychologists, 
from developmental psychologists to neuroscientists. There are multiple ways in 
which others influence behaviour, from the subconscious mimicry of people we like 
(van Baaren, Janssen, Chartrand & Dijksterhuis, 2009), to conformity to the ideas of 
others (Asch, 1956). The very first experiments in psychology itself are thought to be 
in the area of social influence. Following his interest in the way cyclists became 
more competitive when together, Triplett (1898) tested whether children were 
affected by the presence of others. In this seminal work, children reeled a flag along 
a track, both when they were alone and when they were competing with another 
child. The majority of children were faster when there was another child and thus 
Triplett (1898) concluded that the presence of others could facilitate performance. 
Despite criticisms of the lack of statistical significance and possible misinterpretation 
of his results (Stroebe, 2012), Triplett’s (1898) work led to a new age of social 
psychology.  
After Triplett (1898), social psychologists considered whether mere presence –the 
presence of another person or audience, minus any competitive elements or other 
factors – could impact upon behaviour by facilitating performance (Guerin, 1993). 
Research examining social facilitation during the first half of the 20
th
 century 
attempted to theorise the topic (Allport, 1924), but studies generally reported mixed 
findings (Dashiell, 1935). It was not until 1965 that Zajonc succinctly put forward a 
theory of social facilitation. Zajonc (1965) suggested that when people (and other 
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animals) were observed completing an easy task, performance was facilitated and 
they became better at the task. Such social facilitation effects have been found more 
recently with performance on easy video games improved by the presence of an 
audience (Bowman, Weber, Tamborini & Sherry, 2013). If the task was difficult, 
however, Zajonc (1965) noted that performance was inhibited and became worse 
when an audience was present. These conceptions formed part of Zajonc’s (1965) 
drive model, which suggested that such effects occurred due to an increase in 
generalised drive. The concept of drive has been criticised as being too vague 
(Andrew, 1974). Although Zajonc (1965) likened drive to arousal, there has been no 
strong evidence of physiological changes when other people are present (Guerin, 
1993).  
Following Zajonc’s (1965) drive theory, social conformity theories (e.g. Cottrell, 
Wack, Sekerak & Rittle, 1968) were proposed, followed by more cognitive 
explanations (e.g. Baron, Moore, & Sanders, 1978) of social facilitation. These 
theories will now be considered in turn.  
In one social conformity theory, evaluation apprehension, Cottrell et al. (1968) 
proposed that an increase in learned rather than generalised drive occurs when others 
are present. What has been learnt is that others can evaluate one’s behaviour, and it is 
the expectation of this evaluation that causes arousal which impacts on performance. 
This claim was based on Cottrell et al.’s (1968) finding that the presence of a 
blindfolded audience did not cause social facilitation effects, but a closely observing 
audience did – suggesting that something more than just mere presence is required to 
produce social facilitation. Similarly, other social conformity theories posited that 
another person’s presence leads to increased awareness of behaviour, particularly 
whether that behaviour is normative, and a subsequent increase in conformity occurs 
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(Guerin, 1993). For example, self-presentation theory (Goffman, 1959) assumes that 
people attempt to present a particular image of the self when observed by others. 
Guerin (1993) suggests, however, that social conformity theories lose some of the 
simplicity presented by Zajonc (1965).  For example, it is difficult to apply social 
conformity theories to evidence for social facilitation in animals, which is thought to 
occur due to hard-wired mechanisms rather than a learned process (Harlow, 1932; 
Tolman, 1964). 
Cognitive theories – which assume that information is taken in, transformed, stored 
and acted upon – propose that the presence of a person affects which information is 
attended to. Distraction-conflict theory (Baron et al., 1978) claims attention can be 
shifted by the presence of others and conflict may occur when the person does not 
have enough attentional capacity to attend to both a person’s presence and the task. 
This conflict, however, increases drive and facilitates performance (Baron, 1986). 
Another cognitive approach to social facilitation considered cognitive appraisals, 
specifically challenge appraisals and threat appraisals. Feinberg and Aiello (2010) 
found that participants who were threatened (told that the task was about speed and 
accuracy) performed worse when observed, and those who were challenged (told that 
the task was a challenge to overcome) performed better. These findings were 
irrespective of task difficulty, which the authors suggest undermine Zajonc’s (1965) 
drive theory, which focussed on the importance of task difficulty as part of social 
facilitation.  
A meta-analysis of 241 social facilitation experiments by Bond and Titus (1983) 
revealed that mere presence could only explain 0.03% to 3% of the variance in task 
performance. They found that the presence of others causes a reliable increase in 
speed during simple tasks, and the opposite effect in more complex tasks. There was 
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a slightly weaker effect of presence on task accuracy, with accuracy generally 
increasing in simple tasks and decreasing in complex ones. Also, the effect of 
evaluation was inconsistent and did not add to the previously mentioned effects, 
which goes against Cottrell et al.’s (1968) prediction that something more than mere 
presence is required for social facilitation effects. Changes in physiology were not 
found consistently across the 241 studies.  
The picture of social facilitation appears to be more complex than first thought, but it 
does appear that compared to when we are alone, others affect behaviour. Aiello and 
Douthitt (2001) argue that other factors play an important role in moderating the 
effect, including the familiarity of the person observing and their physical proximity. 
Individual differences may also play a role, with differences in motivation, 
personality and intelligence impacting on how individuals react to the presence of 
others (Aiello & Douthitt, 2001). What is apparent, despite this phenomenon being 
around for over a century, is that we still do not fully understand exactly why we are 
affected by the presence of others.  
Going beyond the area of social facilitation may help us to answer this question. 
Social influence is more than just social facilitation: others not only facilitate (or 
impair) behaviour, they can cause behaviour to change in other ways, such as by 
increasing prosocial behaviours. I now focus on one potential cause of this behaviour 
change: reputation.  
1.2.1. Reputation 
Reputation – how we believe we are seen in the eyes of others – is perhaps one of the 
strongest driving forces behind social influence. Our reputation is a social 
construction, based on what we believe others think of us (Emler, 1990). 
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Leimgruber, Shaw, Santos and Olson (2012) define reputation as the information 
possessed about an individual that can be used to guide expectations of how that 
person will act in the future. Reputation is therefore an important tool in partner 
choice (Barclay & Willer, 2007). Some authors argue that reputation is “everything” 
(Shaw, Li & Olson, 2013), and that reputation makes humans unique (Emler, 1990; 
Engelmann, Herrmann & Tomasello, 2012). Indeed, reputation transcends all areas 
of life – from the internet, to the workplace, to life at home or with friends (Tennie, 
Frith & Frith, 2010). Having a good reputation can reap great benefits – from being 
respected and trusted by others, to increasing sales of a company online (Resnick, 
Zeckhauser, Swanson, & Lockwood, 2006).  
Reputation may also be used to influence others, for example, to encourage others to 
be more generous (Reinstein & Reiner, 2012) and maintain contributions to a public 
good (Milinski, Semmann & Krambeck, 2002), with reputation acting as a reminder 
to encourage other individuals to be generous. Reputation can be used as a regulator 
of behaviour (Casiglia, Lo Coco & Zappulla, 1998), used to determine behaviour by 
enforcing norms (Giardini, Conte & Paolucci, 2013; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). For 
example, an individual may abide to social norms more in the presence of others than 
when alone.  
From an evolutionary perspective, reputation is valuable for cooperation. Individuals 
with a reputation for being cooperative are more likely to be selected as partners in 
the future (Barclay & Willer, 2007; Sylwester & Roberts, 2010). Furthermore, 
Sommerfeld, Krambeck and Milinski (2008) noted that learning about others’ 
reputations could increase cooperation. Several authors suggest that using reputation 
to select cooperative partners increased the human race’s chances of survival, since 
cooperating in groups may have aided human evolution by increasing gains in terms 
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of foraging (Rand & Nowak, 2013; Tomasello et al., 2012; Tomasello & Vaish, 
2013). Some authors (Karlan & McConnell, 2014; Krasnow, Cosmides, Pederson & 
Tooby, 2012) suggest that reputation serves to benefit the self by boosting self-
image, rather than to maintain group harmony and norms. Reputation may benefit the 
self, but ultimately it can benefit the group by encouraging cooperation (Semmann, 
Krambeck & Milinski, 2005). 
Reputation Management. Reputation management is the effort individuals make to 
maintain or obtain a desired reputation: people attempt to control what others think 
by changing their behaviour when others are present to uphold a good reputation 
(Benabou & Tirole, 2005). Reputation management involves weighing up current 
costs that may ultimately lead to a good, beneficial reputation in the future (Knoch, 
Schneider, Schunk, Hohmann & Fehr, 2009).  
The first theorising on reputation management came in the form of Goffman’s (1959) 
self-presentation theory. According to this theory, the world is a stage upon which 
people project an image of the self that they wish others to see. Self-presentation is 
thought to be strategic, occurring in order to enhance and improve the self (Banaji & 
Prentice, 1994). Baumeister (1982) suggested that people are motivated to present a 
desirable image to others, due to a desire to obtain the reward of positive regard from 
others and to fulfil the “ideal self”. Mirroring this, the impression management 
model (Leary and Kowalski, 1990) proposed two components to impression 
management. The first component is that people are motivated to control the 
impression that they present to others (impression motivation). The second is that 
people decide exactly what impression they would like to present and how to create 
it (impression construction). Reputation management is conceptualised in a similar 
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way: reputation is constructed and signalled to others, with the intention of gaining 
rewards from others (Tennie et al., 2010).  
There may be several steps that occur for an individual to manage their reputation 
(Banerjee, 2002a). First, the individual must be aware that they have a reputation 
held by others (even if the exact content of this reputation is unknown) and that this 
reputation is not a fixed entity (Shaw et al., 2013). Second, the individual must be 
concerned about the content of their reputation. Third, there must be motivation to 
either maintain a particular reputation or obtain a preferred reputation. This 
motivation should lead to a change in behaviour, and thus, reputation management. 
The effects of reputation management can be seen as an increase in prosocial 
behaviour. For example, the presence of a pair of eyes increased donations to a 
university coffee collection (Bateson, Nettle & Roberts, 2006). This effect has been 
shown in other experiments testing the impact of such subtle cues on donation 
behaviour (Haley & Fessler, 2005; Oda, Niwa, Honma & Hiraishi, 2011; Powell, 
Roberts & Nettle, 2012), littering rates (Bateson, Callow, Holmes, Redmond Roche 
& Nettle, 2013; Ernest-Jones, Nettle & Bateson, 2011) and crime and anti-social 
behaviour (Nettle, Nott & Bateson, 2012b).  In a meta-analysis of studies testing this 
“eyes effect”, Nettle, Harper, Kidson, Stone, Penton-Voak and Bateson (2012a) came 
to the conclusion that the presence of a pair of eyes will increase the probability of 
donating, but the mean donation does not increase – implying that eyes reduce 
variation in behaviour by increasing conformity to social norms.  
The fact that such subtle cues can enhance prosocial behaviour demonstrates the 
power that the implication of observation can have. This effect has also been found 
in the social facilitation literature, where the knowledge of others performing the 
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same task in another room can cause social facilitation (Dashiell, 1930). In 
experimental tasks where people have the opportunity to demonstrate their 
generosity, researchers have consistently found that people tend to become more 
generous when they believe they are being observed (Andreoni & Petrie, 2004; 
Ariely, Bracha & Meier, 2009; Kurzban, DeScioli & O’Brien, 2007; Lamba & Mace, 
2010; Rege & Telle, 2004). Reputation management appears to be an important 
trigger for such behaviour: what people believe others think of them leads to an 
enhanced awareness of behaviour, which leads to an increase in prosocial behaviour 
(Benabou & Tirole, 2005). Arguably, this could be a subconscious, implicit or 
automatic process, whereby people are not necessarily aware that they are changing 
their behaviour (Izuma, 2012). Yet, there may be occasions where reputation is 
consciously considered. Fehr and Schnieder (2010) found that only explicit 
reputation cues (telling participants of other participant’s actions (i.e. reputation) in a 
trust game) triggered strong reciprocity (accepting a loss in order to punish another 
for their actions), while subtle cues did not. As such, there appears to be a distinction 
between explicit and implicit forms of reputation management.  
Explicit and implicit reputation management. The notions of explicit and implicit 
cognition are a common feature of psychology. From explicit and implicit attitudes 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), to distinguishing between explicit and implicit 
theory of mind (ToM; Frith & Frith, 2007, 2008a, 2011), it is theorised that people 
process the social world both with and without awareness (Bargh, 1984). 
Accordingly, implicit processing can be thought of as automatic and inflexible, while 
explicit processing can be thought of as conscious and flexible (Frith & Frith, 
2008a).  In terms of reputation, a distinction between implicit and explicit reputation 
management has been proposed (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Shaw et al. , 2013). On the 
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one hand, an individual could implicitly manage their reputation without awareness 
that they are doing so. Evidence of this implicit reputation management comes from 
the fact that people can be susceptible to cues of being observed (e.g. Nettle et al., 
2012a) and alter their behaviour in subtle ways. Such automatic reputation 
management would be beneficial in monitoring behaviour without conscious effort. 
The procedure for this automatic or implicit reputation management is unclear: subtle 
cues such as the presence of other people may elicit subconscious awareness of one’s 
reputation, and slight behaviour changes occur that modify one’s actions to be in line 
with normative behaviour. These steps for implicit reputation management echo 
Cottrell et al.’s (1968) evaluation apprehension theory of social facilitation (see 
section 1.2). This theory claims that subtle changes in behaviour (such as socially 
facilitated behaviour) when others are present is driven by a learned expectation that 
others will judge one’s behaviour. Perhaps, then, implicit reputation management 
occurs due to this learned expectancy of others assessing one’s reputation. 
On the other hand, explicit reputation management occurs when an individual is 
consciously aware that their reputation is at stake, and they make a deliberate effort 
to manage their reputation. As previously discussed, this effort has been quantified in 
the self-presentational literature, where individuals actively present themselves in a 
certain light (Banerjee, 2002b). For example, individuals may boast or self-promote 
to successfully obtain employment. However, self-presentation is more strategic than 
explicit reputation management (Shaw et al., 2013). For example, explicit reputation 
management refers to a slightly more subtle process of upholding of a certain 
reputation (e.g. “I want this person to like me, so I will act like a kind person”), 
whereas self-presentation is more deliberate and premeditated (e.g. “I want this 
person to like me so I can get a job, therefore I will tell them all of my qualities”).  
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Although reputation management has been suggested to be the cause of an increase 
in prosocial behaviour when others are present, the question becomes one of exactly 
how individuals manage reputation. There are two main proposed mechanisms, 
theory of mind and social motivation, in addition to other potential mechanisms – 
reciprocity and inhibitory control – whose relationship to reputation management 
have yet to be examined.  
1.3. Which mechanisms underlie reputation management? 
Theory of mind. The description of reputation management itself involves assessing 
what other people might think about the self – a recursive, meta-cognitive ability that 
echoes the concept of theory of mind (ToM). ToM, or mentalising, is the ability to 
think about what others are thinking – to understand that other people have thoughts, 
desires and beliefs, all of which can be different from your own and from the state of 
reality. Premack and Woodruff (1978) were the first to coin the term “theory of 
mind” when questioning whether chimpanzees could possess such an ability. 
Following this seminal work, a wealth of research has attempted to determine the 
developmental origins of ToM in humans (Flavell, 1999). Usually, the hallmark of 
possessing a ToM is the successful passing of a false belief task. False beliefs are 
beliefs that are not true of reality. For example, an individual could believe that they 
have left their bicycle outside when in reality it has been stolen. Wimmer and Perner 
(1983) designed the false belief task on the basis of this general premise. The 
standard procedure for the task (also known as the Sally-Ann task; see Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie & Frith, 1985) is as follows. Participants are told that Maxi has placed his 
chocolate in the cupboard, and then he goes out to play. While he is outside, his 
mother moves the chocolate to a new location. Participants are then asked where 
Maxi will look for his chocolate on his return. To pass this task, participants must 
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correctly infer that Maxi will look in the location he last left the chocolate, where he 
(falsely) believes it to be. Success on this task reflects the ability to think about 
another’s thoughts – or first-order ToM – and children over four reliably begin to 
pass this task (Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001).  
Second-order ToM, the recursive ability to think about what others are thinking 
about others’ thoughts, is decidedly more complex. For example, Perner and 
Wimmer (1985) tested children’s understanding of “John thinks that Mary thinks 
that...” in their Ice Cream Story task, where two characters have independently been 
informed of an ice cream van moving location – although John does not know that 
Mary also knows the van has moved. Children are asked where John thinks Mary 
will go to get ice cream. It is not until around 6 to 7 years of age that children 
correctly ascertain that John would believe Mary would go to the old location. 
Happé’s (1994) Strange Stories task is frequently used to measure second-order 
ToM, with stories considering various aspects of ToM such as double bluffs, irony 
and sarcasm. Recent research (Grueneisen, Wyman & Tomasello, in press) has found 
that 6-year-olds can reason using second-order ToM to align and coordinate with 
peers to pursue a shared goal. Understanding others’ minds is thus important for 
everyday social interaction. 
Apperly (2012) argues that ToM has previously been considered theoretically in 
three ways:  as a conceptual problem, as a set of cognitive processes, or as social 
motivation. As a conceptual problem, this assumes that individuals either have or do 
not have the concept of other minds.  However, if ToM was purely conceptual, it 
would be difficult to explain why children pass some ToM tasks but not others. As 
such, ToM may be more than just a concept. Executive processes, such as inhibition, 
may form part of ToM being a set of cognitive processes – with ToM dependent in 
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part on such executive functions. Finally, individual differences in social competence 
or motivation are thought by Apperly (2012) to play an important role in social 
ability. For example, typical children rated as the most socially competent by their 
teachers were also more successful on false belief tasks (Razza & Blair, 2009). 
Apperly (2012; Samson & Apperly, 2010) argues that ToM is not just a concept – it 
is something cognitive that we use and reason with, and that some may be more 
motivated to use than others.  
Theorising about what others are thinking is a difficult skill – involving guesswork as 
to what is going on inside another person’s mind, and even adults struggle to 
correctly implement this skill at all times (Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003; Samson & 
Apperly, 2010). Adults and children can also be susceptible to biases, such as an 
egocentric tendency to take into account their own perspective during false belief 
tasks (Birch & Bloom, 2007, 2004). Further, the use of false belief as a measure of 
ToM has perhaps over-dominated the field. Indeed, Apperly (2012) suggested that 
researchers have only been studying ToM with a very narrow range of tasks, which 
may limit what is known about ToM. Bloom and German (2000) also identified 
several problems with the classic false belief task. First, in order to pass the false 
belief task, other skills, such as attention, memory and language, are required. For 
example, an individual needs to hold several representations in mind, and be able to 
inhibit answering based on their own knowledge. Recent evidence has shown that 
altering the task demands, such as by allowing the child to control a doll who 
possesses the false belief, can enable 3-year-olds to successfully pass false belief 
tasks (Rubio-Fernandez & Guerts, 2013). Second, Bloom and German (2000) argue 
that there is more to ToM than just false beliefs. For example, people can use 
another’s eye gaze to infer objects of their attention and share interest with them 
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(Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007). This ability does not require the individual to 
think about beliefs that are false. Finally, social decision making does not just 
involve ToM – it also requires empathy and perceptual processes (Frith & Singer, 
2008; Tager-Flusberg, 2007), to guide the choices people make in their social lives.  
Theoretical accounts of ToM have advanced such that there is now a general 
acceptance that ToM can either be explicit or implicit (Frith & Frith, 2008a; 
Ruffman, 2014) and the underlying neural networks support this proposition 
(Adolphs, 2009; Van Overwalle & Vandekerckhove, 2013).  Implicit ToM is 
unconscious, automatic, and inflexible, demonstrated by the fact that 3-year-old 
children, who do not verbally pass the false belief task, look at the correct location 
(Clements & Perner, 1994). There is some evidence to suggest that even 7-month-old 
infants can automatically compute the beliefs of an agent (Kovacs, Teglas, & 
Endress, 2010; see Onishi & Baillargeon (2005) for evidence at 15 months and 
Heyes (2014) for alternative explanations). Explicit ToM is the conscious, effortful, 
flexible means of thinking about another’s thoughts, for example, expressing verbal 
understanding of false beliefs (Frith & Frith, 2008a). It is not until children are 4 
years old that they consciously report explicit verbal understanding that others’ 
beliefs can be different to the current state of reality (Wellman et al., 2001).  
As previously mentioned, the definition of reputation management seems to be 
imbued with the ability to think about and track other’s thoughts (Frith & Frith, 
2008a). ToM is often thought of as a hallmark of social skills – someone with great 
skill in theorising about others’ minds can predict others’ behaviour (Astington, 
1994), manipulate others (Sodian, Taylor, Harris & Perner, 1991) and achieve 
successful social relationships (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). Young children with 
better ToM skills have been noted to share more than those with poorer ToM skills 
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(Wu & Su, 2014). Indeed, Byom and Mutlu (2013) claim that social success is 
related to ToM, through enabling the sharing of knowledge and the perception of 
others’ perspectives. 
It would appear that ToM may be a necessary skill for managing a good reputation 
(Amodio & Frith, 2006). First, being able to think about another’s thoughts is likely 
to cause reflection on how one might look in the eyes of that person. Second, one can 
use ToM to manipulate and manage what another person thinks, with prosocial 
behaviour likely to produce a reputation for being a good person (Benabou & Tirole, 
2005). There is some evidence of links between ToM and reputation management. 
Banerjee and Yuill (1999) note that in children, better ability to predict self-
presentational facial displays (for example, a person smiling rather than frowning 
when they receive a present they do not like) was correlated with improved 
performance on second-order ToM tasks. There may also be some relationship 
between ToM and the ability to develop successful friendships (Petrina, Carter & 
Stephenson, 2014).  As such, those with better ToM skills may be better at managing 
their reputation.  
Social motivation. There is arguably more to reputation management than just the 
ability to think about others’ thoughts, and another potential mechanism for 
reputation management is social motivation. Those who are more socially motivated 
may be more likely to manage their reputation due to a greater desire to be viewed 
positively by other people. I will now consider several facets of social reward, 
including the motivation for social rewards, alongside evidence to suggest that social 
motivation is necessary to produce reputation management.  
31 
 
There are three aspects of social reward: learning, affect and motivation, with each 
component potentially mediated by different parts of the brain (Berridge & 
Robinson, 2003). The first component, learning, is crucial. People learn what 
happens when certain stimuli are chosen and this may determine whether this 
stimulus is selected again in the future. Second, the stimulus itself can produce 
pleasurable and affective feelings. Finally, the reward has to be wanted or desired so 
that the individual is motivated to take actions to obtain the reward (Berridge & 
Robinson, 2003).  
In the brain, learning (in particular stimulus-response learning) is thought to activate 
several neural structures including the amygdala, ventral striatum and prefrontal 
cortex (PFC; Cardinal, Parkinson, Hall & Everitt, 2002). The affective component is 
assumed to relate to activity in the ventromedial PFC (Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011), 
and motivation with the ventral striatum, amygdala and nucleus accumbens (Berridge 
& Robinson, 2003; Kohls, Chevallier, Troiani & Schultz, 2012), although a 
rewarding stimulus is likely to activate many different brain areas at the same time 
(Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008). Dopamine, and the corresponding dopamine 
neurons, appears to be important in signalling reward (Schultz, 1998). Indeed, many 
of the aforementioned areas of the brain could be conceptualised as the mesolimbic 
dopamine projection system (Dichter, Damiano & Allen, 2012a).  
As previously mentioned, maintaining a good reputation is something that many 
people work tirelessly for. Reputation has perhaps become even more salient given 
the age of the internet, where a company or product’s reputation can be stated with 
rating systems or reviews, and such indicators (although not so subtle) can damage a 
company’s reputation (Resnick et al., 2006; Tennie et al., 2010). Kohls et al. (2012) 
have suggested that the affective and motivational components of reputation are 
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crucial for people to strive towards reputation management. Indeed, Falk, Way and 
Jasinska (2012) suggest that social influence shares its neurological underpinnings 
with sensitivity to reward. For example, Izuma, Saito, and Sadato (2010) measured 
brain activity using fMRI while participants completed a donating to charity task 
when alone and when observed. They found that the ventral striatum was activated 
during observation, in addition to the medial PFC, an area they suggested to be used 
for representing reputation. Furthermore, Phan, Sripada, Angstadt and McCabe 
(2010) found that in a trust game, people who cooperated with partners with a 
reputation for reciprocation showed activity of the ventral striatum, but not when 
cooperating with partners who had a reputation for not reciprocating. Therefore, not 
only is it rewarding to have a good reputation for oneself, it also seems rewarding to 
interact with others who have a good reputation.  
A consistent formulation of theories of self-presentation (section 1.2.1) is that people 
are motivated and consequently rewarded by working towards a particular image 
(Baumeister, 1982; Goffman, 1959; Leary & Kowalski, 1990). A good reputation 
rewards the self by ensuring that people are chosen as cooperative partners in the 
future (Sylwester & Roberts, 2010). From the presented evidence, it could be 
suggested that social motivation is necessary for the occurrence of reputation 
management – if people did not find reputation rewarding, then one might assume 
that they would not make great efforts to manage their reputation. Clearly, the 
motivational aspects of reputation need to be considered when conceptualising 
reputation management.   
Reciprocity. A key aspect of social behaviour is that it is often reciprocal. Although 
reciprocity can have different facets (see below), reciprocity can broadly be defined 
as a response to others actions or intentions (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). Reciprocity 
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is an important concept that links to reputation, first, since having a reputation for 
being a reciprocal individual could lead to cooperation from others (Phan et al., 
2010), and second, since reciprocity is thought to be an internalised norm, many 
individuals see the returning of favours as a social rule (Burger, Sanchez, Imberi, & 
Grande, 2009). Therefore, others’ reputations can be judged based on reciprocal 
behaviour (Phan et al., 2010).  
Two types of reciprocity are of particular importance: direct and indirect reciprocity. 
Direct reciprocity involves direct experience with another person, whereby one can 
respond to another’s behaviour through reward, punishment or reciprocation (Falk & 
Fischbacher, 2006). In this way, one can directly learn about others’ reputations, and 
vice versa. Indirect reciprocity occurs when behaviour toward another person is 
rewarded or punished by a third party: indirect reciprocity can therefore be seen as a 
means of transmitting reputational information (Engelmann & Fischbacher, 2009). 
Here, one can learn about the reputations of others through others, or one’s own 
reputation can be spread to others. Direct and indirect reciprocity can interact 
together to aid an individual’s decisions on how to act toward another person 
(Molleman, van den Broek, & Egas, 2013).  
Also, fairness decisions may come into play when considering whether one should 
reciprocate or not. Fairness is an other-regarding behaviour, and appears around 5 
years of age and continues to increase throughout development (Overgaaw, Güroglu 
& Crone, 2012). For example, 5-year-olds systematically punish a mean, unfair 
puppet even at a cost to self, by spending a coin to take five coins from the mean 
puppet (Robbins & Rochat, 2011). Research suggests that while young children 
report that people should be fair and equal in resource distribution, they themselves 
are not fair in practice (Blake, McAuliffe & Warneken, in press; Sheskin, Bloom & 
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Wynn, 2014; Smith, Blake, & Harris, 2013). Furthermore, Sheskin et al. (2014) 
noted that children under the age of 7 tended to choose a cost to another child so that 
they could receive more themselves, rather than choosing an equal option.  Fehr, 
Bernhard and Rockenbach (2008) observed a shift from children being egocentric to 
more considerate of others’ perspectives between 7 and 8 years. These findings 
suggest that it is not until children are older that they act reciprocally and fairly. In 
adulthood, acting fairly can signal reputation by demonstrating that the individual is 
fair and they expect reciprocity as a result of this fairness (Hoffman, McCabe & 
Smith, 2008). 
Humans are thought to frequently utilise reciprocal principles to enforce cooperative 
behaviour (West, El Mouden, & Gardner, 2011). Economic games are games used in 
psychology to test social decision-making, since people tend to behave in ways that 
indicate that they have social preferences, rather than behaving to receive the most 
gain for the self (Gummerum, Hanoch & Keller, 2008). For example, reciprocal 
behaviour – and expectations of reciprocity from others – is thought to affect the fact 
that humans do not act in an economically rational manner in economic games 
(Kahneman, 2003), instead acting as though they follow a norm of reciprocity 
(Camerer & Fehr, 2002). Thus reciprocity could be thought of as a reputational 
signal, to indicate whether it would be worth cooperating with a certain individual 
(Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1998). A better understanding and expectation of 
reciprocity may therefore underlie reputation management, by guiding decisions 
concerning whether one should manage their reputation or not (Molleman et al., 
2013). However, the relationship between reputation management and reciprocity 
has yet to be examined.  
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Inhibitory control. Being able to manage one’s reputation could also require self-
control in order to inhibit behaviours that could be detrimental to one’s reputation. 
Inhibition is one of several executive functions, which also includes working 
memory, planning, and shifting between tasks (Huizinga, Dolan, & van der Molen, 
2006). These cognitive processes are thought to underlie goal-directed thought and 
behaviour (Best & Miller, 2010) and help people to think flexibly (Prencipe, Kesek, 
Cohen, Lamm, Lewis & Zelazo, 2011). Executive functions develop and mature 
throughout childhood and adolescence (Blakemore & Mills, 2014). Indeed, Riggs, 
Jahromi, Razza, Dillworth-Bart, and Mueller (2006) suggest that executive functions 
contribute to social-emotional competence in children. For example, children who 
are better at delaying gratification by resisting the temptation of an immediate reward 
in exchange for a later, larger reward, perform better academically and are less 
stressed in later life (Shoda, Mischel, & Peake, 1990). 
This thesis will specifically consider inhibition skills. These skills can be found early 
in childhood, when children manage to delay gratification for a reward from around 
2 years, and more complex inhibition skills, such as inhibiting a prepotent response, 
continue to develop from 3 years of age (Garon, Bryson & Smith, 2008). Inhibition 
skills are useful for controlling oneself: while it appears young children can be 
egotistical, this is not thought to be caused by a lack of understanding of social 
norms but, rather, a failure in the ability to control themselves when tempted by 
selfish behaviour (Steinbeis, Bernhardt & Singer, 2012). Being able to control selfish 
impulses could be an important skill for managing reputation, so that individuals 
present a desired image. Additionally, executive functions impact on the decisions 
we make (Prencipe et al., 2011), and could therefore impact upon the decisions made 
related to reputation management. However, the proposed relationship between 
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inhibitory control and reputation management has yet to be examined 
experimentally.  
Relationships between suggested mechanisms. The suggested mechanisms are not 
mutually exclusive, and likely impact one another. As mentioned above, for example, 
ToM may also require social motivation to actually be used (Apperly, 2012). Overlap 
between ToM and executive functions has also received considerable research 
attention, given the suggestion that these two mechanisms are strongly related 
(Carlson & Moses, 2001), with executive functions thought to underpin ToM ability 
(Pellicano, 2007). For example, recent research suggests that executive function is 
used for coordinating own and others’ perspectives (Fizke, Barthel, Peters & 
Rakoczy, 2014). Inhibitory control has also been suggested to relate to fairness 
decisions, such that children are able to utilise their inhibition skills with age, 
enabling them to act fairly rather than selfishly (Steinbeis et al., 2012). Reciprocity 
and ToM are also thought to have links (Castelli et al., 2010). For example, Fett et al. 
(2014) found that adolescents with better perspective taking skills were more 
cooperative, yet if they were treated unfairly, they dramatically reduced their 
reciprocal behaviour. These suggested relationships should be considered as part of a 
complex underpinning of reputation management.     
1.4. How does reputation develop?  
Considering reputation and social influence more broadly within a developmental 
context might help to determine why people are affected by the presence of others: 
what, developmentally, leads individuals to care about what others think of them? 
There are two possible competing explanations of how reputation develops, which 
may help to answer this question. First, there is the contention that reputation is an 
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intrinsic drive from a young age. Rochat (2009) theorises that it is through fearing 
what others think of us that we come to define the self – that people are conscious of 
the self precisely because they are conscious of what others think. Accordingly, a 
fear of social rejection develops which drives people to act in certain ways, such as 
conforming. Rochat, Broesch and Jayne (2012) found that when they created a norm 
of having a sticker on one’s forehead (by surreptitiously putting stickers on the 
child’s mother and the experimenter) 2-year-old children were more reluctant to 
remove the sticker on their own head when they saw their reflection in a mirror. 
Children who did not witness this norm did not exhibit this behaviour. The authors 
suggest that this shows that even children as young as 2 years old attempt to adjust to 
perceived norms and that they do this due to an intrinsic drive to fit in with others.  
Proponents of the Terror Management Theory (Pyszczynski, Greenberg & Solomon, 
1997) also propose this inherent fear and subsequent reputation management.  Thus, 
from a young age there is a need to manage reputation in front of others in order to 
avoid rejection and satisfy the need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Such 
theorising may fit with social motivation being the primary mechanism behind 
reputation management. From a young age, being viewed positively by others is 
something children find rewarding and strive towards, and subsequently develop the 
skills necessary to achieve a good reputation.  
Other theorists, however, argue against the idea of an intrinsic drive to manage 
reputation. Instead, reputation management is proposed to develop later in childhood 
as children learn the norms of their social group and culture (Hepach, Vaish & 
Tomasello, 2012). Subsequently, children learn what is socially acceptable (or not) in 
order to know that they should be managing their reputation in accordance with such 
norms. This theory may necessitate ToM. Banerjee’s (2002a) work on self-
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presentation in childhood suggests that ToM abilities are correlated with children’s 
understanding of self-presentational behaviours. Banerjee (2002a, 2002b), however, 
highlights a need for both ToM abilities and motivation – children need to be able to 
represent what others think of them and be motivated to manage this. Following this, 
it may be the case that representational ability precedes the motivation to manage 
reputation.  
Considering some of the preceding developmental steps before reputation 
management first occurs may be useful for conceptualising its development. Once 
children become self-aware, around the age of 2 (Amsterdam, 1972), they soon 
demonstrate self-conscious emotions, such as embarrassment and pride (Lewis, 
Sullivan, Stanger & Weiss, 1989). Such emotions indicate that the child is aware that 
the self is under scrutiny from others (Lewis, 1991) and an audience appears to be an 
important factor in the display of embarrassment and pride (Seidner, Stipek & 
Feshbach, 1988), indicating a possible rudimentary awareness of reputation. 
Furthermore, from 5 years of age children start to adopt behaviours which may be 
designed to influence others, including ingratiating behaviours like flattery (Fu & 
Lee, 2007). Feasibly, these behaviours could form part of the development of 
reputation management.  
As mentioned previously, reputation management often manifests itself in prosocial 
acts, such that individuals might act prosocially to improve their reputation. Children 
appear to be prosocial from a very young age, around 8 months old (Hay, 1994). For 
example, 8-month-old children will altruistically help an experimenter to achieve a 
goal (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). Such evidence is thought to point towards an 
early disposition towards prosociality. Yet, it is unclear what drives such behaviour: 
whether young children are prosocial for the sake of helping others or to ultimately 
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gain something for the self. Infants may start life being naturally prosocial, but at 
some point in development prosocial behaviour may become selective and 
potentially underlain with ulterior motives – such as to obtain a good reputation 
(Sebastian-Enesco, Hernandez-Lloreda & Colmenares, 2013).  
Young children may also have knowledge of others’ reputations: 3-year-old children 
choose partners who are helpful and cooperative over those who are not (Dunfield, 
Kuhlmeier, & Murphy, 2013; Melis, Altrichter & Tomasello, 2013; Warneken, 
Lohse, Melis & Tomasello, 2011) and 4-year-olds trust accurate informants over 
ignorant speakers (Koenig & Harris, 2005), suggesting that preschoolers may be able 
to utilise reputational information for partner choice. Meristo and Surian (2013) used 
a violation of expectation paradigm with 10-month-old children and found that 
infants looked longer when a character helped another character who they had just 
witnessed being unfair, as the infants expected the character to be punished for being 
unfair, not to be helped. Further, Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom & Mahajan (2011; see also 
Kenward & Dahl, 2011) discovered that 8-month-old infants preferred a puppet who 
punished an antisocial puppet. However, these studies do not show evidence of an 
active process of reputation management – rather, that young children may have an 
awareness of reputation before managing their reputation.  
Recent evidence directly testing reputation management in children suggests that 
reputation management can occur from 5 years of age. Leimgruber et al. (2012) 
found that 5-year-old children could target their generosity dependent on the 
knowledge of the child they were sharing with. In their study, children could receive 
or send stickers to another child. Even if the receiver could observe the sender 
allocating stickers, the sender could place the stickers in opaque or transparent 
containers. When the containers were opaque – so only the sender would know how 
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many stickers were inside – 5-year-old children acting as senders were significantly 
less generous than if the containers were transparent. Leimgruber et al. (2012) 
claimed that 5-years-olds are sensitive to reputational cues such as the transparency 
of their actions, and are motivated not by an intrinsic drive to be prosocial but an 
extrinsic need to appear prosocial. They suggest that this tendency occurs before any 
explicit understanding of reputation. 
Further evidence supports the idea of reputation management from 5 years of age. In 
a game where children were given the opportunity to share or to steal another child’s 
stickers to complete a picture, Engelmann et al. (2012) found that more sharing and 
less stealing occurred when children were observed by a peer. Yet children do not 
require a peer to be present in order to manage reputation. Piazza, Bering and Ingram 
(2011) found that children aged 5 to 9 years cheated less when they believed an 
invisible person was observing them. Engelmann et al. (2012) argue that the 
development of the ability to manage reputation is a relatively slow process, which 
develops as children have more peer experiences, leading to older children and 
adolescents developing a particular concern for reputation as group belonging 
becomes of upmost importance.  
Further, 6-year-old children can operate a “veil of fairness” (Shaw, Montinari, 
Piovesan, Olson, Gino & Norton, 2014). In Shaw et al.’s (2014) study, children could 
decide if they wanted to choose a coin toss to assign good or bad prizes for 
themselves and for another child, or they could choose the prize they wanted without 
implementing the coin toss. Most children from the age of 9 performed the coin toss 
over taking a prize immediately for themselves. However, children were allowed to 
check the result of their coin toss alone. For those who had chosen the coin toss, 
more children – including 6-year-olds – than would be expected by chance reported 
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that they had won the toss and thus won the good prize. It seems that even at this age, 
children will attempt to project an image of being a fair individual.  
Shaw et al. (2013) suggest that there are two potential explanations as to why people 
manage reputation – first, that they want to avoid being excluded for being 
ungenerous, and second, to seek out opportunities to promote social status. Even at a 
relatively young age, children form social groups and are sensitive to their in-group 
(Schmidt, Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2012), demonstrating the need to belong to part of 
a group: often suggested as an intrinsic human motivation (Baumeister & Leary, 
1995). Being part of a group is thought to have positive outcomes for children’s 
learning – often, they work better in a group that they identify with (Master & 
Walton, 2013). Appreciating how and why typical children are affected by other 
people, as this thesis intends to examine, is vital for understanding a child’s 
behaviour within social contexts.  
Our understanding of reputation management could also be enhanced by considering 
a population of individuals who have difficulties with social communication, namely, 
individuals with autism.  
1.5. Autism 
Those with autism, a neurodevelopmental condition, form a wide spectrum of 
heterogeneous individuals making up around 1% of the UK population (Baird et al., 
2006). Autistic individuals have marked social and communicative difficulties which 
affect everyday life, as well as restricted and repetitive interests (APA, 2013). Thus, 
individuals with autism have a number of social and non-social difficulties. These 
social difficulties include problems with making friends (Petrina et al., 2014) and 
understanding what others are thinking (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). Non-social 
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difficulties include sensory sensitivities (Rogers & Ozonoff, 2005) and problems 
with some motor skills (Provost, Lopez & Heimerl, 2007). Autism was defined by 
Kanner (1943), who was the first to quantify the children he had come across in his 
work as physician. He noted their insistence on sameness and an “autistic aloneness” 
preventing them from forming social relationships, but some had preserved abilities 
such as excellent memory (Frith, 2003). Around the same time as Kanner (1943), 
Hans Asperger (1944) described a similar group of individuals, later referred to as 
those with Asperger’s syndrome. The primary difference between autism and 
Asperger’s is that in Asperger’s language is not delayed. However, the current 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders - V (DSM-5; APA, 2013) 
does not separate a diagnosis of Asperger’s syndrome from autism, instead 
collapsing the diagnosis category into one of “Autism Spectrum Disorder”, although 
those who already have a diagnosis of Asperger’s can retain this diagnosis. Within 
the autism spectrum, the level of cognitive functioning ranges widely as well as the 
degree of adaptation, with some individuals who may appear to be relatively well 
adapted to everyday life to those who will never live independently.  
There is also vast heterogeneity in the degree of social difficulties in autism, thus 
constituting the “autism spectrum” (Bowler, 2007). Wing and Gould (1979) were the 
first to acknowledge that autism could consist of a spectrum of individuals, following 
their epidemiological survey of severely autistic children. They conceptualised three 
different types of autistic children: those who were odd, aloof, or passive. The aloof 
child appears to be in their own world, avoiding social contact with others. The odd 
child likes other people, but to the point of being inappropriate in his or her 
approaches. Finally, the passive child can seem receptive to social contact but does 
not necessarily like it, and can be upset by changes in routine. In clinical terms, the 
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diagnostic criteria for autism state that the individual may have difficulties with 
developing and maintaining appropriate peer relationships and show a lack of social 
and emotional reciprocity (APA, 2013). Within diagnostic instruments, such as the 
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000), clinicians look 
for certain behaviours such as reduced reciprocal communication, unusual eye 
contact, and reduced social engagement, in order to come to a diagnosis of autism. 
Autism, then, is often viewed as a condition of altered social functioning.  
Much of the previous discussion has focussed on autism as a condition in childhood, 
yet autism extends throughout life. Cognitively-able adolescents and adults with 
autism often face a growing awareness of their own social difficulties (Attwood, 
2000), however, many autistic adolescents report that they do have friends 
(Bauminger et al., 2008) and want friends (Calder, Hill, & Pellicano, 2013; Locke, 
Ishijima, Kasari, & London, 2010), but the quality of their friendships can be 
different compared to that of typical individuals, and some may have desired 
friendships but not actual ones (Bauminger & Kasari, 2000). This friendship research 
suggests that not all individuals with autism are devoid or completely avoidant of 
social contact (Sigman & Ruskin, 1999; Daniel & Billingsley, 2010). This apparent – 
although potentially limited – social ability may suggest that autistic individuals 
could be concerned about their reputation. I now review the aforementioned 
mechanisms of reputation management – theory of mind, social motivation, 
reciprocity and inhibitory control – how they manifest themselves in autism, and the 
predictions that they make in terms of reputation management in this population.  
1.5.1. The mechanisms of reputation management in autism 
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Theory of mind. Problems with understanding other minds has been one of the most 
prominent explanations of the social difficulties in autism since Baron-Cohen et al.’s 
(1985) study testing whether children with autism possess a theory of other minds. 
Here, they used the Sally-Anne task (see section 1.3. for description), a modification 
of the original Maxi task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), to test whether children with 
autism, alongside a group of children with Down’s syndrome of similar cognitive 
ability and a group of younger typically developing children, could pass the task. 
Results showed that only children with autism had difficulty with understanding false 
beliefs, and Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) claimed that those with autism could not think 
about others’ minds. Since Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1985) experiment, the ToM 
hypothesis has heavily influenced subsequent research. Although the theory can go 
some way to explaining the social difficulties in autism, it should be noted that it 
cannot easily explain other difficulties such as restricted and repetitive interests 
(Tager-Flusberg, Joseph & Folstein, 2001). Nonetheless, the theory suggests that 
individuals with autism do not have a theory of other minds, and as such, purportedly 
cannot accurately predict the behaviour of others (Yoshida, Dziobek, Kliemann, 
Heekerman, Friston & Dolan, 2010), deceive others (Sodian & Frith, 1992), or apply 
mental states to animate objects (Klin, 2000). Adults with autism, who may pass the 
relatively simple first-order ToM false belief tasks, often fail tests of second-order 
ToM, such as the Strange Stories task (Happé, 1994; White, Hill, Happé & Frith, 
2009a), although many can pass these second-order tasks (Bowler, 1992). However, 
successful ToM task performance is likely underpinned by different information 
processing to that used by typical individuals (Begeer, Malle,  Nieuwland & Keysar, 
2010; Brent, Rios, Happé & Charman, 2004; Kaland, Callesen, Mølle-Nielsen, 
Mortensen & Smith, 2008; Lind & Bowler, 2009). Furthermore, success on false-
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belief tasks depends on task conditions: structuring the false belief task as 
competitive increases pass rates in children with autism compared to the traditional 
false belief task (Peterson, Slaughter, Peterson, & Premack, 2013). In evaluating the 
ToM hypothesis Tager-Flusberg (2007) noted several flaws. First, some children 
with autism do pass ToM tasks, despite continued difficulties in everyday social 
cognition. Second, for typical children, many developments in social communication 
occur before they pass ToM tasks. Third, a number of emotional, perceptual and 
cognitive processes may underlie ToM ability, thus the difficulty may not lie with 
ToM per se but rather the underlying processes.  
Recent evidence has supported the proposition that autistic individuals specifically 
have problems with implicit but not explicit ToM (Callenmark, Kjellin, Rönnqvist & 
Bölte, 2014; Dufour et al., 2013; Frith, 2004; Schuwerk, Vuori & Sodian, 2014; 
Senju, Southgate, White & Frith, 2009). In other words, autistic individuals may be 
able to pass some tests of ToM, perhaps through better language skills, compensatory 
strategies or experience (Happé, 1995a), but do not automatically consider other 
minds. Evidence for this suggestion has been demonstrated in studies showing that 
autistic adults pass traditional tests of ToM, but do not show anticipatory gaze 
towards the false belief location, unlike typical adults and 3-year-olds (Senju et al., 
2009; Ruffman, Garnham & Rideout, 2001). Additionally, Dufour et al. (2013) found 
no differences in the pattern of brain activation between typical and autistic adults 
during a (explicit) false belief task. Missing this automatic propensity may explain 
why autistic individuals’ social difficulties can persevere despite the ability to “work 
out” what others might be thinking (Frith & Frith, 2008a). In everyday life, autistic 
individuals may have problems detecting the cues that others display concerning 
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their mental states, for example, following others’ gaze to engage in joint attention 
(Mundy, Sigman & Kasari, 1990) and the pragmatics of language (Happé, 1995b).  
In terms of reputation management, if individuals with autism have fundamental 
problems with ToM, then they would be unable to consider what another person 
thought of them. Alternatively, if individuals with autism only have problems with 
implicit ToM, this may lead to the suggestion that they do not automatically manage 
their reputation, but may explicitly be able to do so. Adopting the distinction between 
explicit and implicit reputation management could shed light on autistic individuals’ 
ability to manage reputation.  
Social motivation. There has been a recent surge of research into social reward in 
autism (see Dichter et al., 2012a, for a review). This surge may be due to current 
uncertainty as to whether autistics have domain-general or domain-specific (i.e., 
social) reward processing difficulties. It should be noted that reward processing 
atypicalities are not specific to autism, and can be found in other conditions such as 
schizophrenia, obsessive compulsive disorders, and Williams syndrome (Dichter et 
al., 2012a). One of the most widely-used methods to test whether individuals with 
autism have reward processing atypicalities is to consider the underlying brain 
activity in comparison to typical individuals. Such an approach has, however, 
resulted in mixed results. 
If autistic individuals have pervasive reward processing atypicalities, generalised 
difficulties in processing reward regardless of the type of reward would be expected. 
It is possible that autistic individuals may find alternative objects rewarding, 
especially objects that form part of a restricted or repetitive interest. This suggestion 
is exactly what Dichter, Felder, Green, Rittenberg, Sasson and Bodfish (2012c) 
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found using fMRI: autistic individuals showed diminished brain activation in 
response to monetary rewards, but not in response to objects that formed part of their 
special interests, like trains or tractors. Dichter, Richey, Rittenberg, Sabatino and 
Bodfish (2012b) also presented evidence for altered generalised reward processing: 
autistic adults showed both hypo- and hyperactivation to monetary rewards, and 
hyperactivation in the amygdala to social rewards. This hyperactivation was 
correlated with the severity of social impairments in autism. Further support for a 
generalised difficulty was found by Kohls et al. (2012), who showed hypoactivation 
of the amygdala and anterior cingulated cortex in response to both monetary and 
social rewards (smiling faces) during a go/no-go task (measuring inhibition) with 
children with autism.   
Other findings, however, lean more toward a social-specific deficit. Scott-Van 
Zeeland, Dapretto, Ghahremani, Poldrack, and Bookheimer (2010), despite finding 
some diminished neural response to monetary rewards, found a greater diminished 
response to social rewards and additional difficulties during social learning in 
individuals with autism. Lin, Adolphs and Rangel (2012) also reported a specific 
problem with social reward learning in autism. They presented participants with slot 
machines, where choosing one would always lead to a negative outcome (monetary 
loss or an angry face), while the other would lead to a positive outcome (monetary 
gain or a happy face). They found that it took autistic adults longer to learn about 
avoiding the social negative slot machine. Additionally, McPartland et al. (2012) 
found no difference between typical and autistic children in their feedback-related 
negativity responses to monetary reward, which is observed in the brain after 
receiving feedback. Most studies, however, have used money as a non-social reward, 
but as Cascio et al. (2012) noted, many autistic individuals do not manage their own 
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money and may have different symbolic value toward money compared to typical 
individuals. Cascio et al. (2012) found that children with autism who were presented 
with pictures of palatable food following 4 hours of fasting showed an increased 
BOLD response during fMRI similar to typical children. They suggest that this 
finding supports the notion of a social-specific deficit, although they made no direct 
comparison between food and social rewards, and food may elicit a physiological 
response of a different quality to other types of reward.  
In terms of social motivation, there is currently greater evidence to suggest that 
autistic individuals have problems with motivational than affective aspects of reward 
processing, however, this research is still in its infancy (see Kohls et al., 2012, for a 
review). Nonetheless, the ventral striatum is thought to be linked to motivation 
(Kohls et al., 2012), and many studies have consistently found diminished ventral 
striatum activation in autism (Dichter et al., 2012b; Dichter et al., 2012c; Scott-Van 
Zeeland et al., 2010; Schmitz, Rubia, van Amelsvoort, Daly, Smith & Murphy, 2008; 
Kohls et al., 2011), but it remains unclear whether these responses are social-
specific. Objects which form part of a special interest could be more motivating than 
social stimuli – for example, Grelotti et al. (2005) discovered that a boy with autism 
who had a special interest in the cartoon Digimon showed stronger amygdala and 
fusiform gyrus activation to Digimon characters than to human faces. In terms of 
affect, research findings are inconsistent (Kohls et al., 2012).  
The social motivation hypothesis suggests that social stimuli are not rewarding to 
individuals with autism. Dawson and colleagues (2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2008, 2012) 
suggested that in autism, evidence of less spontaneous orientation towards social 
stimuli in early life (Dawson et al., 2004; Pierce, Conant, Hazin, Stoner & Desmond, 
2011) leads to the social cognitive difficulties found in autism in later life. Thus, less 
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sensitivity and experience with social stimuli early on in development impacts upon 
the emergence of social cognition (Dawson, Bernier & Ring, 2012). This idea is 
thought to link to reward processing, such that infants with autism may not find 
social stimuli rewarding and orient less towards such stimuli, which ultimately leads 
to fewer social learning opportunities (Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin & 
Schultz, 2012a).  Chevallier et al. (2012a) construct this as diminished social 
motivation in autism.  
Direct evidence for diminished social motivation is, however, relatively limited. 
Chevallier, Molesworth and Happé (2012b) used a flattery paradigm where children 
had the opportunity to flatter the artist of a drawing. Only typical children 
significantly increased their rating of the drawing when the artist was present 
compared to the rating they had given when the artist was not present. Chevallier et 
al. (2012b) deduced that since their measure of social motivation (a questionnaire 
measuring social anhedonia – that is, lack of social pleasure) was correlated with the 
amount of flattery all children showed, that children with autism did not manage 
their reputation due to diminished social motivation (see section 5.4. for further 
discussion of this experiment). 
However, recent research has found that children with autism may find social stimuli 
just as rewarding as typical children (Ewing, Pellicano & Rhodes, 2013). Ewing et al. 
(2013) discovered that autistic children expended as much effort (using an effortful 
key press) to view faces, and were sensitive to the attractiveness of faces, similar to 
typical children. Additionally, Deckers, Roelofs, Muris and Rinck (2014) found that 
although autistic children explicitly reported a lower desire for social interaction, 
they implicitly indicated a social desire that was similar to, and perhaps stronger 
than, typical children. In their study, children could push or pull a face away or 
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towards them, and it is thought that those with a stronger social desire are quicker to 
pull faces towards them. Deckers et al. (2014) claim that this implicit desire, but 
reduced explicit social desire, may be a result of real-life social interactions being too 
complex and overwhelming for children with autism.   
Although the picture of reward processing in autism is clearly complicated and 
currently unresolved, if autistic individuals do find social stimuli less rewarding, this 
would lead to the assumption that they may not find reputation rewarding. Further, if 
during development they had never found reputation rewarding, they may not be 
motivated to manage it in later life.  
Reciprocity. Reduced social reciprocity is a diagnostic feature of autism (APA, 
2013), with autistic individuals showing fewer reciprocal responses in conversation 
and social behaviour. Difficulties in understanding reciprocal principles has been 
suggested as a key challenge for enabling autistic individuals to maintain friendships 
(Carrington, Templeton & Papinczak, 2003b). Reciprocity is a norm followed by 
typical individuals (Camerer & Fehr, 2002), and autistic individuals are thought to 
stick rigidly to rule following (Corbett, Constantine, Hendren, Rocke, & Ozonoff, 
2009; Russo, Flanagan, Iarocci, Berringer, Zelazo & Burack, 2007). Autistic children 
can master norms and use them to judge their own behaviour (Sterponi, 2004) and 
others’ moral behaviour (Blair, 1996). Some authors suggest that autistic individuals 
are too focussed on following rules and norms since they tend to refer more to norm 
violation than any hurt caused by the violation (de Vignemont, 2007).  
Fairness also contributes to reciprocal behaviour (Hoffman et al., 2008). Children 
with autism appear to have an explicit awareness of fairness, although they will 
depart from equality when instrumental gain is possible without obvious harm to 
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another person (Schmitz, Banerjee, Pouw, Stockmann, & Rieffe, 2014). This finding 
suggests that autistic children may acquire explicit knowledge of the norm of 
equality, but while typical children show a strong preference for equality, autistic 
children deviated from this preference – instead selecting more generous options 
rather than the equal option. Typical children may be more likely to use fairness as a 
reputational signal. Other researchers have suggested that typical children prefer 
fairness to generosity since generosity could signal favouritism, which may be 
perceived negatively by others (Shaw, 2013). Applying this to Schmitz et al.’s (2014) 
findings, autistic children may use norms, but may not do so with consideration of 
their reputation. As yet, there has not been any research directly examining the 
possible link between reciprocity and reputation management in autism.  
Inhibitory control. Some researchers have proposed that autistic individuals have 
pervasive difficulties with executive function (Hill, 2004a, 2004b). As noted above 
(section 1.3), executive functions consist of a number of different components, 
including working memory, shifting, planning and inhibitory control (Huizinga et al., 
2006). Autistic individuals have been noted to have difficulties across a number of 
tasks testing these various components (see Hill (2004a) and Pellicano (2012) for a 
review). However, this thesis focuses specifically on inhibitory control given its 
proposed relationship with reputation management.  
The evidence for difficulties with inhibition in autism is currently mixed. Using the 
Stroop (1935) task  (a colour-word interference task), where participants have to 
inhibit reading the text (e.g. “blue”) and report the colour of the word instead (e.g. 
“red”), some authors have found autistic children perform worse on this task than 
typical children (Corbett et al., 2009). Other authors, however, have found no 
differences on this task (Lopez, Lincoln, Ozonoff & Lai, 2005; Ozonoff & Jensen, 
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1999). One problem with the colour-word interference task, though, is that autistic 
children often have language difficulties that may mean that the word does not have 
the same semantic connotations as it does for typical children, and is thus not 
distracting in this task (Adams & Jarrold, 2009).  
Another task designed to measure inhibitory control is the go/no-go task. In this task, 
participants have to respond to “go” stimuli (e.g. triangles) and not respond to “no-
go” stimuli (e.g. squares). A prepotent response is built to the “go” stimuli by 
presenting more of these stimuli, and participants have to inhibit this response when 
a “no-go” stimuli appears (Cragg & Nation, 2008). Christ, Holt, White and Green 
(2007) found differences between autistic and typical children on this task, with 
autistic children making more errors on “go” trials, but no differences in terms of the 
inhibitory components of the task (i.e. “no-go” trials). More recently, Adams and 
Jarrold (2012) demonstrated that autistic children do not have difficulty with 
inhibiting prepotent responses, rather, they have a specific difficulty with resistance 
to distracting stimuli. However, Adams and Jarrold (2012) noted that, rather than 
difficulties in inhibiting the interference caused by distractors, autistic individuals 
instead have a greater tendency to process these distractors (Remington, 
Swettenham, Campbell & Coleman, 2009).  
Clearly, there are numerous theoretical accounts which present an inconsistent 
picture of inhibitory control in autism. In terms of reputation management, if autistic 
individuals do have difficulties with inhibition, then they may struggle to inhibit 
certain behaviours which may be damaging to their reputation. However, this 
proposed relationship has yet to be examined in autism.  
1.5.2. Reputation in autism: current knowledge and future directions  
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Given the above discussion of the possible mechanisms of reputation management, 
and the evidence presented for potential difficulties in these mechanisms in autism, it 
follows that autistic individuals may have difficulties with reputation management. 
Despite some theorising on the mechanisms behind reputation management in 
autism, we do not know precisely which mechanism(s) is the primary cause of 
assumed diminished reputation management. The current section will describe the 
few existing studies on reputation in autism.   
Social influence in autism. As previously mentioned, an increase in prosocial 
behaviour when others are present is a common manifestation of social influence in 
typical children and adults. The degree to which prosocial behaviour in individuals 
with autism is driven by social influence and reputation is a matter for further 
investigation. Evidence indicates that autistic children are capable of being prosocial, 
for example in economic games such as in the prisoner’s dilemma game, whereby 
children are given the option to compete or cooperate with another player (Downs & 
Smith, 2004). Sally and Hill (2006) found few differences between typical and 
autistic children in cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma and other economic games 
such as the dictator game, where children have to decide how to divide a resource 
between themselves and another individual.  
Furthermore, Liebal, Colombi, Rogers, Warneken, and Tomasello (2008) noted that 
young children with autism, like their typical counterparts, helped an experimenter to 
retrieve an out-of-reach object and cooperated with a partner to obtain a reward. 
However, Liebal et al. (2008) found that children with autism were less likely to 
attempt to re-engage the experimenter when she suddenly stopped interacting with 
them. The authors claimed that this provided evidence for Tomasello, Carpenter, 
Call, Behne, and Moll’s (2005) shared intentionality hypothesis, which argues that 
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humans differ from all other species in their intention to collaborate with others 
toward shared goals, and that individuals with autism lack this shared intentionality. 
Rather than lacking in shared intentionality, though, it may be the case that autistic 
individuals are less likely to appear to share intentions due to a number of other 
factors reducing the propensity to do so, such as problems with joint attention and 
imitation (Colombi, Liebal, Tomasello, Young, Warneken & Rogers, 2009) and 
whether the collaborator is a friend or not (Kimhi & Bauminger-Zviely, 2012). 
While it appears that individuals with autism can act prosocially, whether the 
underlying motivation for this behaviour stems from social influence is unclear. 
There have been few studies investigating whether individuals with autism are 
susceptible to social influence. Bowler and Worley (1994) examined social 
conformity in adults with Asperger’s by replicating Asch’s (1956) line judgement 
paradigm, whereby a group of participants have to judge which comparison line, out 
of three, matched a standard reference line. The majority of the group, however, were 
confederates who were instructed to give the wrong answer, and conformity was 
measured in terms of whether or not participants conformed by giving the incorrect 
answer too. There were no significant differences in the rates of conformity between 
typical adults and adults with Asperger’s, although there was a trend toward less 
conformity in participants with Asperger’s, and those with Asperger’s were more 
likely to either stick to a strategy of conforming or not conforming at all. Bowler and 
Worley (1994) suggested that this tendency could reflect rigid and repetitive 
behaviours characteristic of autism (APA, 2013). Although there were no significant 
differences in conformity rates between the two groups, there may be differences 
between typical and autistic adults in terms of exactly how they are influenced by 
others. Further work by Maras and Bowler (2012, 2011) has noted that in the context 
55 
 
of eyewitness testimony, adults with autism are no more suggestible or compliant 
than typical adults when presented with misinformation or suggestive questioning 
styles. These findings may imply that autistic adults are not susceptible to social 
influence – but it is important to note that in this context, typical adults were just as 
resistant to influence.   
Recently, Yafai, Verrier, and Reidy (2013) adapted Asch’s (1956) line judgement 
paradigm to test conformity in children with autism. Children were presented with 
three varying lengths of animals (for example, a snake or giraffe), and they had to 
identify which of the three matched a comparison line. Unlike Asch's (1956) study, 
where one participant heard the choices of several confederates, children were 
simply told which line “the majority of other people” had chosen. Since children 
with autism were less likely to be influenced by this information, Yafai et al. (2013) 
concluded that autistic children were more resistant to peer pressure than typical 
children.  
Other potential evidence that children with autism may be less susceptible to the 
influence of others derives from Marsh, Pearson, Ropar and Hamilton’s (2013) 
imitation task. Over-imitating others may be a conformitive response, whereby an 
individual imitates a sequence of others’ actions despite some of these actions being 
unnecessary.  Marsh et al. (2013) found that children with autism were less likely to 
over-imitate, instead performing only the actions that were necessary to achieve an 
end-goal. This result may be conceptualised as a reduced tendency to conform to the 
actions of others.  
The above studies appear to suggest that autistic individuals may be less susceptible 
to social influence, for example by conforming less (Marsh et al., 2013; Yafai et al., 
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2013) or by having different strategies toward conformity (Bowler & Worley, 1994). 
However, further research in this area is clearly required to confirm this hypothesis, 
in particular given the lack of consistency between the studies with children (Marsh 
et al., 2013; Yafai et al., 2013) which note significant differences in conformity, and 
work with adults with autism (Bowler and Worley, 1994; Maras & Bowler, 2012, 
2011) which has not found significant differences in social influence between typical 
and autistic adults. A few studies have aimed to test reputation management in 
individuals with autism, and this area of research may help to further explicate 
whether or not autistic individuals are susceptible to the influence of others.  
Reputation management in autism. Before considering the evidence for reputation 
management in autism, it is necessary to elucidate whether individuals with autism 
are aware of reputation. Current evidence suggests that children with autism are 
capable of assessing the reputations of others, although they may not utilise this 
information during interactions. Li, Zhu, and Gummerum (2014) noted that 6 to 12-
year-old children with autism could correctly identify story protagonists as morally 
“nice” or “naughty”, but they did not exploit this knowledge when playing a 
prisoner’s dilemma game with the protagonist. Typical children, however, tended to 
cooperate more with protagonists who had been judged as “nice”. Previous studies 
have deduced that children with autism can make appropriate moral judgements 
when judging underlying motives for moral transgressions, although their 
justifications can be poorer in quality (Grant, Boucher, Riggs, & Grayson, 2005). 
This evidence suggests that autistic individuals could be able to make basic 
judgements about the reputations of others.  
Two avenues of research present conflicting evidence as to whether individuals with 
autism can manage their reputation. On the one hand, experiments testing for the 
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more subtle effects of observation on behaviour suggest that autistic individuals may 
not manage their reputation. On the other hand, research considering autistic 
individual’s more explicit and effortful self-presentational abilities suggest that 
autistic individuals can manage reputation.  
Implicit reputation management in autism. Experiments examining reputation 
management where reputation is only implied (e.g. through observation) suggest that 
autistic individuals may not manage their reputation. One of the first tests of 
reputation management in children with autism adopted a flattery paradigm to test 
whether children with autism would flatter others more when they were being 
observed (Chevallier et al., 2012b). To this end, children had to rate drawings twice. 
For one of the pictures, the experimenter claimed that she had drawn the picture 
herself. The crucial test was to see whether children would then increase their rating 
of this particular drawing in order to flatter the experimenter. Typical children 
enhanced their rating in this situation, and this was thought to demonstrate that they 
were flattering the experimenter because they were concerned about their reputation. 
Children with autism, however, did not enhance their rating in this situation. 
Chevallier et al. (2012b) interpreted their findings in terms of social motivation, that 
is, the autistic children were not motivated to manage their reputation, since reported 
social motivation was correlated with the amount of flattery shown. 
Another study with autistic adults has suggested that autistic individuals do not 
implicitly manage their reputation. In a trust game – where participants send money 
to another player, which is then tripled, and the other player then decides how much 
they would like to return to the first player – Chiu et al. (2008) found an unusual lack 
of activity in the cingulate cortex during the ‘self’ phase of the game in adults with 
autism. This activity, in typical adults, was purportedly when individuals were 
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thinking about how much money they should allocate to the other player. Frith and 
Frith (2008b) speculated that this result was due to the autistic individuals not 
considering how their choice would look to the other – their reputation. However, 
this study was not designed with the aim of directly manipulating the need to manage 
reputation. 
Izuma, Matsumoto, Camerer, and Adolphs (2011) used a charity donation task to see 
whether autistic adults would manage their reputation when observed by another 
person. While typical adults tended to donate more to charity when observed, autistic 
adults did not, purportedly due to a fundamental deficit in ToM, although Izuma et 
al. (2011) did not measure ToM (see Chapter Two for further interpretation of their 
results). Frith and Frith (2011) further proposed that the lack of reputation 
management seen in Izuma et al.’s (2011) study could be thought of as a lack of 
hypocrisy. In other words, reputation management – acting in a way to satisfy the 
opinions of others and improve one’s own image – is manipulative and hypocritical. 
Perhaps typical individuals are too concerned with their reputation, which results in 
reputation management even in generally non-consequential experimental 
conditions, while autistic individuals appear to have a venerated honesty.  
Explicit reputation management in autism. Reputation management may be 
possible for autistic individuals when reputation itself is more explicit. One area of 
research, which directly consolidates with explicit reputation management, examines 
self-presentation in autism. Self-presentation can be thought of as any attempts 
individuals use to promote or present the self in a desired light (Banaji & Prentice, 
1994). The findings from self-presentation research in autism tend to conflict with 
the notion that autistic individuals cannot manage reputation (Izuma et al., 2011). 
Begeer, Banerjee, Lunenburg, Meerum Terwogt, Stegge, and Rieffe (2008) asked 
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typical and autistic children to describe themselves twice – once with no incentive, 
and once when they were told they could be chosen to win some prizes. Therefore, 
children had opportunity to gain a prize by self-promoting and expressing why they 
deserved the prize. Results showed that autistic children were capable of self-
promotion, by increasing positive statements about the self to gain the prize. 
However, autistic children were less strategic than typical children, for example by 
reporting fewer aspects of self that related to their game-playing skills. Schereen, 
Begeer, Banerjee, Meerum Terwogt, and Koot (2010) replicated and extended 
Begeer et al.’s (2008) study by giving children the opportunity to direct their self-
promotion for specific audiences (for example, toward a new child in their class who 
liked animals). Once more, children with autism could self-promote, but were less 
strategic and less flexible in adapting to the identity of the audience. The authors 
suggested that autistic children may be less likely to self-promote due to a reduced 
tendency to be dishonest, and therefore they are less likely to exaggerate or lie about 
the self in order to self-promote. Furthermore, children with autism do appear to 
understand self-presentational display rules (such as knowing which emotion to 
express in certain situations) but are less effective in using them (Barbaro & 
Dissanayake, 2007). Self-presentation research appears to suggest that children with 
autism have an ability to present the self in certain ways, but are less skilled in doing 
so.  
Research into friendship in autism (e.g. Bauminger & Kasari, 2000; Bauminger et al., 
2008; Locke et al., 2010) shows that many autistic individuals report a desire for 
friendship which could link to an explicit awareness of reputation, since many 
autistic individuals appear to be concerned about their friendships and want to have 
friends. The quality of autistic individual’s friendships appears to be different to 
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those of typical individuals, which could impact on reputation management. For 
example, Petrina, Carter and Stephenson (2014) reviewed 24 studies on the nature of 
friendships in cognitively-able children with autism. This review found that autistic 
children had fewer friendships, struggled to give complete definitions of friendships, 
experienced less reciprocity in friendships, and had lower frequency of contact with 
their friends. It may be the case that autistic individuals do find some or many social 
relationships rewarding, but lack the social abilities to maintain these friendships, 
with autistic individuals having an awareness of their reputation but difficulties in 
effectively managing their reputation. However, there is a paucity of research 
directly examining this issue.  
1.6. The current thesis 
This thesis first aimed to test whether individuals with autism manage their 
reputation, and second, to identify the mechanisms behind reputation management in 
individuals with and without autism.   
To examine these aims, this thesis considered reputation management in adults, 
children and adolescents with and without autism. First, Chapter Two examined 
whether autistic adults could manage their reputation under certain circumstances. 
This study was motivated by Izuma et al.’s (2011) experiment, which claimed that 
autistic adults could not manage their reputation as they did not donate more to 
charity when observed, unlike typical adults. However, Izuma et al.’s (2011) study 
could not rule out alternative explanations for their results – namely, whether autistic 
adults could manage reputation in different, more motivating, situations. Chapters 
Three to Six were conducted concurrently. Chapter Three considered the 
development of explicit and implicit reputation management in typical children, to 
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inform our understanding of reputation management in typical development. Chapter 
Four subsequently examined the potential mechanisms (theory of mind, social 
motivation, expectations of reciprocity and inhibitory control) underlying reputation 
management in typical development, given the lack of research directly testing the 
contribution of these mechanisms. Chapter Five intended to elucidate whether 
children with autism manage their reputation, by testing the proposed forms of 
explicit and implicit reputation management. Chapter Six examined the suggested 
mechanisms of reputation management in autistic children. Finally, Chapter Seven 
looked in further detail at reputation management in adolescents with autism by 
adopting qualitative methods to examine this under-researched area. Adolescence is a 
time of particular interest when considering reputation management, since 
friendships tend to become of upmost importance (Blakemore & Mills, 2014) and 
autistic individuals become more aware of their social differences (Stoddart, 1999). 
Qualitative methods enabled a detailed thematic analysis of autistic adolescents’ 
potential concerns for reputation. Overall, this thesis intends to contribute to 
knowledge of reputation management, and more widely to social influence, in a 
range of individuals both with and without autism.  
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Chapter Two 
Reputation management in adults with autism 
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2.1. Introduction  
In Chapter One, I argued that reputation is an important motivator of prosocial 
behaviour and trigger for social influence. In this study, reputation management was 
investigated by considering whether autistic adults were able to manage their 
reputation when motivated to do so.  
2.1.1. Reputation management in adults with autism  
The first study to test directly reputation management in autistic adults was 
conducted by Izuma et al. (2011). In their study, participants played a variation of the 
dictator game (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1986) in which they could decide if 
they wanted to accept losses of money from an endowment, when it meant that a 
charity could gain some money. Crucially, they did this task once when alone and 
once when observed. They were observed by a confederate, posed as a technician, 
who noted down the participant’s decisions after an error occurred on the computer. 
Izuma et al. (2011) found that when observed, typical adults tended to accept more 
losses, therefore donating more to charity, presumably to manage reputation. Adults 
with autism, however, did not change their behaviour when observed. Izuma et al. 
(2011) thus concluded that autistic adults were insensitive to reputation.  
To engage effectively in reputation management, we need to be able to represent 
what other people think of us (Amodio & Frith, 2006), an ability typically referred to 
as theory of mind (ToM). Some theorists argue that the social and communicative 
difficulties shown by individuals with autism are caused by fundamental problems in 
ToM (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). If autistic people have problems with ToM, and 
reputation management relies on ToM, it follows that those with autism may be less 
able to manage how they are viewed in the eyes of others. Izuma et al. (2011) 
64 
 
adopted the stance that adults with autism have difficulties with ToM that resulted in 
them being unable to manage their reputation. Adults with autism in Izuma et al.’s 
(2011) study were aware that they were being observed, since Izuma et al. (2011) 
also conducted a social facilitation experiment which demonstrated that when 
observed, performance on a simple task for both autistic and typical participants was 
facilitated, in line with social facilitation theory (Zajonc, 1965). 
However, there are a number of alternative explanations which could explain Izuma 
et al.’s (2011) results. Izuma et al. (2011) themselves suggested that autistic people 
can represent reputation, but are not intrinsically motivated to do so due to decreased 
sensitivity to social reward. The social motivation hypothesis of autism suggests that 
social stimuli, including reputation, are not motivating to individuals with autism 
(Chevallier et al., 2012a). It is therefore possible that while adults with autism might 
have the ability to manage reputation, the propensity to engage in reputation 
management is reduced due to diminished social motivation.    
Alternatively, autistic adults could find reputation motivating only under certain 
circumstances. For example, they may be particularly motivated to have a good 
reputation with specific individuals. Research has suggested that some people with 
autism desire friendships: cognitively-able autistic children report that although they 
have a lower frequency and quality of social interactions, they would like to take part 
in more satisfying interactions but do not know how (Bauminger, Cory, & Agam, 
2003). Adults with autism also report this discrepancy between problems with 
initiating social interactions and the longing for greater intimacy (Muller, Schuler, & 
Yates, 2008). It may be the case that autistic adults do not instinctively know how to 
manage their reputation, despite a desire to impress certain individuals with whom 
they would like to obtain friendships.  
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Furthermore, an important aspect of reputation management that has not previously 
been examined in autism is the distinction between implicit and explicit reputation 
management (Shaw et al., 2013). An individual could implicitly manage their 
reputation without conscious awareness that they are doing so, while explicit 
reputation management occurs when an individual is consciously aware that their 
reputation is at stake, and deliberate effort is made to manage reputation. 
Considering the putative explicit-implicit distinction in autism, evidence suggests 
that cognitively-able autistic adults come to possess an explicit but not implicit ToM 
(Frith, 2004). Evidence for this distinction comes from Senju et al.’s (2009) eye-
tracking study. They found that although adults with autism could give the correct 
answers to (explicit) false belief tasks, they failed to show anticipatory gaze to the 
false belief location, indicating no implicit awareness of false belief. This finding 
suggests that difficulties with ToM may arise specifically in its implicit or automatic 
use for individuals with autism. Due to its hypothesized reliance on ToM (Izuma, 
2012), perhaps reputation management is more likely to occur for autistic individuals 
when it is explicitly clear that they should be managing their reputation.  
Finally, the reciprocal aspect of reputation management also requires consideration 
and has yet to be examined experimentally in autism. Direct reciprocity can be 
defined as a contingent response to another’s behaviour (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). 
Indirect reciprocity occurs when a third party (person C) is aware of one’s previous 
actions (for example, whether person A helped person B), and subsequently rewards 
or punishes the other for their previous behaviour (Engelmann & Fischbacher, 2009). 
Indirect reciprocity is therefore reputation-based: if others know of your reputation, 
they can utilise this information to decide how they treat you. Reciprocity is an 
important mechanism for cooperation, by helping to promote non-selfishness and a 
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norm of reciprocal behaviour (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). Therefore, situations in 
which one is aware of the importance of reciprocity for one’s reputation could lead to 
a change in behaviour to take advantage of reciprocal principles, particularly if one 
expects others to reciprocate.  
Although Izuma et al.’s (2011) study has served to stimulate further research in this 
area, alternative explanations – as identified in Chapter One, such as the distinction 
between explicit and implicit reputation management and reciprocity – have not been 
examined, therefore these explanations must be tested in order to develop our 
understanding of reputation management in autism.  
2.1.2. The current study 
The current study aimed to test whether cognitively-able autistic adults could manage 
their reputation, in particular when it was more explicitly clear that reputation should 
be managed. Therefore, this study provided a potentially motivating situation in 
which some participants were led to believe that the observer could later reciprocate 
with them. Izuma et al.’s (2011) experiment was replicated by asking typical and 
autistic participants to donate to charity when alone and when observed. Critically, 
the experiment was extended by (1) also asking them to donate to a person and (2) by 
manipulating the extent to which participants were motivated to make a donation. To 
this end, half of all participants were presented with a situation in which the person 
they were donating to was the observer (a confederate), in the knowledge that this 
observer would be donating to them next (motivation condition). Participants were 
therefore motivated to take into account this person’s opinion, believing the person 
watching not only could see how generous they were being, but also had the power 
to reciprocate (i.e., respond to the participant’s offer) and be generous in return. The 
67 
 
remaining half believed the observer was simply watching the procedure (no 
motivation condition). Data were also gathered from questionnaire measures which 
may relate to the propensity to manage reputation, such as social anxiety and social 
desirability. An individual’s desire for social approval or any anxiety caused by 
social situations could impact upon the amount of reputation management that takes 
place. Finally, this study also directly replicated the social facilitation experiment 
carried out by Izuma et al. (2011). Izuma et al. (2011) found that for autistic adults, 
like their typical counterparts, performance in a simple task was improved by 
observation.  
Following Izuma et al. (2011), it was predicted that in the no motivation condition, 
when reputation is only implied through observation, typical adults, but not those 
with autism, would donate more in an attempt to manage their reputation – 
particularly when donating to charity as this recipient would be seen as more 
deserving (Eckel & Grossman, 1996). Any behaviour change in the motivation 
condition allows for us to disentangle the two competing hypotheses for the lack of 
reputation management seen in autistic adults in Izuma et al. (2011). If they do lack 
the ability to think about others’ minds then, even when motivated to do so, they 
should not increase their donations to the observer. Alternatively, if the supposed 
inability to engage in reputation management is instead better characterised as a 
reduced propensity to do so, then providing a situation in which individuals could 
gain more rewards by maximising principles of reciprocity should result in an 
instrumental increase in donations to the observer. In this way, reputation 
management becomes instrumental for gaining a good outcome by encouraging 
reciprocity in others. 
2.2. Method 
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2.2.1. Participants  
Thirty-nine male participants took part in this study: 19 cognitively-able autistic 
adults and 20 typical adults. Two additional typical adults participated but were 
excluded from analyses for guessing that the observer was a confederate, and one 
additional autistic adult also participated but was excluded for not fully 
understanding the task. Participants within each group were randomly assigned into 
either “motivation” or “no motivation” conditions (see below), yielding four groups. 
These groups were matched for chronological age and intellectual functioning, as 
measured by the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence - II (WASI-II; 
Wechsler, 2011) or the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS; Wechsler, 1997) 
(Table 1). A 2 (group; autistic or typical) x 2 (condition; no motivation or 
motivation) between-participants analysis of variance (ANOVA) confirmed that 
there were no significant group differences in Full-Scale IQ, F(1,35) = 1.97, p=.17, 
ηp
2
=.05, differences between conditions, F(1, 35) =.94, p=.34, ηp
2
=.03, and no 
significant interactions (all ps>.15). There were also no significant differences in age 
between groups, F(1,35) = 1.59, p=.22, ηp
2 
=.04, or between conditions, F(1, 35) = 
2.12, p=.15, ηp
2 
=.06.  
All participants with autism had received independent clinical diagnoses of an autism 
spectrum condition according to DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) and met algorithm 
criteria for autism or Autism Spectrum Disorder on the Autism Diagnostic 
Observational Schedule – Generic (ADOS-G; Lord et al., 2000; Table 1). Autistic 
participants were recruited through a participant database held at the Institute of 
Cognitive Neuroscience at University College London. Typical participants were 
recruited through volunteer databases at Birkbeck College and the Institute of 
Education, London, and the group comprised a range of occupations.   
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Table 1.  
Descriptive statistics for typical and autistic participants in motivation and no 
motivation conditions.   
  Typical Autism 
  No 
motivation 
Motivation No 
motivation 
Motivation 
n  10 10 9 10  
Chronolog
-ical age  
M (SD) 27.9 (7.4) 34.7 (9.6) 34.2 (7.6) 34.7 (5.6) 
Range 21 – 41  21 – 48  25 – 48  29 – 48  
Full Scale 
IQ  
M (SD) 102.2 (13.9) 106.1 (17.1) 108.2 (14.8) 113.9 (15.5) 
Range 73 – 118  85 – 135  87 – 128  77 – 132  
Verbal IQ  M (SD) 106.0 (12.0) 105.6 (17.7) 107.63 (14.1) 113.22 (20.7) 
Range 86 – 125  88 – 138  85 – 124  74 – 138  
Perceptual 
IQ  
M (SD) 97.4 (15.2) 105.1 (14.5) 101.43 (14.1) 111.25 (8.40) 
Range 64 – 116  86 – 130  84 – 125  99 – 122  
ADOS 
score  
M (SD) - - 10.1 (2.4) 9.0 (1.8) 
Range - - 7 – 15 7 – 11 
Notes. Intelligence Quotient (IQ) measured with the WASI-II or WAIS. Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule (ADOS) – higher scores indicate greater severity of symptoms of autism. 
All participants gave written informed consent prior to participation and were fully 
debriefed on its completion. Ethical approval was gained from the Faculty of Policy 
and Society’s Research Ethics Committee at the Institute of Education, London. 
2.2.2. The donation task 
The donation task was designed to measure reputation management by testing 
whether typical and autistic adults were sensitive to observation, by changing their 
behaviour by donating more when they were observed. This task had a mixed design. 
The independent variables in this study were group (autism or typical), condition 
(motivation or no motivation), observer (absence and presence) and recipient (charity 
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and person). The dependent variables of interest were the total number of accepted 
donations to (1) the charity and (2) the person.  
In the donation task, participants played a variation of the dictator game, following 
Izuma et al. (2011). At the beginning of the task, participants were told that they 
could receive £40 of real money for participating. The choice they had to make was 
whether they were willing to lose some of this money, so a charity or a person could 
gain some money. Participants were told that one trial would be chosen at random at 
the end of the sessions, and their decision on that trial would take effect. Participants 
completed this task once when alone (absence) and once when observed (presence), 
the order of which was counterbalanced across participants.  
Motivation and no motivation conditions. Following Izuma et al. (2011), 
participants were told that they could donate to the charity UNICEF, but unlike 
Izuma et al. (2011), they could also donate to a person, which they were told was 
another participant. When completing the task alone, all participants were told that 
the person’s name was a participant who had completed the task previously, and if 
they decided to donate money to them, the experimenter would contact this 
participant to tell them that they had been given money. Crucially, we extended 
Izuma et al.’s (2011) study to manipulate the motivation to donate between 
participants. Participants in the ‘no motivation’ condition were watched by the 
observer (a confederate), who was simply observing the task procedure before she 
(allegedly) participated. In this condition, participants again believed they were 
donating to a person who had previously completed the task. For those in the 
‘motivation’ condition, participants were told that the person to whom they could 
donate was the observer (the same confederate) currently observing them completing 
the task. In earshot of the participant, the confederate was told that when she 
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participated next, she would have the opportunity to donate to the current participant. 
Thus, those in the motivation condition were led to believe that the individual 
observing them, and to whom they were donating money, would have the 
opportunity to donate to them in the near future.  
Materials and general procedure. The pay-off matrix for losses and gains can be 
seen in Figure 1. Participants could lose between £0 and £16, while the recipient (a 
charity or a person) could gain between £0 and £32. This pay-off matrix was the 
same as that used by Izuma et al. (2011), except the gain to recipients was doubled. 
The amount the recipient could gain was increased because (1) it becomes more 
logical to donate to the recipient as greater returns can be expected if they 
reciprocate, and (2) this modification reduced the number of redundant trials where it 
made no sense to donate (i.e., where the participant’s loss was greater than the 
recipient’s gain; red cells in Figure 1).  
                             
 
Figure 1. Pay-off matrix in the donation task. Each individual cell (25 in total) shows 
the amount the participant could lose (top left of cell) and the recipient could gain 
(bottom right). Red cells reflect trials during which the participant could lose more 
than the recipient could gain, and yellow cells are where the recipient’s gain is larger 
than the participant’s loss. Green cells denote equal gain to loss and purple cells are 
Participant  
 
Recipient  
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where the participant lost nothing. The grey cell, where participants would lose 
nothing and the recipient would gain nothing, was excluded from analyses. 
Each cell in the pay-off matrix was tested twice for each recipient (i.e., twice for the 
person and twice for charity: 50 trials each). These 100 trials were randomised, and 
whether participants were donating to a person or to charity was randomised within 
each session. Since each cell was tested more than once, to avoid memory of choices 
each cell had a random amount (range £0.10 - £0.30) added or subtracted from both 
participant loss and recipient gain. If losses and gains were equal (2 green cells), the 
random amount added or subtracted was the same, and if the amount was zero, 
nothing was subtracted or added.  
Participants had to decide to accept or reject the trial they saw on screen using a 
keyboard press (Figure 2). Once the choice was made, the selected option was 
highlighted in red for 1000 ms before proceeding to the next trial. Their choice was 
highlighted in all conditions, but this emphasis was particularly important in the 
presence condition to ensure that it would be clearly visible to the person observing. 
Following Izuma et al. (2011), trials on which participants would lose nothing and 
the recipient would gain nothing were excluded from analyses (4 trials; grey cells in 
Figure 1), as decisions to accept or reject could be random. It was stressed to 
participants that only one trial would be selected randomly at the end of the 
experiment, the choice made on that trial would take effect, and the participant would 
lose the specified amount of money if they had accepted that trial. Participants who 
rejected all of the trials, including those where they would be losing nothing, were 
excluded, as this suggested they did not understand the task (n = 1; autism group).  
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Figure 2. Example trial in donation task: Participants saw money they could lose from 
£40, and money a charity or person could gain. They had the option to accept or reject 
the choice and their decision was highlighted for 1000 ms. 
Participants completed 10 practice trials at the beginning of the experiment to 
familiarise them with the procedure. MATLAB (The Mathworks, Massachusetts, 
USA) and Cogent (LON, FIL, & ICN, London, UK) were used to display the stimuli. 
The stimuli were shown on a non-reflective 42” screen and the confederate sat 
approximately 1 metre behind the participant, to their left.  
Each participant completed the task twice on the same day, one session in which 
participants completed the task alone (absence) and a second in which they were 
observed by another person (presence). The order of these sessions was 
counterbalanced across participants. Half of the participants were randomly assigned 
to the motivation condition, and the other half to the no motivation condition, as 
described above.  Participants completed other experiments during the break between 
sessions (60 – 90 minutes). Questionnaires relating to the experiment were 
administered at the end of the second session. 
1000 ms Participant’s response 
Money you could lose Money Dave could gain 
£4.17 £24.31 
Accept Reject 
Money you could lose Money Dave could gain 
£4.17 £24.31 
Accept Reject 
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Each participant met Experimenter 1 (E1) at a designated location before arriving at 
the laboratory. Upon meeting, E1 explained they were waiting for another participant 
(the confederate). When the confederate arrived, E1 introduced the participant and 
the confederate to each other and brought them to the lab, where together they were 
presented with the task instructions. For participants who completed the presence 
condition first, E1 explained that the confederate was going to watch them complete 
the task before she (allegedly) completed the task herself. After the participant 
completed the task, E1 introduced another experimenter (E2), who accompanied the 
confederate to another room to complete unrelated tasks with them, while the 
participant performed unrelated tasks before completing the donation task again 
when alone. For participants who completed the absence condition first, E2 entered 
at the beginning of the experiment and immediately took the confederate with her to 
‘complete some different tasks’. When the confederate returned for the second 
session, E1 explained she had been doing different tasks and missed the procedure of 
the donation task, so was going to watch the current participant perform the task.  
In the second session, regardless of whether the observer was present, all participants 
were told that the task was being repeated to collect as much data as possible. E1 left 
the room before the task began in each session.  
2.2.3. Theory of mind measures 
A number of tasks were used to measure autistic participants’ ability to read and 
reason about others’ minds. Data on 16 autistic participants’ explicit ToM skills had 
been collected previously on three tasks: the Ice Cream Story (Perner & Wimmer, 
1985), the Penny Hiding task (Baron-Cohen, 1992) and the Strange Stories task 
(Happé, 1994). 
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In the Ice Cream Story (Perner & Wimmer, 1985), participants were told a story 
whereby John and Mary went to the park and decided to buy ice cream. However, 
Mary had forgotten her money, so she left John to fetch some money from home. In 
the meantime, the ice cream vendor informed John that he was going move from the 
park to the church. As the ice cream vendor travelled past Mary’s house, he also 
informed her that he was moving to the church. Later, Mary went to buy an ice 
cream. While she was gone, John visited Mary’s house, and her mother told him that 
Mary had gone to buy the ice cream. Participants were then asked where John thinks 
Mary will be. To pass, participants must give the correct answer is that he believes 
she will have gone to the park. Participants therefore were scored as either having 
passed (score of 1) or failed (score of 0) this task.  
The penny hiding task (Baron-Cohen, 1992) is considered a measure of deception, 
with the ability to deceive assumed to require an understanding of others’ minds. In 
this task, participants scored one point for successfully hiding a coin from the 
experimenter in one of their hands. Participants did not score any points if they failed 
to deceive the experimenter, for example, by revealing the penny before the 
experimenter had guessed, or failing to hide both hands when originally hiding the 
coin. Participants completed six trials where they had the opportunity to hide the coin 
yielding a maximum possible score of 6 points.   
Happé’s (1994) Strange Stories task presents complex stories considering various 
aspects of ToM such as double bluff, irony and sarcasm. The subset of 8 mental state 
stories selected by White et al. (2009a) was used in this study. Participants were 
asked several questions about the stories and are scored 0 points for incorrect, 1 point 
for partially correct, and 2 points for fully correct answers, yielding a maximum 
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possible score of 16. A detailed description of the Strange Stories task can be found 
in section 4.2.3.  
2.2.4. Continuous performance task: social facilitation  
The continuous performance task directly replicated that used by Izuma et al. (2011) 
to measure social facilitation, that is, to test whether participant’s performance on an 
easy task was facilitated by the presence of an observer. All participants completed 
this task. The independent variables were group (autism or typical) and observer 
(absence and presence). D prime (d’) scores calculated by calculating the difference 
between the z-transforms of hits and false alarms (d’ = z(H) – z(F); Keating, 2005).  
A higher d’ score indicated that the signal was better detected. 
In this task, single randomised letters of the alphabet appeared repeatedly on-screen 
for 200 ms, with a 1000 ms inter-stimulus interval (Figure 3). Letters appeared in 
white on a black background. The target letter X appeared in 26% of trials (156 
trials). MATLAB (The Mathworks, Massachusetts, USA) and Cogent (LON, FIL, & 
ICN, London, UK) were used to display the stimuli. 
 
  
Figure 3. Trial structure in the continuous performance task. 
200ms 
Target 
stimuli 
1000ms 
 
X 
 
K 
 
H 
1000ms 
200ms 
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Before the task began, participants were instructed to press the spacebar every time 
they saw the letter X appear on screen. The task was completed twice, in two 
separate sessions, once when observed (presence) and once when alone (absence). 
There were 600 trials in each session, with each session lasting around 12 minutes.  
The observer was the same confederate used in the donation task, who observed the 
continuous performance task either prior to or following the donation task, the order 
of which was counterbalanced. The confederate’s presence was justified by saying 
that she was watching the task to see how it was performed before she completed the 
task herself.  
2.2.5. Questionnaires  
Bespoke Likert-scale questions. Several Likert-scale questions were used to 
confirm that there were no differences in attitudes toward donation behaviour or the 
observer between the two groups of participants. Replicating Izuma et al. (2011), 
following the experimental session participants were asked several questions 
regarding the experiment, including (1) how important they believed the mission of 
UNICEF to be and (2) how socially desirable they believed donating to UNICEF to 
be, both on a 7-point scale. This 7-point scale consisted of “not at all 
important/socially desirable” (1) to “very important/socially desirable” (7). 
Participants were also asked to rate how socially desirable they believed donating 
money to other people was, on the same 7-point scale. Other questions elicited 
participants’ attitudes about the observer: whether they thought the person watching 
them was friendly, observant, and how much they wanted the observer to like them 
on a 5 point scale, from ‘1’ (“not at all friendly/observant”) to ‘5’ (“very 
friendly/observant”).  All participants were asked whether they believed their 
behaviour changed when they were being observed, and by how much, which they 
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rated on a four-point scale, with ‘1’ indicating “I was not aware of the person”, ‘2’ “I 
was aware of the person but did not change in any way”, ‘3’ “I changed a little” and 
‘4’ “I changed a lot”. Participants were also asked to elaborate on the ways in which 
they thought their behaviour changed. 
Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale. The Marlowe-Crowne social 
desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) was used to measure participants’ need 
for social approval. Participants had to state whether they believed 33 statements to 
be true or false in relation to themselves, for example, “I never hesitate to go out of 
my way to help someone in trouble”. Higher scores on this scale are thought to relate 
to higher need for social approval, with a maximum score of 33. Theoretically, 
participants who report a tendency to act in socially desirable ways may also have a 
stronger desire to possess a good reputation amongst other people, and will therefore 
be more likely to manage their reputation.  
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS). The SIAS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998) was 
used to measure participants’ anxiety towards social interactions. In response to 19 
different statements, such as “I find it difficult to mix comfortably with the people I 
work with”, participants had to indicate the degree to which the statements applied to 
themselves, on a 5-point scale from ‘0’ (“not at all”) to ‘4’ (“extremely”). Higher 
scores reflect higher reported levels of social interaction anxiety, and the maximum 
possible score was 76. Participants who are more socially anxious may be more 
conscious (and anxious about) what others think of their reputation, thus they may 
attempt to manage their reputation more.  
Social Phobia Scale (SPS). The SPS was developed by Mattick and Clarke (1998) to 
measure fears of scrutiny during every day activities, for example, “I get nervous that 
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people are staring at me as I walk down the street”. Participants considered 20 
different statements which could be rated on a 5-point scale from ‘0’ (“not at all”) to 
‘4’ (“extremely”) in relation to how true the statement was of the individual. Higher 
scores relate to higher levels of social phobia, with a maximum possible score of 80. 
Social phobia and social interaction anxiety differ in that social phobia involves fear 
of being observed during certain activities, while social anxiety involves distress 
during social interactions (Mattick & Clarke, 1998). As social phobia specifically 
involves a fear of being observed, this was important to take into account given this 
study involved direct observation of the participant.  
Reciprocity questionnaire. Since the motivation condition related to the principle of 
reciprocity (such that the observer could reciprocate the offers made to her when she 
played the game), the Personal Norm of Reciprocity questionnaire (Perugini, 
Gallucci, Presaghi, & Ercolani, 2003) was used with autistic participants to confirm 
that they understood reciprocity. This questionnaire is designed to measure three 
aspects of reciprocity: positive reciprocity (the likelihood of reacting and paying 
attention to positive reciprocal behaviours, such as sharing), negative reciprocity (the 
likelihood of reacting and paying attention to negative reciprocal behaviours, such as 
revenge), and beliefs in reciprocity (belief in the use of reciprocal behaviour, for 
example, “to help somebody is the best policy to be certain s/he will help you in the 
future”). Participants rated 27 statements on a 7-point scale as to how true the 
statements were of themselves, from ‘1’ (“not at all true for me”) to ‘7’ (“very true 
for me”). Scores for each of the three aspects of reciprocity (positive, negative, and 
beliefs) were then averaged (maximum score 7), with higher scores indicating 
stronger reactions to positive and negative reciprocity and higher beliefs in 
reciprocity.  
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To further test understanding of reciprocity, all participants were asked direct 
questions about sharing money with others and their expectations of reciprocity, 
namely “if you were given £10, and shared £5 of this with another person, how much 
would they share with you if they were then given £10?”, and “if another person was 
given £10, and shared £5 of this with you, how much would you share with them if 
you were then given £10?”.  
Attitudes toward money. To ensure there were no differences between groups in 
their attitude toward money, given that the current study used money as a reward in 
the donation task, the Money Attitudes Scale was used (Yamauchi & Templer, 
1982). This questionnaire includes 29 questions pertaining to people’s attitudes to 
money, rated on a 7-point scale from ‘1’ (“always”) to ‘7’ (“never”). Higher scores 
(maximum raw score = 203) on this scale indicate more negative attitudes toward 
money. Participants were also asked to rate on a 4-point scale, from ‘1’ (“not at all”) 
to ‘4’ (“very much”) how much they needed and wanted extra money, with higher 
scores indicating higher need and desire for money (maximum score of 4 for each).  
2.3. Results 
Results for each of the tasks (the donation task and the continuous performance task) 
and the theory of mind and questionnaire measures are now considered in turn. Data 
were analysed in terms of group differences across the various measures.  
2.3.1. The donation task  
Figure 4 shows the total accepted donations to the recipients (charity or person), 
when alone and when observed, for typical and autistic individuals in either the 
motivation or no motivation condition. To test for the effects of these variables on 
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donation decisions, a 2 (group; autism or typical) x 2 (observer; absence and 
presence) x 2 (condition; motivation or no motivation) x 2 (recipient; charity and 
person) mixed design ANOVA was performed on the number of accepted donations. 
There was a significant main effect of observer, F(1, 35) = 24.8, p<.001, ηp
2 
=.42, 
and a main effect of recipient, F(1,35) = 35.3, p<.001, ηp
2 
=.50. There was a 
significant 2-way observer x group interaction, F(1, 35) = 4.61, p=.039, ηp
2 
=.12. 
There were also significant 3-way interactions between observer, recipient and 
condition, F(1, 35) = 7.92, p=.008, ηp
2 
=.19, and recipient, group and condition, F(1, 
35) = 6.67, p=.014, ηp
2 
=.16. These interactions were qualified by a significant 4-way 
interaction between observer, recipient, condition and group, F(1, 35) = 4.76, 
p=.036, ηp
2 
=.12. All other main effects and interactions were non-significant 
(ps>.06). An additional ANCOVA controlling for age, IQ, and session order did not 
alter the pattern of results.   
 
     A. Donations to Person 
 
       B. Donations to charity 
Figure 4. Mean total donations by typical and autistic individuals to the person (A) 
and to charity (B) in absence and presence conditions, for motivation and no 
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motivation groups. Asterisks and bar groupings indicate significant differences 
between groups. Error bars indicate +/- one standard error. 
To determine the source of the significant 4-way interaction, the difference score 
between the presence and absence conditions was calculated (i.e., the “observer 
effect”, Figure 5), and a 2 (group; autism or typical) x 2 (condition; motivation or no 
motivation) x 2 (recipient; person or charity) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the 
observer effect. This analysis revealed significant main effects of recipient, F(1, 35) 
= 4.31, p=.045, ηp
2 
=.11, and group, F(1, 35) = 4.77, p=.036, ηp
2 
=.12, and a 
significant interaction between recipient and condition, F(1,35) = 8.18, p=.007, ηp
2
 
=.19. The 3-way interaction between recipient, group and condition was also 
significant, F(1, 35) = 4.52, p=.041, ηp
2 
=.11. All other main effects and interactions 
were not significant (all ps>.11). 
Figure 5. Observer effects (difference score between presence and absence 
conditions) on person (A) and charity (B) donations for each group (typical or 
autism) and condition (no motivation or motivation). Asterisks indicate observer 
effects significantly different from zero. Error bars indicate +/- one standard error. 
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Planned comparisons were used to examine the three-way interaction between 
recipient, group and condition. Independent t-tests produced a highly significant 
Levene’s test (p=.001), therefore equal variances were not assumed. There was a 
significant difference in the person observer effect between typical and autistic 
participants in the motivation condition, t(18) = 3.14, p=.008, r=.59. There was also a 
significant difference in the person observer effect between motivation and no 
motivation conditions for typical adults, t(18) = 2.83, p=.011, r=.55. All other 
planned comparisons between groups and conditions were not significant (all 
ps>.39).  
One-sample t-tests were used to determine whether the observer effects in each 
group were significantly different from zero, indicating a reliable change in 
behaviour. When donating to the person (Figure 5, panel A), typical individuals in 
the motivation condition showed an observer effect significantly different from zero, 
t(9) = 4.44, p=.002, r=.83. Adults with autism in the motivation condition also 
showed an observer effect significantly different from zero, t(9) = 2.30, p=.047, 
r=.61. When donating to charity (Figure 5, panel B), only typical individuals in the 
no motivation condition showed an observer effect significantly different from zero, 
t(9) = 2.39, p=.040, r=.62. All other effects were not significant (all ps>.07). 
Notably, when donating to charity in the no motivation condition – the closest 
replication of the original Izuma et al. (2011) study – adults with autism did not show 
an observer effect that was significantly different from zero, t(8) =.85, p=.42, r=.29.  
 
Following Izuma et al. (2011), to test whether participants had similar preferences 
for donations, I used linear regression to assess whether the proportion of accepted 
donations in the absence condition depended on the amount participant’s were losing 
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and the amount the recipient was gaining. Results showed that for all groups, loss to 
the participant significantly predicted the proportion of accepted donations (all 
ps<.001), such that all participants were more willing to accept small losses.  
Considering the amount that the recipient could gain, all groups showed normal 
preferences for accepting donations (all ps<.007), such that as recipient gain 
increased, the proportion of accepted donations increased. Figure 6 below visually 
demonstrates the proportion of accepted donations to the person and to charity in the 
absence condition, across all of the possible groups. This figure supports the above 
findings that participants were more willing to accept small losses, particularly when 
the other was set to gain more.  
  
Figure 6. Proportions of accepted donations to the person and to charity in the 
absence condition for each group and condition. White indicates a high proportion of 
accepted donations and black indicates a low proportion of accepted donations.  
Proportion of accepted donations 
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Izuma et al. (2011) also theorised that those who donated little when they were alone 
would show a greater increase in donations when watched – as they would be more 
motivated to enhance their reputation – while individuals who already donated a high 
amount when alone would not increase their donations a great deal. However, I failed 
to replicate this result, with no significant correlations between donations in the 
absence condition and the observer effect for any group (all ps>.15). 
2.3.2. Theory of mind  
Data from 16 autistic participants’ ToM skills were available from their participation 
in previous research (Table 2), of which 8 participants had received the motivation 
condition, and the remaining 8 received the no motivation condition. T-tests 
confirmed there were no significant differences between the two conditions for any 
ToM measure (all ps>.37). 
Table 2.  
Measures of theory of mind completed by autistic participants, with percentage of 
participants giving correct responses or mean scores. 
Measure  Result (n = 16) 
Ice Cream Story  Percentage passing 73% 
Penny hiding  
(max = 6) 
M (SD) 4.93 (1.28) 
Range 2 – 6 
Strange Stories task  
(max = 16) 
M (SD) 11.5 (2.45) 
Range 6 – 14 
  
Table 3 displays the correlations between the observer effects and the second-order 
ToM measures. There were no significant correlations between ToM performance on 
any of the second order tasks and the person or charity observer effects (all ps>.07). 
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Table 3.  
Correlations between the observer effects and theory of mind measures for autistic 
participants. 
  Penny hiding Ice Cream Story Strange Stories 
Person observer 
effect 
r -.29 -.19 .31 
p .32 .51 .24 
Charity 
observer effect 
r -.14 -.48 -.42 
p .62 .07 .11 
To test whether these measures could predict the observer effect, a linear regression 
with Strange Stories, penny hiding, and ice cream story scores as predictors was 
conducted, controlling for individual differences in age and IQ. For the person 
observer effect, the model was a poor fit for the data, F(5,14) = 1.64, p=.24. Only 
scores on the Strange Stories task were marginally significant in predicting the 
person observer effect within this model, t = 2.21,  =.69, p=.054, with higher 
Strange Stories scores relating to larger person observer effects. For the charity 
observer effect, no predictors were significant (all ps>.24). 
2.3.3. Continuous performance task (CPT). 
Mean hit and false alarm rates for both groups can be seen below in Table 4. The 
high level of accuracy is indicative of a ceiling effect for both groups. These rates 
were used to calculate participants’ d’ score. 
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Table 4. 
Mean proportion and standard deviations of hit and false alarm rates during the 
Continuous Performance Task, according to group (typical or autism) and condition 
(absence and presence).  
 
  
Group 
  Typical Autism 
 Absence Presence Absence Presence 
Hits  M (SD) 99.01% (1.31) 99.55% (.76) 99.02% (1.63) 98.95% (1.44) 
 Range 96 – 100% 97 – 100% 94 – 100%  94 – 100% 
False 
alarms  
M (SD) .45% (.73) .36% (.31) .70% (1.42) .63% (.93) 
 Range 0 – 3% 0 – 1%  0 – 6%  0 – 3%  
 
Figure 7 shows that when observed, the typical group had a mean d’ score of 5.40 
(SD =.50), and when they were alone the mean d’ was 5.19 (SD = .62). Autistic 
individuals had a d’ score of 5.14 (SD =.66) when observed and 5.20 (SD =.74) when 
they were alone. 
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Figure 7.  Mean d’ scores for autistic and typical individuals when alone (absence) 
and when observed (presence).  
A 2 (observer) x 2 (group) x 2 (session order) mixed ANOVA was performed on d’ 
scores. This analysis revealed no significant main effects or interactions, with the 
exception of a significant interaction between observer and session order, F(1,31) = 
5.66, p=.024, ηp
2 
=.15. This interaction was driven by performance being worse in 
the second session regardless of the absence or presence of an observer or group.  
2.3.4. Questionnaire measures 
Participants’ attitudes towards donating to charity and to other people were 
measured. To test for any significant differences on these measures between group 
and condition, 2 (group: autism or typical) x 2 (condition: motivation or no 
motivation) between-participants ANOVA were used for each scaled question. This 
revealed no significant main effects or interactions between group and condition for 
questions concerning the importance of UNICEF’s mission (all ps>.10), the social 
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desirability of donating to UNICEF (all ps>.43) and the social desirability of 
donating money to other people (all ps>.15). Considering attitudes toward the 
observer, rated on a 5-point scale, the same 2 x 2 between-participants ANOVA 
revealed no significant main effects or interactions for when participants were asked 
how observant they thought the observer was (all ps>.07
2
) and how much they 
wanted the observer to like them (all ps>.24). However, when asked how friendly 
they thought the observer to be, there was a significant main effect of condition, 
F(1,38) = 4.82, p=.035, ηp
2 
=.12, with those in the no motivation condition (M = 
3.95, SD =.78) rating her as more friendly than those in the motivation condition (M 
= 3.40, SD =.82). When asked whether participants felt that their behaviour had 
changed when observed (on a 4-point scale), the 2 x 2 between-participants ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of condition, F(1,38) = 4.79, p=.035, ηp
2 
=.12. 
Accordingly, those in the motivation condition reported that their behaviour had 
changed more when observed (M = 2.80, SD =.83) than those in the no motivation 
condition (M = 2.26, SD = .65).   
Several questionnaire measures of constructs thought to impact upon reputation 
management were also administered to all participants. Table 5 shows descriptive 
statistics for each measure according to group and notes significant group 
differences. Due to the small sample size, and as there were no differences between 
conditions (all ps>.09), results are collapsed across conditions (motivation and no 
motivation) to increase the power of the results. 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Adults with autism reported that the observer was observant, compared to typical individuals, t(37) = 
1.92, p=.063, r=.30.  
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Table 5. 
Results of questionnaire measures according to group, with significant differences 
between groups highlighted with asterisks. 
Measure  Typical  Autism  
Marlowe-Crowne social 
desirability scale 
M (SD) 15.50 (4.90) 12.21 (5.90) 
Range 5 – 23  2 – 21  
Social phobia scale M (SD) 15.05 (8.92) 19.63 (11.04) 
Range 4 – 33  2 – 49  
Social interaction anxiety 
scale 
M (SD) 16.05 (11.02) 30.11 (16.41)* 
Range 3 – 43  1 – 62  
Note. *p<.01. 
Notably, there were significant group differences in social interaction anxiety – with 
autistic participants scoring significantly higher on this scale. Since social interaction 
anxiety could impact upon the propensity for reputation management, I correlated 
this measure with the observer effects for person and charity donations, separately 
for typical and autistic individuals. Results showed that only for typical individuals 
did social interaction anxiety positively correlate with the person observer effect, r 
(18) =.514, p=.021 (Figure 8). In the continuous performance task, the questionnaire 
measures did not significantly correlate with the observer effect on d’ scores.   
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Figure 8. Scatterplot showing the relationship between social interaction anxiety and 
person observer effect. 
Since social interaction anxiety could explain some of the variance in predicting the 
observer effects, I therefore conducted the previous donation task 4-way ANOVA 
controlling for this variable. Results showed that compared to the original 4-way 
ANOVA (section 2.3.1), the main effects of observer and recipient were no longer 
significant (both ps>.07). The two-way, three-way interactions and four-way 
interactions remained unchanged, suggesting that the main findings remain even after 
controlling for social anxiety.  
 
Self reports. In answer to the question “if your behaviour changed, how or in what 
way do you believe it changed”, 11 typical participants (motivation condition: n = 5; 
no motivation condition: n = 6) and 12 autistic participants (motivation condition: n 
= 9; no motivation condition: n = 3) reported that their behaviour had changed and 
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provided a written response (Table 6). Four themes were identified from the 
responses of participants with and without autism. First, many (typical n = 5, autism 
n = 2) reported awareness that they were donating more when being observed. 
Second, a few participants (typical n = 2, autism n = 3) expressed reputational 
concerns over how they appeared to the observer. Some participants (typical n = 2, 
autism n = 4) also commented that they felt that they were thinking or concentrating 
more when they were being observed. Finally, some participants (typical n = 1, 
autism n = 2) also reported discomfort when being observed. Table 6 below shows 
each participant’s observer effects, how much they believed their behaviour changed 
on a 4-point scale (‘1’ (“I was unaware I was being watched”), ‘2’ (“I was aware of 
the person but I did not change”), ‘3’ (“I changed a little”) and ‘4’ (“I changed a 
lot”)), and their self-report if they believed their behaviour had changed. Chi-square 
showed that there was no difference between autistic and typical participants in their 
Likert-scale report of how much they believed their behaviour had changed, χ2(3) = 
2.52, p=.47, φ =.25.  
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Group: 
condition 
Observer effect How much did your behaviour 
change? 
How did your behaviour change? (Self-report) 
 Person Charity    
Autism:  No 
motivation 
1 6 Aware of person but did not change N/A 
8 10 I was unaware I was being watched N/A 
-3 2 I changed a little I might have been more inclined to donate to the stranger, even though they are a complete 
stranger, when the cost to me was comparatively small in relation to the reward they were getting. 
4 4 Aware of person but did not change N/A 
5 0 Aware of person but did not change N/A 
-7 5 I changed a little I was trying to think a bit harder and concentrate more. 
6 0 I changed a little I felt a bit as though I had to be an example of what needed to be done and to show the procedure 
of the tasks. 
0 -1 Aware of person but did not change N/A 
-4 -11 Aware of person but did not change N/A 
Autism: 
motivation  
10  4 I changed a little When I did not know the person I was less willing to lose money to give to them than if I knew 
the person and was being watched by them. 
0 -1 I changed a little Being watched made me nervous. I look her opinion into account. The more stingy she perceived 
me to be the less likely she would be generous to me when doing the test with my name. 
2 -1 Aware of person but did not change N/A 
-1 1 Aware of person but did not change It did not change, but I did feel a little more at ease and comfortable, and a little less awkward 
when I wasn't being watched. 
5 5 I changed a little I think I pretended to be more generous than I really am while I was being watched. But to be 
honest, the sums of money involved would not make much difference in my life (but also the 
sums involved would be fairly trivial for UNICEF, which is a charity I do not have strong 
feelings about).  
4 4 I changed a little Was more mindful that I needed to donate 
1 0 I changed a little I'd make comments to her about the task. Also I thought out loud more. 
-1 -1 Aware of person but did not change Very slightly if at all. 
2 1 I changed a lot Slightly more generous. 
2 3 Aware of person but did not change Thinking before giving this person money as it was like giving them an open cheque 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. 
Self-reports of behaviour change from autistic and typical participants, alongside observer effects for person and charity conditions. 
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Group: 
condition 
Observer effect How much did your behaviour 
change? 
How did your behaviour change? (Self-report) 
 Person Charity    
Typical: 
No 
motivation  
 
3 -2 I changed a little I hope my behaviour did not change but I was aware of taking more time to settle into the 
decision making process. 
6 5 I was unaware I was being watched N/A 
4 1 Aware of person but did not change N/A 
9 6 I changed a little Because of the effect of being judged or being labelled as not very generous. 
8 12 I changed a little I was more concentrating on what answer to choose 
0 1 Aware of person but did not change Did not change mainly because I thought that they were merely observing how to do the 
experiment, answers may have changed if someone more official was watching. 
-1 -1 Aware of person but did not change Even though I didn’t change, I felt slightly uncomfortable being watched, as thought my 
decisions might be perceived of as unkind. 
-11 5 Aware of person but did not change N/A 
1 3 I changed a little Donated more perhaps. 
2 1 Aware of person but did not change N/A 
Typical: 
motivation 
  
21 0 Aware of person but did not change N/A 
17 -1 I changed a lot I donated more to the person watching me. 
3 5 Aware of person but did not change N/A 
0 1 Aware of person but did not change N/A 
7 2 I changed a lot I felt more inclined to donate money to the observer. 
14 9 Aware of person but did not change N/A 
16 1 I changed a lot When being watched I was concerned about how my donating to the individual would be 
interpreted. I adopted the same strategy in both conditions about donating to UNICEF. 
4 3 Aware of person but did not change N/A 
18 -1 I changed a lot Would donate money to her in some instances but not all. It did not change in respect to 
donating to UNICEF. 
5 -3 I changed a little Sometimes I preferred to donate her more money than I used to before. 
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Reciprocity questionnaire. Responses from 16 autistic participants and 10 typical 
participants were obtained for a number of questions concerning reciprocity. Due to a 
poor response from the typical adults (50%), results are collapsed across motivation 
and no motivation groups for subsequent analyses. Data from 16 autistic participants’ 
attitudes towards the norm of reciprocation was compared to the means obtained 
from Perugini et al.’s (2003) normative sample of 951 participants. This analysis 
revealed no significant difference in negative or positive reciprocity (both ps>.12), 
but there was a significant difference in beliefs about reciprocity, t(15) = 5.79, 
p<.001, r=.83, such that the adults with autism had higher beliefs in reciprocation (M 
= 4.76, SD =.56) than the norm (M = 3.96), as shown in Table 7 below.  
Table 7.  
Autistic participants mean (SD) responses to the Personal norm of reciprocity 
questionnaire as compared to the norm reported in Perugini et al. (2003). 
 Autism (n = 16) Norm 
Beliefs in reciprocity 4.76 (.56)* 3.96 
Positive reciprocity 5.28 (.72) 4.99 
Negative reciprocity 3.84 (.99) 3.60 
Note. *significantly different to Perugini et al.’s (2003) norm (p <.001) 
In answer to the question “if you were given £10, and decided to share half of this 
(£5) with another person, and then this same person was given £10, how much of that 
do you think they would share with you?”, all typical participants said they expected 
to receive £5 from the other person, however, the mean amount autistic participants 
believed they would receive was £3.83 (SD = 2.08) – an amount significantly lower 
than that reported by the typical group, t(23) = 2.17, p=.048, r=.41. When 
participants were asked the reverse question, “if another person was given £10, and 
decided to share half of this (£5) with you, and then you were given £10, how much 
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would you then share with that same person?”, typical participants reported they 
would share £4.80 (SD = .63) and autistic participants £4.88 (SD = 1.15) on average. 
There was no significant difference between groups in answer to this question, t(24) 
= .19, p=.85, r=.04.   
Attitudes toward money. Considering attitudes toward money, there was no 
difference between typical (n = 10, M = 145.89, SD = 13.01) and autistic participants 
(n = 16, M = 142.87, SD = 16.92) on the Money Attitude Scale (Yamauchi & 
Templer, 1982), t(22) = .46, p=.65, r=.10. On a 4-point scale, participants were also 
asked how much they wanted and how much they needed extra money. Again, there 
were no significant differences between groups in answer to either of these questions 
(all ps>.21).  
2.4. Discussion  
The current study intended to test whether adults with autism could manage their 
reputation under certain conditions. The findings suggest that, contradictory to Izuma 
et al.’s (2011) interpretation, autistic adults do have the ability to manage their 
reputation. However, there may be several factors that reduce the likelihood that 
reputation management actually occurs in autism.   
2.4.1. The donation task  
The donation task aimed to test whether autistic adults could manage their reputation 
when motivated to do so, in order to explain purportedly absent reputation 
management in these individuals. Three main findings require explanation. First, 
unlike typical adults, adults with autism did not manage their reputation by 
increasing donations to charity when watched. Second, when provided with 
motivation, autistic adults did demonstrate an observer effect when donating to the 
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person. Third, the magnitude of this observer effect was significantly attenuated 
relative to the effect shown by typical adults. These findings suggest that autistic 
individuals have the ability to show a degree of reputation management, under 
conditions in which it is beneficial to think about another person’s opinion.  
The charity data replicated those obtained by Izuma et al. (2011): typical adults 
donated more to charity when watched, while adults with autism did not. Two 
candidate explanations for this effect were previously advanced: (1) that those with 
autism are unable to manage their reputation because of ToM difficulties or (2) that 
those with autism do not find reputation rewarding and thus do not attempt to 
manage their reputation. The additional manipulation of participants’ motivation 
enabled an attempt to distinguish these competing explanations. Here, I found that 
when autistic participants were in a situation where they could utilise reciprocal 
principles to gain a financial reward, they significantly increased their donations 
when watched. These results suggest that the autistic adults may have used explicit 
ToM ability in the motivation condition to anticipate that the observer could judge 
their behaviour in terms of reciprocity. A specific difficulty with implicit ToM (Frith, 
2004; Senju et al., 2009) might be the primary driver of the lack of an observer effect 
when donating to charity. It is worth noting that the suggested relationship between 
explicit and implicit distinctions within social cognition differs to results in other 
areas of cognition. For example, autistic adults tend to show a pattern of intact 
implicit but impaired explicit performance on measures of memory (Gardiner, 
Bowler & Grice, 2003) and learning (Brown, Aczel, Jiménez, Kaufman & Plaisted 
Grant, 2010). Further work is needed to examine the explicit/implicit distinction 
across a variety of domains and test its applicability to different clinical populations 
(Mottron, Dawson & Soulières, 2008). 
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In this study, an explicit situation appeared to make autistic people more aware of 
their behaviour, and as such, led to attempts to manage reputation. Evidence of this 
explicit awareness is supported by the questionnaire measures, which revealed that 
all participants in the motivation condition were aware that their behaviour had 
changed, and this was further supported by participants’ self-reports (see section 
2.4.3. for further discussion). This finding is consistent with recent research showing 
that adults with autism can use abstract social rules (in the current experiment, the 
norm of reciprocation) during social interactions (Baez et al., 2012). A degree of 
reputation management may be possible when autistic people are explicitly aware 
they should be thinking about what another person thinks – thus, the ability to 
manage reputation may be unaffected in autism.  
Nonetheless, the degree to which the autistic participants changed their behaviour 
when observed, even when motivated, was significantly attenuated compared to the 
typical participants. There are at least two possible explanations for this attenuation, 
either (1) difficulties with reward processing or (2) further difficulties with ToM. 
First, if the monetary incentive to manage reputation is less rewarding for those with 
autism (Kohls et al. 2012), we would expect participants to make less effort to obtain 
money as a reward. Yet the autistic participants showed no differences in their desire, 
understanding, or need for money, implying that they found money a rewarding and 
motivating stimulus (for similar findings see Lin, Rangel, & Adolphs, 2012; 
Damiano, Aloi, Treadway, Bodfish & Dichter, 2012). Furthermore, analysis of 
donation behaviour in the absence condition suggested that both groups donated in 
similar ways when they were unobserved.  
Perhaps, then, specific difficulties in autism with social reward processing may lead 
to a lessened propensity to engage in reputation management. The social motivation 
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hypothesis of autism (Dawson, 2008; Chevallier et al., 2012a) proposes that the 
pervasive social difficulties in autism are caused by a primary deficit in social 
motivation, which leads to secondary difficulties in social cognition. In the current 
study, it is unclear whether the motivational attenuation was observed specifically in 
response to social rewards – given that the motivation was not purely social – or 
whether individuals with autism have more pervasive reward processing difficulties. 
It is possible that social motivation links to an individual’s (both typical and those 
with autism) propensity to actually engage in reputation management – those who 
are more socially motivated being more likely to attempt reputation management. 
The current study, however, did not directly test this hypothesis. Future research 
could test the impact of an explicit social reputation condition, for example, by 
telling participants the observer was watching to rate people’s generosity. Such a 
study would benefit from a larger sample size than that used in the current study 
which may have biased effect sizes (Levine & Hullett, 2002) and prohibited subtle 
effects from being observed.  
Aside from reward processing difficulties, the attenuation in the person observer 
effect may reflect further problems in ToM. Indeed, there was some evidence for the 
idea that those with better ToM, as measured by the Strange Stories task (Happé, 
1994; White et al., 2009a), showed larger observer effects when donating to the 
person, suggesting better ability to think about others’ thoughts could lend itself to 
reputation management. However, caution is advised in interpreting this finding, 
first, as analyses suggested that the model was not a good fit to the data, and second 
since the predictive power of the Strange Stories task was not specific to the 
motivation condition, where reputation management had been noted. It is therefore 
unclear exactly how much ToM contributes to reputation management.  
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Further, while autistic participants may realise that they should donate more to the 
observer as she could later reciprocate, they may not fully realise that the degree of 
reciprocity is determined by their own behaviour. Such difficulties would be 
consistent with the reported difficulties experienced by adults with autism in 
predicting and influencing the behaviour of others (Yoshida et al., 2010). In the 
current study, participants in the motivation condition had to predict that the observer 
would engage in a tit-for-tat strategy, but ToM problems in some adults with autism 
might have limited the degree to which this behaviour was predicted.  Therefore, it 
seems that some degree of explicit ToM ability would benefit reputation 
management. 
Furthermore, the above findings are consistent with research into self-presentation in 
childhood (Begeer et al., 2008; Scheeren, Begeer, Banerjee, Meerum Terwogt & 
Koot, 2010). Such studies have shown that cognitively-able children with autism do 
show evidence of the ability to self-promote for a reward, although they do so less 
effectively and with less sensitivity to their audience than typical children. These 
results could also be conceptualised as evidence for ability to manage reputation 
(since self-promotion is a key method in managing one’s reputation), but reduced 
propensity to do so. In support of this idea, Scheeren et al. (2010) suggested that 
children with autism show less flexibility in their self-presentational ability possibly 
due to the desire to stick with following rules – such as avoiding lying, even when 
lying could improve one’s reputation.  
2.4.2. Continuous performance task 
The current study also attempted to replicate Izuma et al.’s (2011) finding that both 
typical and autistic participants would be socially facilitated during an easy task, the 
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continuous performance task (CPT). However, this result was not replicated, with no 
social facilitation found in either group. This null finding, however, is likely to be 
driven by ceiling effects, as all participants were highly accurate during the task. 
Performance was also affected by session order such that participants performed 
better in the first session regardless of whether they were observed or alone.  
Social facilitation, as a social psychological phenomenon, has obtained mixed 
findings. It is thought to be one of the first effects discovered in social psychology, 
by Triplett in 1898 (see section 1.2) but was not conceptualised until 67 years later 
(Zajonc, 1965).  Zajonc (1965) considered social facilitation to be the increased 
emission of dominant responses in the presence of another person or audience. 
Recent findings suggest that video game performance (Bowman et al., 2013) and 
visual search task efficiency (Miyazaki, 2013) can be facilitated by an audience. 
However, research into social facilitation has also found null findings (for example, 
Manstead & Semin, 1980). Guerin (1993) reports that for 18 published studies 
examining social facilitation, only 11 find evidence of mere presence facilitating task 
performance. Clearly, although social facilitation remains to be an important concept, 
the null results in the current study are not surprising given the mixed findings of 
social facilitation across past research.  
Furthermore, as participants in both groups were affected by the presence of an 
observer in some conditions in the donation task, this finding suggests that autistic 
people can be affected by the presence of another person. Consolidating the CPT and 
donation tasks could support Cottrell et al.’s (1968) suggestion that something more 
than just the mere presence of another person is required to produce social 
facilitation effects. Specifically, Cottrell et al. (1968) postulated that a learned 
expectation of evaluation from others causes a change in behaviour when observed. 
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In the current study, concerns for evaluation were likely to be heightened in the 
motivation condition of the donation task, but the mere presence of an observer 
during the CPT task was not enough to provide strong evidence for social 
facilitation.  
2.4.3. Relationships between reputation management and questionnaire 
measures  
This study also took into account a number of questionnaire measures that may 
impact upon behaviour in the donation and CPT tasks. First, both groups had similar 
attitudes toward the charity UNICEF to whom they were donating, and toward the 
observer. There were also no significant differences between groups on the Marlowe-
Crowne social desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), and there were no 
group differences on the social phobia scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998). These 
findings confirm that both autistic and typical participants in our sample had similar 
desire for social approval and neither feared observation.  
However, social interaction anxiety differed significantly between the groups. 
Specifically, autistic individuals scored significantly higher on social interaction 
anxiety, supporting previous reports of increased anxiety in this group (Gillott and 
Standen, 2007; Tantam, 2000; White, Oswald, Ollendick & Scahill, 2009b). 
However, the results suggested that for typical individuals, social interaction anxiety 
was positively correlated with the person observer effect. Social interaction anxiety 
specifically considers individual’s anxiety toward social situations (Mattick & 
Clarke, 1998). In the current study, participants were presented with the situation of 
being observed by another person whom participants believed was going to play the 
game after them, and they may have anticipated that they would have to later interact 
103 
 
with this individual. This anticipation could therefore have heightened social anxiety 
and caused an increase in donations to the person to avoid potentially negative 
interaction in the future. 
I also tested whether the attenuated observer effect found in autistic individuals could 
be explained by any alternative factors. Specifically, I examined whether the autistic 
participants understood the principle of reciprocity. Understanding of reciprocity was 
important in the current task, as participants may increase their donations in the 
motivation condition due to expected reciprocation from the observer. The results 
revealed some interesting differences in understanding and expectations of 
reciprocity in the autistic participants.  
First, I tested whether participants with autism understood and believed in the norm 
of reciprocation. Interestingly, the results revealed that the participants with autism 
had unusually high beliefs in the norm of reciprocation, perhaps due to more rigidity 
in following rules (APA, 2013; Bowler & Worley, 1994; Scheeren et al., 2010) 
and/or an explicit learning of the norm of reciprocation. However, when participants 
were asked how much they would expect to receive in return from another person 
whom they had shared £5 of £10 with, autistic participants only expected to receive 
£3.83 on average, whilst all typical participants anticipated they would receive £5 in 
return. Autistic participants understood the question, since when asked the reverse, 
“if another person was given £10, and decided to share half of this with you (£5), and 
then you were given £10, how much would you then share with that same person?”, 
there was no difference between typical and autistic participants. It seems that the 
autistic adults did not necessarily expect others to reciprocate with them, despite 
reporting that they would reciprocate themselves.  
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Difficulties in being able to plan and predict how others act towards them may be 
exacerbated by autistic adults’ low expectations of reciprocation, which may be 
based on their experiences with others. Perugini and Galluci (2001) believe that 
reciprocity occurs for two reasons: because it is an internalised standard and because 
people are concerned about what others think (see also Burger et al., 2009). The 
current results imply that adults with autism reciprocate because it is a social norm 
that they adhere to, rather than to gain something for their own reputation. 
Experience and expectations of others’ behaviour may be an important component of 
reputation management, and expectations of reciprocity have been shown to mediate 
trust behaviour (Tanis & Postmes, 2005) and determine behaviour in economic 
games (Hoffman, McCabe & Smith, 1996). Our experiences with others are an 
important means of learning exactly what to predict from other people (Frith & Frith, 
2006). Autistic individuals are more likely to have limited experiences with others 
and may have more negative experiences, such as bullying (Roekel, Scholte, & 
Didden, 2010). Arguably, an individual’s propensity for reputation management may 
be lessened if one does not expect a good reputation in the eyes of others to be 
reciprocated with social rewards in the future. Indeed, in the motivation condition, 
there is no guarantee that the observer will reciprocate the participant’s offers when 
she subsequently completes the task. If autistic adults have an expectation that others 
do not tend to reciprocate their actions, this could lessen the degree of reputation 
management.  
Finally, self-reports were collected from participants regarding how they thought 
their behaviour changed during the donation task. Several themes to which both 
groups referred were noted: awareness of observation, reputational concerns, 
increased concentration, and discomfort when being observed. In line with the 
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suggestion that autistic adults have the ability to manage reputation, several autistic 
participants reported that they were changing their behaviour when observed, for 
example, “I think I pretended to be more generous than I really am while I was being 
watched”. Comparatively, one of the typical participants in the motivation condition 
reported that “when I was watched I was concerned about how my donating to the 
individual would be interpreted”. Although limited by a small sample size, the 
qualitative data corroborate the quantitative findings of reputation management 
ability in autistic individuals.  
2.4.4. Limitations and future directions  
The current study was limited by a small sample size. Effect sizes throughout were 
relatively small, limiting the statistical power of the study. Caution in interpretation 
is therefore recommended, and future studies should attempt to replicate the current 
findings to confirm whether autistic adults do have the ability to manage reputation. 
The autistic participants were also highly verbal. Given the highly heterogeneous 
nature of autism (APA, 2013), it is likely this sample represents only the highly 
cognitively-able end of the autism spectrum. Future studies should take into account 
whether the ability to manage reputation is limited to this end of the spectrum, since 
more able autistic adults may be able to utilise verbal ability or have learnt some 
reputation management skills.  
Economic games, such as the dictator game, may not be an ecologically valid 
measure of social influence. On the one hand, the dictator game does not reflect real-
life social interaction, where reputation management occurs in a wide range of 
situations from the workplace to the internet (Tennie et al., 2010). On the other hand, 
economic games are an excellent experimental means for testing social influence, 
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precisely because people do not act in an economically-rational way (Camerer & 
Fehr, 2002). The dictator game has also been used across a variety of different 
cultural contexts which suggests it has good reliability (Thomae, Zeitlyn, Griffiths & 
Van Vugt, 2012). Whether or not the dictator game produces a limited or perhaps 
over-estimated picture of reputation management, it currently serves as a useful 
controlled experimental situation to test for reputation management.  
Future research, nonetheless, should attempt to go beyond economic games. Indeed, 
as mentioned above, self-presentation research (e.g. Begeer et al., 2008; Schereen et 
al., 2010) has shown that children with autism can self-promote, an important 
element of reputation management. It would be interesting to examine other 
situations in which reputation management may occur for autistic adults. For 
example, research suggests that the internet is being utilised by autistic individuals to 
foster social relationships and aid social communication (Benford, 2008; Burke, 
Kraut, & Williams, 2010). Autistic individuals may be concerned how they are 
perceived by those they have developed online friendships with, but less concerned 
with how a stranger would view them. Indeed, in the current study increasing the 
identity of the observer – from a technician in Izuma et al.’s (2011) study to another 
participant in the current study – appeared to produce observer effects for autistic 
adults. Typical individuals, conversely, seem to be inherently sensitive to their 
reputation in a multitude situations regardless of the identity of the person, or even if 
a real person is present (e.g. Nettle et al., 2012a; Oda et al., 2011).   
These results suggest that adults with autism do have the ability to manage reputation 
but a reduced propensity to do so. Frith and Frith (2011) proposed that adults with 
autism are “free of hypocrisy” since they did not manage their reputation whilst 
donating to charity (Izuma et al., 2011). Although this finding was replicated, autistic 
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individuals also showed a degree of reputation management in the motivation 
condition. It is likely that the typical adults in the motivation condition were 
motivated more by self-interest rather than by subtle attempts to manage reputation. 
Autistic adults, meanwhile, remain free of hypocrisy, as they attempt to utilise a 
norm of reciprocation, but do so out of believing in reciprocation itself, rather than to 
manipulate others.   
In sum, the current study found that reputation management was possible for autistic 
adults, but the propensity of reputation management occurring was reduced. These 
results suggest that autistic adults do not have a deficit when it comes to managing 
reputation: rather, they are less likely to manage reputation due to a number of 
possible factors. Appreciating what may lead autistic individuals to have different 
social perception is of great importance, and this thesis will consider some of the 
developmental factors that may underlie reputation management skill in subsequent 
chapters. However, surprisingly little is known about the development of reputation 
management in typical individuals – as shown in the current study, typical adults 
appear to be very sensitive to their reputation. Chapters Three and Four test the 
development of reputation management and its possible underlying mechanisms. 
Given that the current study suggested that there may be a distinction between 
implicit and explicit forms of reputation management, subsequent chapters will also 
consider this distinction in both typical and autistic children (Chapters Three to Six).    
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Chapter Three 
The development of reputation management in typical children 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Chapters Three to Six were conducted concurrently but are reported separately 
here for ease of interpretation.  
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3.1. Introduction 
As shown in Chapter Two, and many other previous studies, there is abundant 
evidence that typical adults manage their reputation (e.g., Izuma et al., 2011; Haley 
& Fessler, 2005; Ariely et al., 2009; Lamba & Mace, 2010). Yet, there is 
comparatively little research on the nature and extent of reputation management in 
typically developing children. Further, enhancing our knowledge of the typical 
development of reputation management will also serve to inform our understanding 
of how autistic children manage their reputation (Chapters Five and Six).  
Recent evidence suggests that typical children as young as 5 years may be capable of 
managing their reputation. Leimgruber et al. (2012) found that 5-year-old children 
shared more stickers with another child only when it was clear that the other child 
would see them sharing. Engelmann et al. (2012) also noted that when observed by a 
peer, children from the age of 5 would steal less and share more stickers. Finally, 
Shaw et al. (2014) noted that 6-year-old children could act with a “veil of fairness”. 
They found that children would appear generous by selecting a coin toss to delineate 
prizes, however, after completing the coin toss in private, they lied about the results 
to gain the best prize for themselves. Thus, it appears that some skill in reputation 
management may be present from at least 6 years.  
The above studies all noted a subtle and possibly automatic change in behaviour – 
for example sharing more or cheating less when observed – that may be 
conceptualised as implicit reputation management. Leimgruber et al. (2012) 
suggested that these subtle behaviour changes are implicit since the sensitivity to 
being observed occurs before children report an explicit understanding of reputation. 
Implicit reputation management and the automatic modulation of behaviour from a 
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young age could be beneficial for cooperation (Tomasello et al., 2012; Tomasello & 
Vaish, 2013) and ultimately for young children’s friendships. Children who share 
more and steal less when observed may be more likely to be chosen as partners for 
play.  
There are times, though, when an individual expends more effort to actively manage 
reputation, for example, by deliberately altering behaviour to achieve a certain 
reputation that could ensure future benefits. Evidence for explicit reputation 
management in childhood has previously been derived from the self-presentation 
literature. Self-presentation can be thought of as a more deliberate and strategic 
means to obtain a desired image (Banaji & Prentice, 1994; DePaulo, 1992).  Previous 
research suggests that it is not until around 8 years that children attempt to 
deliberately self-promote (Aloise-Young, 1993; Banerjee, 2002a, 2002b). Also, it is 
not until 8 years of age that children explicitly report an understanding of the 
concepts surrounding reputation, such as how gossip can contribute to one’s 
reputation (Hill & Pillow, 2006).  
Shaw et al. (2013) propose that these implicit and explicit distinctions are an 
important facet of reputation management, and claim that implicit reputation 
management appears prior to explicit reputation management. However, there is a 
paucity of research in support of this explicit-implicit distinction in childhood, that 
is, whether during typical development there is evidence for such a distinction, and 
whether the two aspects show different developmental trajectories. To the best of my 
knowledge, no other study has attempted to test both implicit and explicit forms of 
reputation management within the same group of children. 
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3.1.1. The current study  
This study investigated the development of reputation management by using novel 
tasks to measure both implicit and explicit reputation management in children aged 6 
to 14 years. This age range was selected as, given the research discussed above, one 
may expect to find reputation management from 6 years of age. This study is thus 
interested in how this ability develops across time and into adolescence. Using a 
large age range enabled me to determine whether explicit and implicit manifestations 
of reputation management follow different developmental trajectories.  
Novel tasks were designed to examine both implicit and explicit reputation 
management. To test for implicit reputation management, children completed several 
one-shot dictator games (Camerer & Fehr, 2002), where they were asked to decide 
how many points they wanted to share with others. Crucially, children completed this 
task once alone and once when observed by another child. If children implicitly 
manage reputation, they should be sensitive to observation and share more points 
when observed (Frith & Frith, 2008b). To test for explicit reputation management, 
children were presented with a situation in which they believed they had performed 
poorly on a task. They then had the opportunity to protect their reputation by 
deciding whether they wanted other people to know how they had performed on the 
task. If children have an explicit awareness of their reputation being at stake, then 
they should decide to prevent other people becoming aware of their poor 
performance.  
I predicted that there would be a distinction between explicit and implicit reputation 
management, as suggested by Shaw et al. (2013). In line with previous research 
(Engelmann et al., 2012; Leimgruber et al., 2012; Shaw et al., 2014), it is predicted 
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that implicit reputation management – as manifested by a subtle change in behaviour 
when observed – should appear from 6 years. A more deliberate and explicit form of 
reputation management, as shown by a desire to protect one’s reputation when it is 
clearly at stake, should be present later on in development, by approximately 8 years, 
as suggested by self-presentation research (Aloise-Young, 1993; Banerjee, 2002a, 
2002b; Banerjee & Yuill, 1999).  
3.2. Method 
3.2.1. Participants  
Ninety-four typically developing children took part in the current study, aged from 6 
to 14 years. These children were categorised into four age groups, 6-7 year-olds, 8-9 
year-olds, 10-11 year-olds and 12-14 year-olds, as shown in Table 8. Children were 
recruited through primary schools and Scout groups in the London area, and through 
a science club run at the Institute of Education during the school holidays.  
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Table 8.  
Descriptive statistics, including mean, standard deviation and range, for age, gender 
and intelligence quotient (IQ) measures for each age group.  
  6-7 year-
olds 
8-9 year-
olds 
10-11 year-
olds 
12-14 year-
olds 
n  26 26 19 23 
Gender ratio 
(M:F) 
 17 : 9 12 : 14 9 : 10 7 : 16 
Chronologi-
cal age 
(years)  
M (SD) 6.82 (.65) 8.94 (.52) 10.75 (.62) 13.17 (.86) 
Range 5.46 – 7.88 8.08 – 9.87 10.00 – 11.80 12.15 – 15.21 
Verbal 
mental age* 
M (SD) 7.11 (1.01) 9.66 (1.27) 12.11 (1.17) 13.91 (1.57) 
Range 5.46 – 9.10 6.69 – 11.43 10.30 – 14.63 10.66 – 17.51 
Full-scale IQ  M (SD) 105.38 (12.37) 107.04 (11.77) 111.42 (8.51) 105.04 (10.81) 
Range 85 – 129 80 – 128 93 – 125 87 – 129 
Verbal IQ  M (SD) 104.27 (10.78) 107.81 (11.08) 113.63 (9.51) 105.61 (9.48) 
 Range 80 – 120 80 – 123 102 – 134 86 – 131 
Performance 
IQ  
M (SD) 105.08 (14.95) 104.69 (18.23) 106.79 (11.44) 102.78 (12.26) 
Range 74 – 132 67 – 150 83 – 131 79 – 119 
Notes. *Verbal mental age was calculated by dividing verbal IQ by chronological age, and then 
multiplying by 100. IQ was measured using the WASI-II (see section 3.2.4).  
Although the gender distribution within each age group differed, a chi-square test 
showed that there was no significant association between age group and gender, χ²(3) 
= 6.03, p=.11, φ =.25. MANOVA was used to test for differences in the IQ measures 
(see section 3.2.4) between age groups, and revealed only a significant main effect of 
age for verbal IQ, F(3, 90) = 3.35, p=.022, ηp
2
=.10. Post-hoc corrections revealed 
that this was driven by a significant difference between 6 to 7-year-olds and 10 to 11-
year-olds, p=.021. Controlling for verbal IQ, however, did not change any of the 
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results reported in this chapter or Chapter Four. The contribution of verbal ability to 
reputation management and its potential mechanisms in typical development is 
further considered in section 4.3.2.  
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the Faculty of Policy and Society’s 
Research Ethics Committee at the Institute of Education, London. Children over the 
age of 11 years gave their written consent to take part in the research and children 
under the age of 11 gave verbal assent. Immediately prior to the research, children 
confirmed that they understood that their parents had agreed to allow their 
participation, were briefed on the nature of the research and were told that they could 
stop the research at any time. Children were debriefed verbally following the 
conclusion of the research and parents’ received a debrief letter outlining the aims of 
the research.  
3.2.2. Design 
The current study had a mixed design. The independent variable for both the explicit 
and implicit reputation management tasks was age group (6 – 7 years, 8 – 9 years, 10 
– 11 years and 12 – 14 years). The dependent variables for each task are outlined 
below.  
3.2.3. Materials & procedure 
Two novel tasks were designed to measure whether children manage their reputation, 
both implicitly and explicitly. The order of conditions within both these tasks was 
counterbalanced (see below). All tasks were presented on 13” Windows 7 Toshiba 
Portege laptops using MATLAB (The Mathworks, Massachusetts, USA) and Cogent 
toolbox (LON, FIL, & ICN, London, UK).  
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Introduction to Verden. All tasks (including those described in Chapters Four to 
Six) took place in the context of a pretend online gaming world named ‘Verden’, 
which served to engage children with the experimental tasks and to create an 
overarching theme to the study. Children were led to believe that they were logging 
in to Verden, where there were many different games for them to explore and other 
players online with whom they could interact. Each player was represented by a 
simple avatar and the child was able to choose his/her own avatar (Figure 9). 
Furthermore, children could accumulate points throughout the session, which they 
could also spend. The amount of points was fixed across participants, to help keep 
the external motivation for points similar. Subsequently, all children were rewarded 
200 ‘bonus points’ for joining Verden. Following this introduction, children 
completed the implicit reputation management task and the explicit reputation 
management task was completed later on in the session (see section 4.2.2 for full 
details of task orders).  
 
Figure 9. Excerpts of children’s introduction to Verden (manually controlled by 
experimenter). 
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Implicit reputation management task. This task was designed to test whether 
children would change their behaviour when observed by sharing more points with 
another player, which would indicate implicit reputation management. Children 
played 10 one-shot dictator games once unobserved and once when observed, 
resulting in 20 trials in total. These dictator games were played with other players in 
the online world. Children were instructed that they were going to play a decision 
making game: “You are going to meet some of the other players in Verden. Each 
time you meet a new player, you will get 10 points. You can give him or her some or 
all of these points and you keep the rest”. Children were then asked, “How much do 
you want to give [name of other player]?” Children input the number of points they 
wished to give to the other player (between 0 and 10 points) using the keyboard. S/he 
then viewed the number of points the other person would receive and how many 
points they themselves would keep (Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10. Example of a single trial from the implicit reputation task, in which 
children are first asked how many points they would like to share with the other 
player. After making their choice, the allocation points to the other and to the self 
were shown on-screen.  
To familiarise children with the trial procedure, they all completed one practice trial 
before the experimental trials. The experimenter read the on-screen layout (as shown 
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in Figure 10) and showed children the keys they would be using to make their 
choices. Children were briefed on how points could be divided, by showing them the 
various combinations they could use on a sheet of paper. For example, if they gave 
the other person 0 points, they would keep 10 points, and if they gave 1 point, they 
would keep 9 points, and so on. This sheet was left out for all children to consult, if 
needed. Children were also reminded that they were free to make any decision they 
desired. 
All children completed the implicit reputation task under two conditions: once 
unobserved and once whilst observed by another child. The other child was being 
tested separately on the same tasks with another experimenter. Therefore, two 
children were tested at the same time, with two experimenters, Experimenter 1 and 
Experimenter 2. The two children observed one another completing the task during 
the observer condition.  
To justify why the two children needed to observe one another completing the task, 
an error occurred on one of the children’s laptops. The order of observed and 
unobserved conditions was counterbalanced across children. If the children 
completed the unobserved condition first, the error occurred after the first 10 trials of 
the task. If the children completed the observed condition first, the error occurred 
immediately after they had been introduced to Verden.  The word ‘error’ appeared 
several times in red on screen followed by ‘terminate program’. 
Following the error, Experimenter 1 (E1) exclaimed that something had gone wrong 
and suggested they could ask Experimenter 2 (E2) for help. E1 subsequently took the 
child to where E2 was completing the tasks with the other child. E1 described the 
problem to E2, who then went to “fix” the broken laptop. In the meantime, E1 
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suggested the two children should play the decision making game together while E2 
attempted to fix the laptop. To ensure that the child observing was paying attention, 
and that it was clear to the child being observed that s/he was being observed, the 
child who was observing was asked to write down all of the other child’s answers. 
This was justified on the premise that E1 was particularly worried that something 
was wrong with Verden and the laptops, thus it would help if the other child assisted 
by writing down the other child’s decisions, lest the laptop broke again.  
Once one child had completed the task whilst observed, the children exchanged 
places so that the other child could complete 10 trials observed. Once both children 
had observed each other completing the task, E2 returned and claimed the broken 
laptop had been fixed. If the unobserved condition had been first, children moved on 
to the next task. If the observed condition was first, they completed the task again 
unobserved, under the premise that they had to “do it again just to double check all 
the laptops were working”. The mean number of points (from 0 to 10) given in the 
observed and unobserved conditions were calculated followed by the observer effect 
(the difference score between observed and unobserved conditions). This novel 
measure taps implicit reputation management by testing whether children are 
affected by the presence of an observer, by increasing the number of points given in 
the observed condition in order to appear generous.  
Explicit reputation management task. This task was designed to test whether 
children would attempt to manage their reputation when it was explicitly at risk, by 
giving them the opportunity to prevent others knowing about poor performance on a 
game, and thus protect their reputation. Children were asked to test games in Verden. 
These games were simple computer games run through MATLAB, suitable for a 
wide age range, namely ‘Snake’ (Ekstrom, 2007) and ‘Connect Four’ (Stahl, 2001). 
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Children also played a third game which was a measure of inhibitory control under 
the pretext of a game (as described in Chapter Four). Children first played Snake, 
followed by Connect Four, and finally the inhibitory control task. After playing 
‘Snake’ and ‘Connect Four’ for approximately 2 minutes each, children were 
informed that all other players in Verden had been playing the game, and a leader 
board was available. Children were subsequently asked if they would like to view 
their position on the leader board, a binary choice of ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Unbeknownst to 
them, their position on the leader board was manipulated, such that children either 
came in first place or in eighth place (out of 10 players) on the leader board. Leader 
board position was counterbalanced, such that children either came first or eighth 
place following the first game, with the converse displayed following the second 
game. If children decided to view the leader board, they were further asked whether 
they would like to save their position by making a simple yes/no judgement. It was 
emphasised that saving would mean that others would be able to view their position 
on the leader board. Children were then asked how many points (out of 10) they 
would like to spend in order to save or not save their score (Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11. Example trial structure during the explicit reputation task. Children were 
first given the option to see the leader board, and if they decided to do so, they saw 
their position on the leader board (either first or eighth). They were then asked if they 
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would like to save their score, followed by how many points they would like to 
spend to save or not save their score.   
The dependent variables of interest in this task were children’s binary choices of 
whether or not they wanted to (1) see the leader board, (2) save or not save their 
position, and (3) the number of points spent either to save or not save. Children who 
said “no” to saving their position on the leader board when they appeared near the 
bottom were considered to have explicitly managed their reputation, since they 
protected their reputation by preventing others knowing that they had performed 
poorly on one of the games. All children played a third and final game (the inhibitory 
control task, described in section 4.2.3) in which they came top of the leader board, 
which ensured that the session ended on a positive note. 
3.2.4. Intellectual functioning 
Intellectual ability, shown in Table 8 above, was measured using the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI-II; Wechsler, 2011). The WASI-II has 
been validated for use with children from 6 years of age and gauges an individual’s 
verbal, perceptual and full-scale intelligence quotients. This information was used to 
profile the ability level of the children in this study.   
3.3. Results  
Implicit reputation management. The mean number of points given to the other 
when observed and unobserved was calculated, followed by the ‘observer effect’ – 
the difference score between observed and unobserved conditions. There was an 
outlier in the 12 – 14 age group with an observer effect z-score of -6.22, exceeding 
the recommended cut off for outliers (Field, 2009). This outlier was therefore 
removed from subsequent analyses.   
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The mean number of points shared when unobserved and observed according to age 
group is shown in Figure 12 below. Initial inspection of this figure shows a general 
increase in the number of points shared over time, and possible differences between 
observed and unobserved conditions for children in the 12 – 14 year-old group.  
 
Figure 12. Mean number of points given to other players when unobserved and 
observed for each age group. Error bars indicate +/- one standard error.  
The observer effect was calculated by subtracting the number of points shared when 
unobserved from the number of points shared when observed. Figure 13 below 
shows box plots, including individual data, of this observer effect. The data appears 
to show that there may be a reduction in the variation of the observer effect with age. 
A one-way between-participants ANOVA was conducted on the observer effect to 
test for differences between the age groups, and found no significant main effect of 
age group, F(89) = .75, p=.52, ηp
2 
=.025. Further analyses using one-sample t-tests 
were used to test whether this observer effect significantly differed from zero, to 
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establish whether observation caused a significant change in behaviour. Only 12- to 
14-year-olds showed an observer effect that was approaching significance, t(21) = 
1.50, p=.074, r=.31, one-tailed.  
 
Figure 13. Box plots of the observer effect across each age group, including 
individual data (circles, outlier removed). The dotted line represents no observer 
effect (i.e. the child gave the same number of points when observed and unobserved). 
Explicit reputation management. In this task, children had the opportunity to see 
their position on a leader board after playing a game. There were a number of 
children within each group who did not want to see the leader board at all: when they 
would have been top of the leader board, four 6-7 year-olds, two 8-9 year-olds, and 
one 10-11 year-old elected not to view the leader board. All 12-14 year-olds 
indicated that they wanted to see the leader board. When they would have appeared 
bottom of the leader board, four 6-7 year-olds, two 8-9 year-olds, and two 12-14 
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year-olds indicated that they did not want to see the leader board. All 10-11 year-olds 
wanted to see the leader board in this condition. Those who elected not to see the 
leader board moved on to the next task. Table 9 shows only children who did want to 
see the leader board, and the number of children who decided to save or not save 
their position when they were in top or bottom position.  
Table 9. 
Number of children in each group who chose to save or not save their position on the 
leader board (top or bottom).  
 Position 
 Top of the leader board Bottom of the leader board 
Save? Yes No Yes No 
6 – 7 years 20 2 10 12 
8 – 9 years 23 1 6 18 
10 – 11 years 17 1 8 11 
12 – 14 years 23 0 11 10 
 
Considering children’s decisions when they came top of the leader board, the 
majority of children in each age group decided to save their position. Chi-square 
confirmed that there was no association between age group and decision to save 
when top, χ2(3) = 2.17, p=.53, φ =.16. Furthermore, binomial tests confirmed that all 
groups were significantly above chance for selecting to save their position (all 
ps<.001).  
When bottom of the leader board, several children within each age group indicated 
that they did not want to save their position. Chi-square showed that there was no 
significant association between age group and decision to save when bottom of the 
leader board, χ2(3) = 3.86, p=.28, φ =.21. Binomial tests were used to test whether 
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any group differed from chance in their decision to save when bottom. Only 8-9 
year-old children differed significantly from chance (p=.023), with children of this 
age tending to decide not to save their position when bottom of the leader board, 
whilst the other age groups showed no distinct preference for saving. 
Following their decision, children were asked to indicate how many points (between 
0 and 10) they wanted to spend to save (or not to save) their score (Table 10). This 
measure was designed to indicate children’s motivation to save (or not to save) their 
position on the leader board. 
Table 10. 
Mean number of points (and standard deviation) spent following decision to save (or 
not to save) position on the leader board, according to each age group.  
 Position 
 Top of the leader board Bottom of the leader board 
 Yes No Yes No 
6 – 7 years 3.30 (3.94) 5.00 (7.07) 2.20 (3.16) 1.58 (1.73) 
8 – 9 years 4.65 (3.58) 0.00 (.00) 4.17 (4.12) 1.83 (2.23) 
10 – 11 years 5.13 (2.36) 5.00 (.00) 1.63 (1.69) 4.00 (3.62) 
12 – 14 years 4.61 (3.13) - 3.00 (3.03) 5.20 (3.05) 
 
A 2 (decision to save: yes or no) x 4 (age group) between-participants ANOVA was 
conducted on the number of points spent when children had come bottom of the 
leader board. There was no significant main effects of age group, F(1, 77) = 2.20, 
p=.093, ηp
2 
=.08 or decision to save, F(1, 77) = .41, p=.53, ηp
2 
=.005. There was, 
however, a significant interaction between age group and decision to save, F(1, 77) = 
3.11, p=.031, ηp
2 
=.11. To examine this interaction, planned comparisons using one-
way ANOVA on the number of points spent revealed only a significant main effect 
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of age, F(3, 49) = 5.08, p=.004, ηp
2 
=.25. Specifically, post-hoc corrections showed 
that 12-14 year-olds differed from 6-7 year-olds (p=.015) and 8-9 year-olds (p=.014) 
by spending more points not to save their leader board position.  
3.4. Discussion  
Given the paucity of research and available tasks for examining reputation 
management during typical development, the current study used novel tasks to 
determine when explicit and implicit reputation management emerge during 
development, and whether these two aspects of reputation management have 
different developmental trajectories. The results suggest that implicit reputation 
management may not emerge until much later on in development than anticipated, 
possibly not until adolescence. Explicit reputation management, however, appeared 
earlier in development at approximately 8 years.  
Little evidence of implicit reputation management was found across all age groups, 
although there was a trend towards an effect for children aged 12 to 14 years. There 
are two alternative explanations for this result: either the task was not sufficiently 
sensitive to detect implicit reputation management, or implicit reputation 
management does not emerge until later adolescence.  
Considering the suggestion that the task was not sensitive enough, studies with adults 
frequently use subtle measures to measure implicit reputation management: for 
example, adults will donate more to charity when observed by another person (Izuma 
et al., 2011, Chapter Two) and even alter their behaviour when only a pair of eyes are 
present (Bateson et al., 2006; Nettle et al., 2012a). Interestingly, in my study with 
adults (Chapter Two), a significant observer effect was found when typical adults 
donated to charity, but not when they donated money to other people. This finding 
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may suggest that this context was also not sufficiently sensitive to produce reputation 
effects, and that typical individuals may select to change their behaviour more in 
situations when it is clear that they could gain reputational benefits, for example, by 
looking like a generous person by donating more money specifically to charity when 
observed (Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Izuma et al., 2011). Implicit reputation 
management, in this sense, may not be truly implicit, if observation only triggers 
reputation management in situations where there is a clear benefit to the self. Indeed, 
Nettle et al. (2012a) suggest that people change their behaviour in response to subtle 
cues precisely to appear generous. Young children also have been noted to attempt 
to operate a “veil of fairness” in order to appear generous (Shaw et al., 2014) 
suggesting that the so-called subtleties of implicit reputation management may have 
a degree of deliberate intent to appear as a “good” person only in specific conditions 
which are more likely to lend to this type of reputation (e.g. donating to charity rather 
than a person). In this way, I suggest that implicit reputation management may in fact 
be a honed skill that develops into adulthood, whereby it becomes more automatic in 
nature, resulting in more consistent effects of observation (Bateson et al., 2006; 
Nettle et al., 2012a; Oda et al., 2011).  
Adolescence is therefore proposed to be an important time in the development of 
implicit reputation management. During adolescence, young people become more 
sensitive to what others think of them (Blakemore & Mills, 2014; Sebastian, Burnett, 
& Blakemore, 2008), which may lend itself to a greater degree of implicit reputation 
management. This suggestion and the current findings conflict with previous 
research which found implicit reputation management in children as young as 5 years 
(Engelmann et al., 2012; Leimgruber et al., 2012). Arguably, these previous studies 
test reputation management in a context which is not entirely implicit. Rather, that 
127 
 
there is a risk of punishment in these studies: for example, a peer could tattle on the 
child for stealing stickers in Engelmann et al.’s (2012) study, and in Leimgruber et 
al.’s (2012) study children were sharing directly with the observer, a familiar child, 
who could potentially punish their actions in future interactions. In the current study, 
children were watched by an unfamiliar child while sharing points with a player in an 
online gaming world. An increase in the number of points shared when observed 
may suggest a true indication of implicit reputation management since other 
variables, such as risk of punishment, are reduced, and there is no obvious benefit to 
changing one’s behaviour other than to boost one’s reputation. Engelmann et al. 
(2012) acknowledge that concern for reputation likely peaks in adolescence 
alongside greater experiences with peers. Indeed, changing behaviour when observed 
due to a concern for punishment is likely a preceding step before a concern 
specifically for reputation motivates behaviour.  
In the explicit reputation management task, where children had the opportunity to 
protect their reputation when it was clearly at stake, there was a peak at 8 to 9 years 
of age, where children of this age decided at above chance levels to protect their 
reputation by not saving their position on a leader board. All other age groups 
showed no distinct preference when bottom of the leader board. When top of the 
leader board, all age groups tended to choose to save their position, suggesting that 
this task was valid in measuring explicit reputation management. At 8 to 9 years, 
there may have been a greater desire to protect reputation for several reasons. 
Previous research has suggested that 8-year-old children begin to use deliberate self-
presentational strategies (Aloise-Young, 1993; Banerjee, 2002a, 2002b), implying 
that at this age children may have a new and heightened sensitivity to presenting the 
self in a positive light. Additionally, there may be a general shift towards less 
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egocentric thinking at 8 years (Fehr et al., 2008), and thus a greater awareness that 
one’s behaviour could be judged by others. In the current task, children were being 
assessed on their competency in computer games. Children aged 8 to 9 may be 
particularly concerned about their comparative performance in these games, while 
older children may put greater emphasis on performance in other aspects of life, such 
as social competency (Sebastian et al., 2008). Interestingly, older children decided to 
spend more points specifically not to save their position on the leader board when 
they came near the bottom. This finding could reflect the fact that the older children 
who did decide to protect their reputation were more concerned (and therefore 
willing to pay more) about preventing others from knowing about their allegedly 
poor performance in the game. In turn, this finding could reflect older children’s 
hypothesised increased concern for reputation (Sebastian et al., 2008). However, 
since the older children showed no distinct preference for whether or not they 
decided to protect their reputation in the first place, there could be great individual 
differences in this explicit concern for reputation, which may also be impacted upon 
by personality correlates such as extraversion. Karmiloff-Smith (1990) also notes 
that development can follow a U-shaped rather than linear trajectory, with different 
mechanisms influencing development at different stages – as Chapter Four sets out to 
examine. The current data (see Table 9) suggest that explicit reputation management 
may follow a U-shaped developmental trajectory. 
3.4.1. Limitations and future directions 
Given the small sample size of each age group, caution in interpreting the results, 
particularly those related to implicit reputation management, is warranted. The effect 
of observation was only showing a trend towards significance for 12-14 year-olds, 
although the effect size was moderate. Another means to examine the lack of implicit 
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reputation management is to test the possible mechanisms underpinning reputation 
management, as Chapter Four intends to examine in typical development. This 
approach could elucidate whether any specific mechanisms can explain exactly why 
implicit reputation management may not occur until adolescence. Further, extending 
the age range into later adolescence and using the same tasks as described here could 
confirm the hypothesis that implicit reputation management does not emerge until 
later in development. Given the suggested importance of peers (Blakemore & Mills, 
2014), it would be interesting to manipulate the identity of the observer, with the 
assumption that friends would cause a greater degree of reputation management than 
unfamiliar peers.  
Although there were interesting results regarding the number of points spent to save 
(or not to save) children’s leader board position, there are some limitations to this 
measure. It could be the case that older children assign less reward value to the 
points, meaning that they are willing to spend more points. However, there was a 
specific effect for older children who said “no” to saving when bottom of the leader 
board, such that they spent more to ensure others did not know that they had come 
bottom of the leader board. This indicates that this is a valid measure for indicating 
motivation. This “point spending” measure is therefore currently a useful metric to 
attempt to gauge children’s motivation behind their binary decision.  
The current findings suggest that reputation management may have a relatively 
protracted development, both implicitly and explicitly. Implicit reputation 
management did not appear until early adolescence. Explicit reputation management 
appeared at around 8 years of age, but appeared to become more refined and 
selective during later childhood. Chapter Four will consider precisely which specific 
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cognitive mechanisms might underlie the ability to manage reputation during typical 
development, in an attempt to explain this variability in reputation management.  
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Chapter Four 
The mechanisms underpinning reputation management in typical development 
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4.1. Introduction 
The results of Chapter Three showed that there are two different types of reputation 
management – one that is implicit and one that is explicit in nature – and these 
appear to follow distinct developmental trajectories. The results indicated that 
implicit reputation management has a relatively protracted development, not present 
until adolescence. Explicit reputation management, however, appeared at 
approximately 8 years. Further research is needed to enhance our understanding of 
the underlying psychological mechanisms that may explain these trajectories. As 
such, the current study considered four potential underlying mechanisms – theory of 
mind, social motivation, expectations of reciprocity, and inhibitory control – to 
strengthen and expand our knowledge of the development of both explicit and 
implicit reputation management in typical children. Furthermore, understanding 
these underlying mechanisms could help enhance understanding of individual 
differences within reputation management.  
The ability to think about the thoughts, beliefs and desires of other people – theory of 
mind (ToM) – seems necessary for reputation management (Izuma, 2012), since one 
must be able to think about how they are seen in the eyes of others before they 
manage reputation. As such, those with better ToM skills may be better at managing 
their reputation. Only one study has directly tested the link between ToM and 
reputation management in children, however. Banerjee and Yuill (1999) found an 
association between understanding of self-presentational motives and second-order 
ToM in children aged 6 to 8 years, with those with better ToM skill having a better 
understanding of self-presentation. Self-presentation can be considered an aspect of 
explicit reputation management, with individuals consciously aware that they are 
presenting the self in a deliberate way. Hill and Pillow (2006) also speculate, 
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although do not measure, a relationship between ToM and a child’s reported 
understanding of reputation.  
Even if a child possesses a theory of others’ minds they must be motivated to use this 
ability (Apperly, 2012). Some argue that such social motivation can be evidenced 
early on in development. For example, Chevallier et al. (2012a) claim that social 
orientation – as expressed by preference for faces – indicates an early preference for 
social stimuli that means these stimuli are rewarding from infancy. Chevallier et al. 
(2012a) also claim that social maintaining, the desire and effort made to sustain 
social relationships, is another manifestation of social motivation. The techniques 
children use to maintain social relationships may include self-presentational 
strategies and ingratiating behaviours. Fu and Lee (2007) investigated the 
development of flattery, an effective means of ingratiation. They found that 6-year-
old children tended to flatter the artist of a drawing when its artist was observing 
them, suggesting that they were socially motivated to maintain a positive relationship 
with the artist and perhaps establish a good reputation.  
Another potential mechanism underlying reputation management is reciprocity. 
Direct reciprocity is a contingent behavioural response to another’s actions, often 
thought of as “tit for tat” (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). For example, one could 
respond to another’s behaviour either by rewarding, matching or punishing that 
behaviour. Reciprocity is thought to be one of the foundations of cooperation (West 
et al., 2011). Children from the age of around 5 begin to consistently match their 
partner’s behaviour in terms of reciprocity in a cooperation game (House, Henrich, 
Sarnecka & Silk, 2013). Reciprocity can also be thought of as a norm that is learned 
and followed in social interactions (Gouldner, 1960). From around the age of five, 
children report an understanding of the norm of reciprocity (Berndt, 1977).  
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An expectation of reciprocity may be necessary for reputation management. Indirect 
reciprocity is a key method by which reputational information is transferred – if 
individual A is observed helping individual B by a third party (individual C), C may 
then help A on the basis of their previous helping behaviour. C may also pass on 
information about A’s previous behaviour to others (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). 
Olson and Spelke (2008) report evidence for indirect reciprocity in children as young 
as 3.5 years. Understanding how the principle of reciprocity links to one’s reputation, 
and expecting that others will reciprocate, could contribute to the propensity of 
reputation management. Specifically, one must expect others to reciprocate – either 
directly or indirectly – in order to invest valuable time and resources into managing 
reputation.  
Developmental changes in executive function could also affect the extent of 
reputation management in childhood. Executive functions incorporate a number of 
cognitive processes that underlie goal-directed behaviour (Best & Miller, 2010), 
which develop throughout childhood and adolescence (Blakemore & Mills, 2014). 
Executive functions include response inhibition, working memory, and shifting, 
components which may be separable and have different developmental trajectories 
(Huizinga et al., 2006). In this chapter I focus specifically on inhibitory control. 
Inhibitory control could play a particularly important role in reputation management 
given that in order to present oneself in a particular way, one may need to inhibit 
certain behaviours that may be detrimental to successful reputation management.  
4.1.1. The current study  
The current study examined for the first time the potential mechanisms underlying 
reputation management in typical development. Specifically, I investigated whether 
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individual differences in reputation management were associated with variation in 
children’s theory of mind, social motivation, expectations of reciprocity and 
inhibitory control. The same children from Chapter Three participated in the current 
study, and all had completed the tasks measuring explicit and implicit reputation 
management. Specifically, in the explicit reputation management task children had 
the opportunity to protect their reputation when it was clearly at risk. In the implicit 
reputation management task, children were observed by a peer sharing points with 
another player – any differences in the amount of sharing compared to when they 
were unobserved was suggestive of implicit reputation management. 
The four mechanisms were tested using a number of tasks designed to tap into these 
mechanisms. Second-order ToM was measured with the Strange Stories task (Happé, 
1995; White et al., 2009a). Social motivation was measured by giving children the 
choice between playing on their own or with someone else, and children were also 
asked to complete the Friendship Motivation Questionnaire (Richard & Schneider, 
2005). Previous research has examined attention to social stimuli such as static 
images of faces as an index of social motivation. However, Risko, Laidlaw, Freeth, 
Foulsham, and Kingstone (2012) note that these static stimuli are far from real social 
rewards, such as a real social interaction. Therefore, the possibility of receiving the 
reward of interacting with another person should provide a more direct test of a 
child’s social motivation than previous methods. Third, children’s expectations of 
reciprocity were measured by adapting the dictator game. Finally, the current study 
measured inhibition skills using a child-friendly go/no-go task (Cragg & Nation, 
2008). 
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4.2. Method 
4.2.1. Participants 
The same participants from Chapter Three completed all of the below measures (n = 
94, see section 3.2.1). The children were divided into the same age groups: 6-7 year-
olds (n = 26), 8-9 year-olds (n = 26), 10-11 year-olds (n = 19) and 12-14 year-olds (n 
= 23).  
4.2.2. Design 
This study used an individual differences design. The outcome variables were two 
measures of reputation management (“explicit” and “implicit”), as detailed in 
Chapter Three (section 3.2.3). The predictor variables were the four possible 
mechanisms of reputation management - theory of mind, social motivation, 
expectations of reciprocity, and inhibitory control (Figure 14). 
 
 
137 
 
 
Figure 14. Illustration of study design. Tasks are presented in rectangular boxes 
while the constructs the tasks have been designed to measure are presented in 
ellipses.  
Tasks were presented in two 20 to 30 minute sessions administered in a fixed order. 
Session one included the implicit reputation task, social motivation and the Strange 
Stories task (Happé, 1994; White et al., 2009a). Session two included tasks designed 
to measure reciprocity, the explicit reputation task, the inhibitory control task (the 
go/no-go task), and the Friendship Motivation Questionnaire (Richard & Schneider, 
2005). A fixed order was used to ensure that all individuals were exposed to identical 
contexts, a method frequently used in individual differences research (Carlson & 
Moses, 2001). This study was primarily interested in individual differences rather 
than mean level performance on tasks. If there is a carryover effect across tasks, then 
this effect would be similar for all individuals (Bell, 2012). 
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4.2.3. Materials and procedure 
As outlined in Chapter Three, all of the tasks were administered on 13” Toshiba 
laptops using MATLAB (The Mathworks, Massachusetts, USA) and Cogent toolbox 
(LON, FIL, & ICN, London, UK). 
All children had previously completed the measures of explicit and implicit 
reputation management (section 3.2.3). In the explicit reputation management task, 
after playing a game children saw their position on a leader board, and had the 
opportunity to save this position. I manipulated whether they appeared first or eighth 
place on the leader board, under the premise that some children would be less likely 
to want others to know that they had come eighth rather than first place. Thus, 
children who said “no” to saving their position on the leader board when they 
appeared near the bottom were considered to have explicitly managed their 
reputation. In the implicit reputation management task, children completed 10 one-
shot dictator games once when unobserved and once when observed. Any difference 
in the number of points shared between the observed and unobserved conditions was 
considered indicative of implicit reputation management.  
Theory of mind. Reasoning about others’ minds was tested using the Strange Stories 
task (Happé, 1994). This task involves a series of stories designed to tap second-
order ToM, which includes more complicated understanding of others’ minds. The 
original Strange Stories task (Happé, 1994) was designed to test autistic individuals’ 
ToM abilities in a context beyond the false belief task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), 
including concepts such as deception, double bluff and persuasion. Fletcher et al. 
(1995) and subsequently White et al. (2009a) reduced these stories to a subset of 
eight mental state stories and eight physical stories, which were designed to assess 
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reasoning about the physical world, and to test general story comprehension. White 
et al. (2009a), however, noted that there might be confounding factors within the 
physical stories, namely that many involved a human agent. They therefore 
introduced an alternative set of “nature” stories, rather than physical stories. The 
nature stories are thought to enable a more reliable exploration of the differences 
between mental state reasoning and general reasoning ability. White et al. (2009a) 
found that performance on the nature stories tended to be better in children with 
autism than their performance on physical stories – confirming that the physical 
stories may be confounded by other variables.  
Consequently, six mental state stories and six nature stories (to capitalise on time in 
the current study) were used from White et al.’s (2009a) battery. The text of each 
story was presented on the computer screen accompanied by an appropriate picture. 
The order of presentation of stories, either mental state or nature, were presented in a 
randomised order for each child. The experimenter read each story aloud and then 
asked the child one question. Answers were scored 0 for an incorrect answer, 1 for a 
partially correct answer and 2 for a fully correct answer (maximum total score 12 
points); see Table 11 for examples. 
Table 11. 
Example of mental state and nature stories from White et al.’s (2009a) Strange 
Stories task. 
Story type Mental State Nature 
Story text One day Aunt Jane came to visit 
Peter. Now Peter loves his aunt very 
much, but today she is wearing a new 
hat; a new hat which Peter thinks is 
very ugly indeed. Peter thinks his 
aunt looks silly in it and much nicer 
In stormy weather, rocks often fall 
from the top of mountains. One day 
on a mountain in the Dolomites, a 
very large boulder becomes loose and 
starts rolling down the mountain. It 
rolls and rolls and rolls, gathering 
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in her old hat. But when Aunt Jane 
asks Peter, “How do you like my 
new hat”, Peter says, “Oh, it’s very 
nice”.  
speed and spinning and bouncing off 
the mountain side. Suddenly, there is 
a very noisy splash. 
Question Why does he say that? Why is there a loud splash? 
Incorrect answer  
(0 points) 
Reference to irrelevant or incorrect 
facts/feelings (he likes the hat, he 
wants to trick her). 
Reference to irrelevant or incorrect 
factors (it’s very big so it’s very 
noisy). 
Partially correct 
answer (1 point) 
Reference to trait (he’s a nice boy) or 
relationship (he likes his aunt); 
purely motivational (so she won’t 
shout at him) with no reference to 
aunt’s thoughts or feelings; 
incomplete explanation (he’s lying, 
he’s pretending). 
Reference to water without reference 
to the boulder (there was a pool at the 
bottom of the mountain). 
Fully correct answer 
(2 points) 
Reference to white lie or wanting to 
spare her feelings; some implication 
that this is for aunt’s benefit rather 
than his, desire to avoid rudeness or 
insult. 
Reference to the boulder falling into 
water to make the splash (the boulder 
must have fallen into a lake). 
 
Social motivation. Social motivation was measured with two tasks which intended 
to gauge children’s desire to be social. The first measure of social motivation was 
designed as an ecologically valid task. To begin, children were told that their 
assistance was required to test some of the new games in Verden, the online gaming 
world. Critically, they had the choice of playing either a two-player game with 
someone else or a one-player game on their own. Once they had made their choice, 
they were asked how many points (ranging from 0 to 10) they were prepared to 
“pay” to play either with someone or on their own, as a measure of motivation for 
their decision (Figure 15).  
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Figure 15. Task presentation in the social motivation task. Children were asked 
whether they wanted to play a game with someone or on their own, followed by how 
many points they would like to spend to play with someone or on their own.  
If the child decided to play a game with someone else, they played the two-player 
game “pong” (Buckingham, 2011). If the child wanted to play alone, s/he played the 
one-player game “Stellaria” (Zhang, 2011). Each game lasted approximately 3 
minutes and was selected due to their suitability for a wide age range of children. 
The identity of the games was not revealed until the children had made their choice 
and performance was not recorded on these games. The two dependent variables 
indexing the degree of children’s social motivation in this task included (1) their 
decision, scored in terms of a binary response (i.e., to play with someone or play 
alone) and (2) the number of points the participant decided to spend in order to play 
with someone or alone (from 0 to 10 points).  
Second, social motivation was also measured using Richard and Schneider’s (2005) 
Friendship Motivation Questionnaire for children, to further quantify children’s 
desire to be social through their motivation to have friends. This measure was 
presented at the end of session two. Children were asked to think about why they 
wanted to have friends. They viewed 12 statements on-screen pertaining to the 
motivations for having friends; examples of these statements include “to be invited to 
parties”, “for the fun moments I have with friends” and “because it makes me feel 
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better when I’m sad”. Children rated each statement on a 4-point scale by deciding 
how much the statement sounded like them from not at all like me (score of ‘1’) to 
exactly like me (score of ‘4’) by making a corresponding key-press. A friendship 
motivation score was calculated by totalling the responses on the scale. A higher 
score indicates higher motivation for friendships (maximum score = 48).  
Reciprocity. Economic games were used to test reciprocity in terms of whether or 
not children act reciprocally toward others and whether or not they expect others to 
act reciprocally toward them. Children played dictator games with other players in 
the online world, under the context of decision-making games. 
Direct reciprocity. This task was designed to test for direct reciprocation – that is, to 
determine how children responded to an offer from another individual. At the 
beginning of the task, children were informed that, as before (in the implicit 
reputation management task), they were going to meet some of the other players in 
Verden and that each time they met someone, they would receive 10 points. Children 
used the keyboard to input how many points they would like to give to the other 
player (between 0 and 10 points) and the number of points they had decided to give 
appeared onscreen (Figure 16). Crucially, the child also saw how many points the 
other player wanted to give to them. Children either saw the other player’s offer 
before or after s/he had made their offer. The number of points that the other had 
given was fixed such that the average number of points the other player shared was 5 
points, which would be considered a fair offer. Children could make the first move 
(giving points to the other first, and then discovering the number of points they 
received in return) or the second move (receiving points from the other first, and then 
giving in return).  
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A.   B.  
Figure 16. Example trial testing direct reciprocity: first move trials (A), where 
children give points to the other first and then see how many points the other gives 
them, and second move trials (B), where children see the number of points the other 
wants to give them and then they decide how many points to give in return. 
After completing one practice trial, all children completed five first move and five 
second move trials. The order of presentation (first move or second move first) was 
counterbalanced across children. Each trial was “one-shot”, played with a different 
player each time with a new set of points. In this task, the dependent variables of 
interest were (1) the mean number of points given under each condition (0 – 10 
points), and (2) whether, in the second move condition, the child matched the offer 
they had been given (reciprocated), gave more (rewarding the other) or less 
(punishing the other) in return. Higher points would indicate a generous offer to the 
other player, and a mean offer of 5 points would be considered a fair offer.  
Baseline: predictions of generosity. This task was designed to provide a baseline 
measure of children’s predictions of generosity from others. This task followed a 
similar format to that of previous reciprocity tasks, except instead of being informed 
of how many points the other gave them, children were instructed to guess how many 
points they had been given (Figure 17). Children again had to decide how many 
points to give to another player (10 trials), with one practice trial at the start. 
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Children were informed that they were deciding how many points to give the other 
player at the exact same time as the other player decided how many points to give to 
them. Thus, neither player knew what the other was offering them. After deciding 
how many points to give to the other player, children could obtain ‘bonus points’ for 
correctly guessing how many points the other would give them. No feedback was 
given regarding whether or not they had correctly guessed, but all children did 
receive a fixed amount of ‘bonus points’ at the end of the task. The dependent 
variables of interest were the mean number of points offered and the mean number of 
points children guessed the other would give them (maximum 10 points), and the 
number of trials (out of 10) in which the children predicted they would receive more 
(reward), less (punishment) or the same number of points (reciprocal offer) from the 
other player. This task measures children’s predictions of generosity from others 
with no reciprocal intent, providing a baseline for subsequent tasks.  
 
Figure 17. Example trial of predictions of generosity. Children first give points to the 
other player, and then have to guess how many points the other has given to them.  
Expectations of reciprocity. The task designed to tap expectations of reciprocity 
followed a similar structure to the predictions of generosity task above, but this time 
children were informed that they would give first to the other player, and then they 
had to guess how much the other player would give them (Figure 18).  The 
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experimenter informed the child that the other player would find out how many 
points they had been given prior to making their decision. This task consisted of one 
practice trial and 10 experimental trials, and the mean number of points offered and 
guessed were calculated, as well as the number of trials in which children expected 
the other to reward, punish or reciprocate their offer. This task therefore examines 
whether children were aware that the other’s response would be contingent upon 
their own offer, in particular whether they would expect reciprocity as a response to 
their actions.    
 
Figure 18. Example trial structure of expectations of reciprocity. Children first 
decided how many points to give the other player, and then had to guess how many 
points the other would give to them. 
Inhibitory control. Inhibitory control was tested with a go/no-go task, where 
children have to inhibit a prepotent response. Following Cragg and Nation’s (2008) 
task design, the go/no-go task was presented in the context of a football game (Figure 
19). Children simply had to press the spacebar to “kick” a football every time it 
appeared on-screen. They were instructed to press the spacebar as fast as they could. 
Ten practice trials served to build a prepotent response to the football. Next, children 
were informed that they should continue to kick the footballs but not kick any rugby 
balls that appeared. 
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Figure 19. Trial procedure in the go no-go task. Children had to ‘kick’ any footballs 
that appeared on-screen, and refrain from kicking any rugby balls that appeared.  
Children completed two blocks of 50 trials each (100 trials in total), including 13 
rugby balls within each block (26%). In between the two blocks, children received 
genuine feedback regarding how many football and rugby balls they had kicked. The 
football or rugby ball appeared for 200 ms, with a random ISI between 1600 and 
2600 ms between stimuli to ensure that the children could not predict when the 
stimulus would appear. The dependent variable was the child’s mean d’ score 
calculated across the two blocks. d’ was calculated by taking into account the 
number of trials in which children had correctly kicked the football (hit rate) and 
incorrectly kicked the rugby ball (false alarm rate; see section 2.2.4 for full 
calculation).  
4.3. Results  
Children’s performance on the explicit and implicit reputation management tasks are 
described in Chapter Three (section 3.2.3). Here, I first considered age-related 
changes for each task tapping the proposed mechanisms separately. Second, I 
examined whether individual differences on these tasks are related to variation in 
Random ISI (1600-2600 ms) 
ISI (1600-2600 ms) 
200 ms 
200 ms 
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children’s performance on implicit and explicit reputation management tasks by 
using correlation and regression analyses.  
4.3.1. Age-related changes within putative mechanisms 
Theory of mind. Figure 20 below shows the mean scores for each age group on the 
Strange Stories task, for mental state and nature stories.  
 
 
Figure 20. Mean scores on the Strange Stories task according to story type (nature or 
mental state) and age group. Error bars indicate +/- one standard error.   
A 2 (story type: mental state or nature) x 4 (age group) mixed ANOVA was 
conducted on scores on the Strange Stories task. There was a significant main effect 
of story type, F(1, 90) = 6.03, p=.016, ηp
2 
=.06, such that scores were higher on the 
mental state stories. There was also a significant main effect of age group, F(1, 90) = 
22.25, p<.001, ηp
2 
=.43, with performance improving with age. There was no 
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significant interaction between story type and age group, F(3, 90) = .79, p=.50, ηp
2 
=.026.  
Social motivation. The first measure of social motivation gave children the choice to 
play with someone or to play alone. The number of children who decided to play 
with someone or alone is shown below in Table 12.  
Table 12.  
Number of children who decided to play with someone or on their own, according to 
age group.  
 Decision to play 
 With someone On own 
6 – 7 years 7 19 
8 – 9 years 19 7 
10 – 11 years 12 7 
12 – 14 years 14 9 
 
Chi-square was used to test for an association between age group and decision to 
play, and indicated that there was a significant association between these variables, 
χ2(3) = 12.56, p=.006, φ =.37. It appears that 6-7 year-olds preferred to play on their 
own, while all other age groups preferred to play with someone. Binomial tests 
further revealed that decisions to play were significantly above chance only for 6-7 
year-olds and 8-9 year-olds (p=.029), with 6-7 year-olds preferring to play on their 
own, and 8-9 year-olds preferring to play with someone.  
Following their decision to play with someone or alone, children were asked how 
many points they wanted to spend in order to do this, as a measure of their 
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motivation. The numbers of points spent according to each age group are shown in 
Table 13.  
Table 13.  
Mean and standard deviation number of points children spent, when they decided to 
play with someone or on their own, according to age group.  
 Decision to play 
 With someone On own 
6 – 7 years 3.71 (3.20)  2.53 (3.20) 
8 – 9 years 3.47 (2.36) 2.57 (3.30) 
10 – 11 years 4.58 (1.73) 3.86 (3.23) 
12 – 14 years 5.64 (2.40) 6.00 (2.06) 
 
A 2 (decision: play with someone or on own) x 4 (age group) between-participants 
ANOVA was conducted on the number of points spent. There was only a significant 
main effect of age group, F(3, 86) = 5.04, p=.003, ηp
2 
=.15. Polynomial contrasts 
revealed a significant linear trend (p=.001), with older children tending to spend 
more, regardless of their decision.  
Children also completed the Friendship Motivation Questionnaire (Richard & 
Schneider, 1995). A one-way between-participants ANOVA was used to test for 
differences in friendship motivation between each age group, and found no 
significant age differences, F(3, 88) = .93, p=.43, ηp
2 
=.031 (6-7 year-olds: M = 35.81 
(SD = 6.27); 8-9 year-olds: M = 37.48 (SD = 4.49), 10-11 year-olds: M = 36.22 (SD 
= 3.00); and 12-14 year-olds: M = 35.39 (SD = 3.54)).   
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Reciprocity. Two aspects of reciprocity were examined: direct reciprocity (how 
children directly respond to others’ offers), and expectations of reciprocity 
(children’s expectations of reciprocity from others).  
First, direct reciprocity was measured by giving children the opportunity to respond 
to offers from others (second move) and to give to others first (first move). Mean 
number of points shared during the first and second move, according to age group, 
are shown below in Figure 21. The mean number of points shared by the other player 
was 5 points.  
 
 
Figure 21. Mean number of points offered during the first and second move 
conditions, according to age group. Error bars indicate +/- one standard error.   
To test for differences across age groups and between first and second moves, a 2 
(move: first or second) x 4 (age group) mixed ANOVA was carried out on the mean 
number of points given. There was a significant main effect of age group, F(1, 88) = 
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3.10, p=.031, ηp
2 
=.096. There were no other significant main effects or interactions 
(all ps>.56). To further analyse the main effect of age, one sample t-tests were used 
to test whether children responded fairly to the other’s offer, by matching the average 
number of points offered to them – a fair offer of 5 points. 6-7 year-olds, 8-9 year-
olds, and 10-11 year-olds all differed significantly in their offers by each giving less 
than 5 points (all ps<.003), but children aged 12 to 14 did not differ significantly 
from 5 points, t(22) = .91, p=.37, r=.19, indicating that children of this age were fair.  
The number of trials during the second move where children responded by 
punishing, rewarding or reciprocating the other player’s offer was also calculated 
(Figure 22). Inspection of this figure suggests that most children responded to the 
other’s offer by punishing (i.e., giving less than they had received themselves).  
  
Figure 22. Percentage of trials during the second move condition where children 
punished, rewarded or reciprocated the offer they had been given during the second 
move.  
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The above data were analysed using chi-square to test for associations between 
response type and group. This analysis showed that there was a significant 
association between age group and response type, χ2(6) = 14.01, p=.03, φ =.39. This 
result is likely driven by 6 to 7-year-olds and 10 to 11-year-olds punishing on more 
trials, and 8 – 9-year-olds and 12 – 14-year-olds reciprocating on more trials. 
Expectations of reciprocity. Children’s expectations of reciprocity were tested by 
asking children to offer and guess how many points other players would give them 
under two conditions: a baseline condition where they were told they were giving at 
the same time as the other player, thus they could predict how many points the other 
would offer them (with no reciprocal intent), and a condition designed to test for 
expectations of reciprocity – where children were told to predict how many points 
the other player would give them after the other had found out the child’s offer. If 
children expect reciprocity, then their offer and guess would be similar in this 
condition. Figure 23 below shows the mean results according to age group. From this 
figure, it appears that with age, children’s offers and guesses become more similar, 
with young children predicting much higher offers from others than they themselves 
were prepared to offer, and older children anticipating the other’s offer to be more 
related to their own offer, in particular in the expectations of reciprocity condition.   
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Figure 23. Mean number of points offered and guessed, according to age group, at 
baseline and in the expectations of reciprocity condition. Error bars indicate +/- one 
standard error.   
To test for differences between baseline (predictions of generosity) and the 
expectations of reciprocity condition across age groups, a 2 (condition: baseline or 
expectations of reciprocity) x 2 (decision: offer or guess) x 4 (age group) mixed 
ANOVA was conducted on the number of points. This analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of decision, F(1,88) = 14.74, p<.001, ηp
2 
=.14, with all children guessing 
that the other would offer more points to them than they themselves had offered the 
other. There was also a significant interaction between condition and decision, F(1, 
88) = 11.37, p=.001, ηp
2
=.11. All other main effects and interactions were not 
significant (all ps>.14). To further examine the interaction between condition and 
decision, planned contrasts using repeated measures t-tests were used to test for 
differences in offers and guesses between the conditions. There was no significant 
difference between guesses at baseline and the expectations of reciprocity condition, 
t(91) = .92, p=.36, r=.10. There was, however, a significant difference between offers 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Baseline Reciprocity 
Expectations 
Baseline Reciprocity 
Expectations 
Baseline Reciprocity 
Expectations 
Baseline Reciprocity 
Expectations 
6  - 7 years 8 - 9 years 10 - 11 years 12 - 14 years 
M
ea
n
 n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
p
o
in
ts
 
Offer Guess 
154 
 
at baseline and offers in the expectations of reciprocity condition, t(91) = 3.40, 
p=.001, r=.34, such that offers were higher in the expectations of reciprocity 
condition.   
In this task children’s trial-by-trial responses were also considered – whether they 
thought the other player would punish, reward, or reciprocate with them at baseline 
(Figure 24A) and in the expectations of reciprocity condition (Figure 24B). Across 
all ages, it appears that children mostly predicted the other would reward them, 
followed by expectations of punishment. Reciprocation was the least predicted 
response across trials for all children, although there appears to be an increase in 
predicted reciprocity in the expectations of reciprocity condition. 
  
A. Baseline B. Expectations of reciprocity 
Figure 24. Percentage of trials with predictions of punishment, reward and 
reciprocation from other players at baseline (when giving at the same time; A) and in 
the expectations of reciprocity condition (when giving first to the other; B), 
according to age group.  
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To test for differences between the baseline and expectations of reciprocity 
conditions in terms of trial-by-trial responses, a three-way hierarchical loglinear 
analysis was conducted to assess the association between age group, condition 
(baseline or expectations of reciprocity), and response type (punish, reward or 
reciprocate). This analysis produced a best-fit model which included the two-way 
interactions, χ2(17) = 46.77, p<.001. Specifically, there was a significant main effect 
of response type, χ2(2) = 176.45, p<.001, a significant main effect of age group, χ2(3) 
= 23.16, p<.001, and a significant interaction between response and condition, χ2(2) 
= 32.36, p<.001. All other interactions and main effects were not significant, 
including the three-way interaction between age group, condition and response (all 
ps>.16). Figure 25 below shows the interaction between condition and response type. 
This figure suggests that the interaction is driven by an increase in expected 
reciprocation and a reduction in expected reward in the condition designed to 
measure expectations of reciprocity. 
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Figure 25. Percentage of trials where children (ignoring age group) expected the 
other to punish, reward or reciprocate in baseline and expectations of reciprocity 
conditions.  
Inhibitory control. The go/no-go task was used to measure inhibitory control. Hit 
(the number of footballs correctly kicked) and false alarm (the number of rugby balls 
incorrectly kicked) rates can be seen below in Table 14.  
Table 14. 
Mean and standard deviations of percentages of hit and false alarm rates during the 
go/no-go task for each age group. 
Age group Mean hits (SD) Mean false alarms (SD) 
6 – 7 years 90.3% (7.57%) 39.7% (17.6%) 
8 – 9 years 90.7% (6.19%) 40.7% (18.7%) 
10 – 11 years 96.4% (3.33%) 31.2% (16.3%) 
12 – 14 years 96.8% (4.03%) 28.2% (11.9%) 
 
MANOVA was used to test for age-related changes on the hit and false alarm rates. 
There was a significant main effect of age group for both hits, F(3, 87) = 8.73, 
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p<.001, ηp
2
=.23, and false alarms, F(3,87) = 3.31, p=.024, ηp
2
=.10. Polynomial 
contrasts revealed significant linear trends in both hit rates (p<.001) and false alarm 
rates (p=.005), with hits increasing with age, and false alarms decreasing.  
D prime (d’) scores were calculated for each age group by using the hit and false 
alarm rates to calculate sensitivity to the stimuli. As shown in Figure 26, 
performance on this task generally improved with age.  
 
Figure 26. Mean d’ scores across age groups in the go/no-go task. Error bars indicate 
+/- one standard error.   
A one-way between-participants ANOVA was used to analyse group differences in 
d’ scores. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of age group, F(1, 89) = 
7.28, p<.001, ηp
2
=.20.  Polynomial contrasts confirmed that there was a significant 
linear trend, with d’ scores increasing with age (p<.001).   
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4.3.2. Relationships between mechanisms and reputation management  
The relationships between the tasks designed to measure the proposed mechanisms 
and explicit and implicit reputation management were examined to identify the 
contribution that these mechanisms might make to reputation management
3
.  
Correlation analyses. First, correlations between developmental variables 
(chronological age and verbal mental age) and the tasks designed to measure the 
proposed mechanisms of reputation management were tested, followed by partial 
correlations controlling for the effect of chronological age in order to remove any 
variance caused by age (Table 15). Given the number of correlations conducted, a 
conservative p value of .01 rather than .05 was used to test for significant 
correlations. Considering the developmental variables, there were significant positive 
correlations between chronological age and verbal mental age, ToM, and inhibitory 
control. There were also significant positive correlations between verbal mental age 
and ToM and inhibitory control. There were no correlations (raw or partial) between 
implicit reputation management and the tasks. For the explicit reputation 
management task, there was a significant positive correlation with ToM after 
controlling for chronological age. Taking into account correlations between tasks 
designed to measure the putative mechanisms, there was only a significant positive 
correlation between direct reciprocity and expectations of reciprocity.  
                                                          
3
 An outlier, identified in Chapter 3 with a high z-score for the observer effect (section 3.3), was 
removed from these analyses.  
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 Chronological 
age 
Verbal mental 
age 
Implicit 
reputation 
management 
Explicit 
reputation 
management 
Theory of 
Mind 
Friendship 
Motivation 
Social reward 
choice 
Inhibitory 
control 
Direct 
reciprocity 
Verbal mental 
age 
.93**         
        
Implicit 
reputation 
management 
.15 .15        
Explicit 
reputation 
management 
-.088 -.052 -.042 
(-.030) 
      
Theory of Mind .49** .55** -.005 .20      
  (-.089) (.29*)      
Friendship 
Motivation 
-.038 -.046 .14 .001 .092     
  (.14) (-.004) (.13)     
Social reward 
choice 
-.17 -.19 .084 .17 -.21 -.010    
  (.11) (.15) (-.15) (-.017)    
Inhibitory 
control 
.38** .35** .049 .044 .20 .10 -.16   
  (-.007) (.083) (.018) (.12) (-.11)   
Direct 
reciprocity 
.13 .21 .063 .11 .18 .046 -.12 -.091  
  (.046) (.13) (.14) (.051) (-.096) (-.15)  
Expectations of 
reciprocity 
-.10 -.010 .026 -.009 .007 -.042 .079 -.046 .31* 
  (.042) (-.018) (.066) (-.046) (.062) (-.008) (.33*) 
Table 15. 
Raw correlations between explicit and implicit reputation management tasks and the tasks tapping the proposed mechanisms, with 
partial correlations controlling for chronological age in parenthesis.   
Note. *p<.01, **p<.001 
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Regression analyses. Regression analyses were conducted to determine which 
mechanisms could explicit reputation management, given the suggestion of the above 
correlational analyses that some of the proposed mechanisms could contribute to this 
form of reputation management.  
Logistic regression was used to test whether any of the mechanisms could predict 
children’s decision to save when bottom of the leader board (binary choice: ‘yes’ or 
‘no’ to saving position; explicit reputation management). The following variables 
were entered into the model: chronological age, verbal mental age, theory of mind 
(mental state stories score), friendship motivation score, social reward choice, 
inhibitory control (d’ score), direct reciprocity (number of matched trials during the 
second move) and expectations of reciprocity (number of trials where the child 
predicted reciprocity in the expectations of reciprocity task). The model could 
correctly classify 64.2% of cases. This result, however, did not classify cases 
significantly better than the constant alone, χ²(8)= 5.73, p=.68. Table 16 shows the 
predictors and indicates significant predictors of explicit reputation management.  
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Table 16. 
Logistic regression predicting explicit reputation management from potential 
underlying mechanisms. 
Predictor B Wald χ² p Odds ratio 
Chronological age -.17 .35 .56 .84 
Verbal mental age -.08 .11 .74 .92 
Theory of Mind .34 5.88 .015* 1.4 
Friendship Motivation -.02 .14 .71 .98 
Social reward choice -1.18 4.43 .035* .31 
Inhibitory control .43 1.29 .26 1.53 
Direct reciprocity .30 2.44 .12 1.34 
Expectations of 
reciprocity 
-.095 .77 .38 .91 
Note. *p<.05 
Theory of mind and social reward choice were significant predictors of explicit 
reputation management. As theory of mind scores improved, the odds of saying “no” 
to saving when bottom of the leader board increased by 1.40. For social reward 
choice (whether children wanted to play with someone or on their own), the odds of 
a child saying “yes” to saving was .31 higher than for those who wanted to play with 
someone.  
4.4. Discussion  
The current study investigated several mechanisms which could potentially underlie 
implicit and explicit reputation management, specifically theory of mind, social 
motivation, expectations of reciprocity and inhibitory control. Understanding of these 
mechanisms and their contribution to reputation management could explain why 
implicit and explicit management appear to have distinct developmental trajectories. 
First, there were some age-related changes in the tasks tapping each of the 
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mechanisms, and second, there were a number of interesting relationships between 
the proposed mechanisms and explicit reputation management, specifically theory of 
mind and social motivation. None of the proposed mechanisms appeared to underpin 
implicit reputation management 
4.4.1. Age-related changes in the proposed mechanisms 
First, as expected, developmental improvements were noted in theory of mind 
ability. Second-order ToM was measured using the Strange Stories (Happé, 1994; 
White et al., 2009a), and children performed better on the mental state than nature 
stories. This finding supports evidence for a continued development of meta-
cognitive ability throughout childhood and into adolescence (Weil et al., 2013). 
Inhibitory control, as measured by the go/no-go task, also improved with age. As 
children got older, they became more accurate in detecting the stimulus, supporting 
previous research (Best & Miller, 2010).  
There were several interesting findings concerning the measures of social motivation. 
There were no age-related differences in children’s reported friendship motivation 
using Richard and Schneider’s (2005) Friendship Motivation Questionnaire, who 
also did not find differences in age on this measure. This finding suggests that 
motivation for friends may be relatively stable throughout development. As children 
reach adolescence, though, peer relationships are known to become increasingly 
important and rewarding (Hartup, 1993). The questionnaire measure may have only 
been sensitive for examining the underlying motivations for having friends (e.g. to 
have others to talk to) but may not directly test the reward value children assign to 
their friendships.  
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This study involved another measure of social motivation which may test reward 
value more directly, whereby children were given the choice of either playing alone 
or with someone. There were some subtle age-related differences between children in 
this ecologically valid measure of social motivation. Notably, children aged 6 to 7 
preferred to play on their own, whereas children aged 8 to 9 preferred to play with 
someone. Children aged 10 to 14 showed no distinct preference in their choice. With 
age, children spent more to points to make either decision. These preferences reflect 
differences in social reward choices across childhood, with 8 to 9-year-olds finding 
the opportunity to play with someone a particularly rewarding incentive, whereas 
younger children preferred to play on their own. There may be a shift around 8 years 
from egocentric thinking to more consideration of others (Fehr et al., 2008) which 
may link to this shift in social desire. After the age of 10, children showed no distinct 
preference for choosing to play on their own or with someone. This could reflect 
individual preferences for social contact – if the social reward had been to play with 
a specific friend, results may have reflected the increased value of friendships in 
adolescence (Jankowski, Moore, Merchant, Kahn & Pfeifer, 2014). The increase in 
the number of points spent could either reflect that older children were more 
motivated to pay more to guarantee their decision, or that older children could assign 
a different value to the points.   
In the novel reciprocity tasks, children became more generous with age, supporting 
previous research testing sharing using the dictator game (Gummerum et al., 2008; 
Harbaugh, Krause, & Liday, 2003; Malti, Gummerum, Keller, Chaparro, & 
Buchmann, 2013). An increase in generosity with age has been suggested to be 
related to older children being more concerned for fairness, reciprocity and 
reputation (Malti et al., 2013). It was not until children were aged 12 to 14 in the 
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current study that they were fairer during the second move by sharing half of their 
points with the other player. However, little reciprocal behaviour was noted across 
all of the reciprocity tasks: even when predicting how others would respond to their 
own offers, most children predicted the other would be more generous to them than 
they themselves were prepared to be. When children were giving first to the other 
player – who would then subsequently know how many points they had been given 
before making their own offer – children changed their behaviour by increasing their 
offers to the other. This result suggests that children attempted to encourage 
reciprocity in the other player by increasing their own offers, demonstrating an 
awareness of reciprocal principles, namely that the other player would be more likely 
to reciprocate a higher offer.  
The reciprocity results support previous research suggesting that children have an 
understanding of reciprocity from around the age of five (House et al., 2013; Berndt, 
1977). However, as noted, children were not particularly reciprocal, and did not 
behave fairly until they reached 12-years-old. This finding may support the idea that 
children may have knowledge of the key principles underlying reciprocity, such as 
equality and fairness, but they often do not act in accordance with this knowledge 
(Blake et al., in press; Sheskin et al., 2014), even though they are aware that they are 
not acting how they should be (Smith et al., 2013). Other authors have also noted a 
relatively protracted development of social decision-making. For example, van den 
Bos, Westernberg, van Dijk and Crone (2010) noted that adolescents tend to become 
more prosocial, trusting, and reciprocal with age, findings they ascertained to be 
related to better perspective-taking ability, and greater understanding that friendships 
are more likely to be maintained if favours are returned. Further work by van den 
Bos, van Dijk, Westenberg, Rombouts, and Crone (2011) has shown that younger 
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adolescents were more egocentric and thus less sensitive to other players’ 
perspectives in economic games, with resultant increases in prosociality with age. 
Other aspects of social decision-making also do not appear to develop until 
adolescence, such as fairness, whereby it is not until children reach early adolescence 
that they begin to be motivated by fairness (Overgaauw, Güroğlu & Crone, 2012),  
and it is not until 12 years that children show an understanding that others have 
intentions behind fair acts (Güroğlu, van den Bos, & Crone, 2009). This research 
supports the above finding that children in this study were not fair until 12-years-old. 
These shifts could be underpinned by greater understanding of social norms in 
addition to perspective taking (Overgaauw et al., 2012). The current study did not 
note a relationship between ToM ability and reciprocity, indicating that norm 
learning may have contributed to reciprocal behaviour in the current study. Arguably, 
an increased sensitivity to reputation with age could also contribute to the seemingly 
protracted development of reciprocity, given the suggested link between fairness and 
reputation (Nowak, Page & Sigmund, 2000), with older children learning social 
norms (such as fairness and reciprocity) and managing reputation in accordance with 
this (Hepach et al., 2012). Another possible explanation for the shifts in 
understanding of reciprocity – where children aged around 10 to 11 years appear to 
develop an expectation of reciprocity (as shown in Figure 23) – could relate to 
Piaget’s (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958) concepts of concrete and formal operations, 
whereby children shift from applying logical thought to concrete objects to more 
abstract and systematic thinking from around the age of 11. This abstract thinking 
could help children to have a greater appreciation of concepts such as reciprocity. 
4.4.2. Relationships between mechanisms and reputation management 
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The current study also attempted to elucidate whether any of the above measures 
could contribute to variation in the development of implicit and explicit reputation 
management. Implicit reputation management is thought to consist of subconscious 
behaviour changes in the presence of others, while explicit reputation management is 
a more deliberate, conscious effort to manage one’s reputation (Shaw et al., 2013). 
The current study is the first of its kind to attempt to understand reputation 
management by considering the potential underlying mechanisms that may 
contribute to the development of these two forms of reputation management. A 
number of analyses were conducted to examine and clarify the contribution of the 
proposed mechanisms. 
Correlation analyses suggested that none of the suggested mechanisms could predict 
implicit reputation management. The lack of significant correlations is not surprising 
given the overall lack of implicit reputation management across age groups, as 
reported in Chapter Three, although there was some indication that adolescence may 
mark a time of increased implicit reputation management. During early adolescence 
(from the onset of puberty, around age 12; Yousefi et al., 2013), children are 
gradually thought to become more sensitive to the thoughts and perspectives of 
others, which could tap into a greater sensitivity to reputation (Blakemore & Mills, 
2014; Somerville, 2013; Sebastian et al., 2008; Somerville, 2013; van den Bos et al., 
2011). However, van den Bos et al. (2011) found that young adolescents still behave 
relatively egocentrically in economic games, and suggest that prosocial behaviour 
does not become automatic until mid-adolescence. Implicit reputation management, 
as a potential cause of prosocial behaviour, may have a relatively protracted and 
continued development into adolescence.  The putative mechanisms should therefore 
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be tested in mid to late adolescence before they can be ruled out as mechanisms for 
implicit reputation management. 
Correlation analyses did reveal a significant relationship between explicit reputation 
management and theory of mind after controlling for age. In the explicit reputation 
management task, those with better ToM skills may be more aware that others could 
judge their performance if they were to save their low leader board position. This 
finding supports previous research purporting ToM to be an important mechanism 
for reputation management (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Izuma et al., 2011; Izuma et al., 
2010) and previous research noting that children with better ToM ability had better 
knowledge of self-presentational motives (Banerjee and Yuill, 1999). Finally, there 
was a significant correlation (including after controlling for age) between direct 
reciprocity and expectations of reciprocity. This relationship likely confirms that 
these tasks were testing the underlying principle of reciprocity, and those who 
behaved more reciprocally had higher expectations of reciprocity. Hoffman, McCabe 
and Smith (1994, 1996) suggest that children who are more generous in economic 
games have higher expectations of reciprocity driven by experiences with others. 
Further, Hoffman et al. (2008) suggest that reciprocity promotes cooperation and 
those who are more reciprocal thus expect reciprocity in return.  
Logistic regression further confirmed that ToM and social motivation could predict 
explicit reputation management. First, those who said “no” to saving when bottom of 
the leader board were more likely to have better ToM scores, supporting previous 
analyses and the suggestion that the ability to think about others’ minds is related to 
the ability to manage reputation when it is explicitly at risk. Second, those who said 
“yes” to saving when bottom of the leader board were more likely to want to play 
with someone than alone. Notably, this finding is contrary to the hypothesised 
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relationship between social motivation and reputation management – that those with 
greater social motivation would be more motivated to protect their reputation 
(Chevallier et al., 2012b). Rather, this finding could reflect a general desire for social 
contact, with children who are more socially motivated preferring to share 
information with others, regardless of its valence. 
 
4.4.3. Limitations and future directions 
Interestingly, inhibitory control appeared to have little role in reputation management 
and did not relate to any of the other proposed mechanisms. One possible 
explanation for this result is that inhibitory control may not impact upon reputation 
management in the proposed manner (by inhibiting behaviours which could be 
detrimental to reputation) until later on in adolescence. For example, Steinberg 
(2010) demonstrated that the ongoing development of self-control and increased 
reward-seeking behaviours contributed to the likelihood of risk-taking in mid-
adolescence. It may be the case that inhibitory control has a greater contribution to 
reputation management only later on in development.  
Adolescence has been noted to be of particular import for the development of 
reputation management, both in the current study and elsewhere (e.g. Sebastian et al., 
2008).  Further study to confirm this hypothesis is needed though, by extending the 
age groups to include older adolescents and young adults (e.g. from 12 to 21). The 
current tasks could be used to confirm the earlier proposition (Chapter Three) that 
implicit reputation management has a protracted development, and that perspective 
taking ability could contribute to this (van den Bos et al., 2010, 2011), as well as 
greater understanding and following of social norms, such as reciprocity and fairness 
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(Overgauuw et al., 2012), and better self-control (Steinberg, 2010). The structure and 
design of the current study could therefore be applied to the study of reputation 
management in adolescence.  
Overall, the current study noted that the mechanisms that appeared to contribute to 
reputation management were theory of mind and social motivation – although the 
impact of these mechanisms impinged only on individual differences found in 
explicit reputation management. Considering the distinction between implicit and 
explicit reputation management, Chapter Five will test these forms of reputation 
management in children with autism. This approach may be particularly interesting 
given the suggestion that autistic individuals may have preserved explicit but not 
implicit ToM ability (Frith & Frith, 2008a) – therefore, this distinction could also be 
applied to reputation management in autism, as previously suggested in Chapter 
Two. Further, Chapter Six will examine the mechanisms contributing to reputation 
management in children with autism, who are thought to have difficulties with 
thinking about others’ minds (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) and social motivation 
(Chevallier et al,. 2012a) – two mechanisms which have been identified as 
contributing to reputation management in typical development in the current study. 
However, further research is needed to clarify whether the same or different 
cognitive processes underpin behaviour (in this case, reputation management) in 
children with autism (Karmiloff-Smith, 2009).  
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Chapter Five 
Reputation management in children with autism 
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5.1. Introduction  
Chapter Two presented evidence that autistic adults have the ability to manage 
reputation, but a reduced propensity to do so: therefore, adopting a developmental 
approach could help to enhance our understanding of this phenomenon in autism, and 
further inform the under-researched area of autistic children’s susceptibility to social 
influence.  
In typical children, researchers have proposed that social influence could trigger 
prosocial behaviours (Sebastian-Enesco et al., 2013). Children with autism are also 
capable of acting in a prosocial manner (Downs & Smith, 2004; Liebal et al., 2008; 
Sally & Hill, 2006), however, the extent to which prosocial behaviour in autism is 
driven by social influence is unknown. Recent evidence indicates that children with 
autism may be less susceptible to social influence: in a child-friendly version of 
Asch’s (1956) classic line-judgement paradigm, autistic children were less 
influenced by information about other individuals’ line judgements (Yafai et al., 
2013). However, it could be argued that Yafai et al. (2013) did not sufficiently test 
social influence, since rather than using the real presence of a person, they simply 
told children which line “the majority of people” had selected. By testing whether 
children with autism change their behaviour in front of a peer, these conditions 
would lend themselves to more valid evidence of social influence (or lack thereof).  
Children with autism can be aware of the reputations of other people: for example, 
they can judge the behaviour of morally “naughty” and “nice” protagonists in story 
vignettes (Blair, 1996). Yet, while typical children tended to cooperate more with 
“nice” protagonists, autistic children did not utilise this information in a prisoner’s 
dilemma game (Li, Zhu & Gummerum, 2014). As such, it appears that children with 
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autism may have difficulty with appropriately utilising information about an 
individual’s reputation to moderate their own behaviour. There is also currently 
mixed evidence as to whether children with autism are aware of their own reputation. 
Chevallier et al. (2012b) tested whether children with autism would flatter an 
experimenter when informed that a drawing they had previously seen had been 
drawn by this experimenter. While typical children increased their rating of this 
drawing, allegedly to manage their reputation, autistic children did not, thus 
Chevallier et al. (2012b) interpreted this as evidence for a lack of reputation 
management in children with autism. 
Research into self-presentational skills, however, suggests that autistic children may 
have some preserved reputation management ability. Self-presentation is the ability 
to present oneself in a certain light (Banaji & Prentice, 1994), a skill needed in order 
to manage one’s reputation. In Begeer et al.’s (2008) study, autistic and typical 
children could win a prize by describing why they deserved to win the prize. Like 
typical children, autistic children used more positive self-statements in this condition, 
compared to when they were just asked to describe themselves. However, children 
with autism were less strategic in their self-descriptions. These findings were 
replicated and extended by Schereen et al. (2010), who also noted that children with 
autism found it harder to target their self-descriptions to specific audiences. Schereen 
et al. (2010) suggested that autistic children may be less skilled in their self-
presentation ability as they have a lessened propensity to lie, and therefore to 
exaggerate or make up facts about the self to gain prizes.  
It seems plausible from self-presentation research in autism (Barbaro & Dissanayake, 
2007; Begeer et al., 2008; Scheeren et al., 2010) that autistic children may be able to 
manage their reputation under certain circumstances. Accordingly, reputational 
173 
 
incentives could be salient for children with autism. One possible reputational 
incentive for children with autism is friendships. Several studies investigating autistic 
children’s friendships suggest that many do desire friendships (Bauminger et al., 
2003; Daniel & Billingsley, 2010; Locke et al., 2010), are satisfied with their 
friendships (Calder et al., 2013), and are interested in and initiate social contact 
(Frith, 2003).  However, children with  autism tend to have fewer friends than their 
typical counterparts and the quality of friendships are often found to be qualitatively 
different for autistic children. For example, in a meta-review of 24 studies, Petrina et 
al. (2014) noted that autistic children perceived lower levels of companionship, 
intimacy and closeness in comparison to their typical peers.  Finally, there seems to 
be great variation between autistic children in the extent to which children want 
social contact – for example, some prefer to be alone (Calder et al., 2013). Autistic 
children who do want friends may be more likely to think about their reputation, and 
differences in friendship quality could be linked to the ability to effectively manage 
reputation and thus obtain desired friendships.  
Overall, the above findings suggest that children with autism do not implicitly 
manage their reputation, but that the ability to explicitly do so may be preserved, 
although they may be less skilled in this ability.  In other words, autistic children 
may not subtly and automatically alter their behaviour in order to manage reputation, 
but there may be situations where they are aware that their reputation is at stake, and 
they may attempt to protect it in such instances. This suggestion corroborates with 
the findings of Chapter Two with autistic adults, who did not implicitly manage 
reputation but were able to manage reputation when it was more explicitly at risk. 
The current study therefore tested whether children with autism have the ability to 
implicitly or explicitly manage their reputation, utilising the same methods as 
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detailed in Chapter Three. Specifically, to measure implicit reputation management 
children with autism completed several one-shot dictator games once when observed 
and once when unobserved. To measure explicit reputation management, they were 
given the opportunity to protect their reputation when they came bottom of a leader 
board.  
5.2. Method 
5.2.1. Participants 
Sixty-six children aged from 7 to 14 years took part in the current study (Table 17). 
Typical children (n = 33) were selected from the sample of children who took part in 
Chapters Three and Four (conducted concurrently with the current study) and 
matched to autistic children (n = 33) on chronological age, t(64) = 1.42, p=.16, r=.17, 
and verbal mental age, t(64) = .37, p=.71, r=.05, given that language ability was 
required for many of this study’s tasks. Children were matched on verbal mental age 
(calculated by dividing chronological age by 100 and multiplying this by verbal IQ 
score as measured by the WASI-II (Wechsler, 2011)) since it gives a sense of a 
child’s developmental level and functioning, and can control for differences in 
developmental rates between typical and autistic children (Burack, Iarocci, Flanagan 
& Bowler, 2004; Burack, Pastò, Porporino, Iarocci, Mottron & Bowler, 2001). An 
additional six children with autism who had a verbal mental age more than 3 years 
lower than their chronological age were excluded from the sample. This cut-off was 
used since none of the typical children showed a discrepancy as large as this between 
chronological age and verbal mental age. Therefore, the current sample consisted of 
autistic children who would be considered cognitively-able or “high-functioning”. 
Although the typical group had a higher proportion of girls than the autism group, chi 
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square confirmed that the gender ratio was not significantly different between the 
groups, χ²(1)=2.75, p=.097, φ =.20. 
Table 17. 
Descriptive statistics for chronological age, verbal mental age, Social 
Communication Questionnaire (SCQ) score and Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule – 2nd edition (ADOS-2) scores. 
  Group 
  Typical Autism 
N  33 33 
Gender (M : F)  21 : 12 27 : 6 
Chronological age 
(in years) 
M (SD) 10.24 (2.00) 10.96 (2.11) 
Range 6.92 – 14.21 7.18 – 14.32 
Verbal mental age 
in years 
M (SD) 10.52 (2.28) 10.31 (2.35) 
Range 5.74 – 14.50 6.15 – 15.31 
SCQ M (SD) 4.67 (3.63) 23.88 (6.62) 
Range 0 – 14 11 – 38 
ADOS overall 
score 
M (SD) - 10.62 (3.33) 
Range - 7 – 19  
Note. Higher ADOS scores reflect greater severity of autism symptoms. 
Autistic children were recruited through autism resource provisions attached to 
primary and secondary schools in London and community contacts. Autistic children 
all had an independent clinical diagnosis of an Autism Spectrum Condition and 
completed the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule – 2nd edition (ADOS-2; 
Lord et al., 2000) which showed that children were above the cutoff score of 7 for a 
diagnosis of an Autism Spectrum Condition. Parents of both autistic (n = 24) and 
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typical (n = 27) children completed the Social Communication Questionnaire (Rutter, 
Bailey, Berument, Lecouteur, Lord & Pickles, 2003) to ensure that none of the 
typical children were above the cut off for autism (a score of 15) and that autistic 
children were above this cutoff. One child with autism was below this cutoff, but was 
retained in analyses since he had a clinical diagnosis of Asperger’s syndrome, met 
criteria on the ADOS, and his removal from the sample did not alter the results. 
5.2.2. Design 
The current study had a between-participants design, with the independent variable 
of group (autism or typical). The dependent variables for the explicit and implicit 
tasks are outlined below.   
5.2.3. Materials and Procedure 
The current study used identical methods to those outlined in Chapter Three, and are 
described in detail in section 3.2.3. In the implicit reputation management task, 
children completed 20 one-shot dictator games: 10 when observed and 10 when 
unobserved. Children were considered to have implicitly managed their reputation if 
they increased the number of points they shared when observed. In the explicit 
reputation management task, children played computer games and were then given 
the opportunity to view their position on a leader board. They were then asked 
whether they wanted to save or to not save their position. Children were considered 
to have protected their reputation when it was explicitly at risk if they chose not to 
save their position when bottom of the leader board, thus preventing others knowing 
about their poor performance.  
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5.3. Results 
Implicit reputation task. Figure 27 shows the mean number of points children 
shared when observed and unobserved.  
 
Figure 27. Number of points shared in the implicit reputation task by typical and 
autistic children when observed and unobserved. Error bars indicate +/- one standard 
error. 
The observer effect, which quantifies the effect of being watched, was calculated by 
subtracting the number of points shared when unobserved from the number of points 
shared when observed. Figure 28 shows box plots demonstrating the distribution of 
observer effects for each group. A one-way between-participants ANOVA was used 
to test for differences between typical and autistic children. This analysis showed that 
there was no significant main effect of group, F(1, 64) = 2.24, p=.14, ηp
2 
=.034. No 
further analyses were conducted. 
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Figure 28. Box plots showing the distribution of the observer effect (the difference 
score between observed and unobserved conditions), for both typical and autism 
groups. The dotted line represents no difference between being observed and 
unobserved (i.e. no observer effect).  
Explicit reputation task. In this task, children had the opportunity to protect their 
reputation. The number of children in each group deciding to save (or not to save) 
their position on the leader board, when either placed top or near the bottom, is 
shown below in Table 18. Some children from each group chose not to see the leader 
board at all: when top of the leader board, one typical child and three autistic 
children opted not to view the leader board. When bottom of the leader board, one 
typical and two autistic children decided not to view the leader board.  
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Table 18. 
Number of children deciding to save or not to save their leader board position 
depending on whether they appeared top or bottom of the leader board.  
 Position  
 Top of leader board Bottom of leader board 
Save? Yes No Yes No 
Typical 31 1 12 20 
Autism 28 2 17 14 
 
Considering decisions when top of the leader board, the majority of typical children 
(96.9%) and autistic children (93.3%) wanted to save their position. Binomial tests 
showed that both groups were significantly above chance for saying “yes” to saving 
when top of the leader board (both ps<.001). Fisher’s Exact Test (used since some 
cells had a count less than 5) showed that there was no association between group 
and decision to save when top of the leader board, p=.61. When they appeared 
bottom of the leader board, 62.5% of typical children and 45.2% of autistic children 
did not want to save their position. Binomial tests revealed that both groups showed 
no distinct preference for whether they saved their score when bottom of the leader 
board (both ps>.22). Chi-square analysis was used to test whether there was an 
association between group and decision to save, however this was not significant, 
χ²(1) = 1.91, p=.18, φ =.17.  
Fisher’s Exact Test was also used within groups to test for an association between 
leader board position and decision to save. For both typical and autistic children 
there was a highly significant association (both ps<.001). This result indicated that 
all children were more likely to save their position when top of the leader board.  
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Children had to spend between 0 and 10 points in order to save (or not to save) their 
position on the leader board. Table 19 shows the number of points spent by each 
group according to their decision.  
Table 19. 
Mean (SD) number of points children in each group decided to pay following their 
decision to save or not to save their leader board position when top and bottom of 
the leader board.  
  Position  
  Top of leader board Bottom of leader board 
Save?  Yes No Yes No 
Typical M (SD) 5.06 (3.20) 5.00(.00) 2.50 (2.71) 2.85 (3.30) 
 Range 0 – 10  - 0 – 8  0 – 10  
Autism M (SD) 6.75 (3.22) .50 (.71) 5.24 (3.62) 3.86 (3.86) 
Range 0 – 10  0 – 1  0 – 10  0 – 10  
 
Given that when they appeared top of the leader board, only one typical child and 
two autistic children decided not to save their score, the following analysis was 
conducted only on responses to appearing bottom of the leader board. A 2 (group: 
typical or autism) x 2 (save: yes or no) between-participants ANOVA was carried out 
on the number of points children decided to spend. There was a significant main 
effect of group, F(1, 59) = 4.54, p=.037, ηp
2 
=.071, such that autistic children spent 
more points, regardless of the decision to save or not when bottom of the leader 
board. All other main effects and interactions were not significant (all ps>.33).  
5.4. Discussion  
The current study aimed to examine whether children with autism would manage 
their reputation. As predicted, children with autism did not implicitly manage their 
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reputation. When reputation was more explicitly at risk, some – but not all – autistic 
children decided to protect their reputation, which suggests that there may be wide 
variability in explicit reputation management in autism. Crucially, similar findings 
were found in typical children. They did not manage their reputation in an implicit 
situation, and there was no difference between the two groups in terms of explicit 
reputation management. 
Previous research testing implicit reputation management in children with autism 
found that they did not manage their reputation, but typical children did (Chevallier 
et al., 2012b). The methodology of Chevallier et al.’s (2012b) study, however, 
differed markedly to that of the current study. Typical children in their study 
demonstrated reputation management by increasing ratings of a drawing that the 
experimenter claimed that she had drawn herself. In the current study, children were 
observed whilst playing dictator games with players in an online gaming world – 
arguably a more subtle situation for one to be concerned about reputation. 
Interestingly, neither autistic nor typical children were sensitive to observation in this 
situation. In Chapter Three, I argued that the lack of implicit reputation management 
noted in typical children was due to a protracted development of this ability, which 
does not emerge until adolescence. However, it seems unlikely that the lack of 
implicit reputation management is due to a protracted development in autism, given 
the fact that autistic adults also do not implicitly manage reputation (Chapter Two). 
Chapter Six will consider whether any of the previously proposed mechanisms can 
explain this result.  
In the explicit reputation task, where children had the opportunity to protect their 
reputation, there was a tendency for some of the autistic children to choose to protect 
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their reputation. These findings are in line with research conducted on autistic 
children’s self-presentation skills, which suggests the ability to attempt to present 
oneself in a certain way is possible in autism (Begeer et al., 2008; Schereen et al., 
2010). Indeed, not all children in both groups wanted to protect their reputation, 
supporting the possibility of wide-ranging individual differences within reputation 
management. Nonetheless, it appears that some autistic children can be aware when 
their reputation is explicitly at stake, but more research is needed to differentiate 
between children who do and do not want to protect their reputation, as Chapter Six 
intends to examine.  
The explicit reputation management task, though, may not reflect real-life scenarios 
for autistic children, which may explain their continued social difficulties in 
everyday life. Indeed, the findings suggest that children with autism can be aware 
that their reputation is at risk, and they can take a simple step of preventing others 
knowing about this in a computer game. Real-life explicit reputation management is 
likely to be more complicated, and indeed Begeer et al. (2008) and Schereen et al. 
(2010) both note that while autistic children can present themselves in a certain light, 
they do so with less skill. Nonetheless it is important to consider this gap between 
knowledge of reputation and reputation management in action, supporting the idea 
that autistic individuals may be aware of reputation, but struggle with the social skills 
needed to effectively manage it, in particular to do so automatically. The following 
chapter will consider the underlying mechanisms which may explain why there is a 
gap between knowledge and action.  
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5.4.1. Limitations and future directions 
One possible limitation relates to the implicit reputation management task. It could 
be argued that an older age range should have been used, given the suggestion that 
implicit reputation management may not appear until later in adolescence (Chapter 
Three). However, the current study was run concurrently with those described in 
Chapter Three and Four, and based on the scant research examining reputation 
management in children, there were theoretically sound reasons to assume that 
implicit reputation management would be present from a young age in typical 
individuals (Engelmann et al., 2012; Leimgruber et al,. 2012; Shaw et al., 2014). 
Further, explicit reputation was noted to emerge from 8 years of age, and the current 
study suggests that some autistic children can explicitly manage reputation from 
around this age, just like typical children of similar verbal mental age. Given the fact 
that adults with autism do not appear to implicitly manage their reputation (Chapter 
Two; Izuma et al., 2011) one assumes that adolescents with autism would not 
implicitly manage their reputation either. Nonetheless, experimental research is 
clearly needed to support this claim and to consolidate the findings with children and 
adults.  
Overall, the current study supported the hypothesis that autistic children would 
explicitly manage their reputation, but not implicitly manage it. In terms of social 
influence, the results suggest that autistic children may be less susceptible to being 
automatically or subconsciously influenced, but they are not immune to explicit 
awareness that their behaviour could be judged by others. However, there were 
individual differences in explicit reputation management in autism, with some, but 
not all, autistic children taking steps to influence what others know about them. To 
understand these individual differences in greater detail, Chapter Six will attempt to 
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identify the source of this variability by testing whether several potential mechanisms 
– theory of mind, social motivation, expectations of reciprocity, and inhibitory 
control – underlie reputation management in autism.  
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Chapter Six 
Mechanisms underpinning reputation management in children with autism 
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6.1. Introduction 
The results of Chapter Five showed that children with autism did not manage their 
reputation when the demand to do so was implicit. When the demand was explicit, 
however, some (but not all) autistic children engaged in reputation management, 
suggesting that there is variation in this ability. It is not clear why children with 
autism respond differently to implicit and explicit demands to manage their 
reputation and if these demands are different to typical children. The current study 
therefore aimed to investigate how different mechanisms contribute to explicit and 
implicit reputation management in autism. In Chapter Four, theory of mind and 
social motivation were identified as variables which contribute to explicit reputation 
management in typical development. The current study tested whether these 
mechanisms, as well as expectations of reciprocity and inhibitory control, impinge on 
reputation management in autism.  
Two main hypotheses have previously been proposed to explain why autistic 
individuals have difficulties with reputation management: first, the theory of mind 
hypothesis (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Izuma et al., 2011), and second, the 
diminished social motivation hypothesis (Chevallier et al., 2012a). The theory of 
mind hypothesis of autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) claims that autistic 
individuals’ social-cognitive difficulties are caused by a lack of ToM. If autistic 
children have difficulty in representing other minds, it has been argued that they 
would be unable to represent how they are viewed in the eyes of others, and thus be 
incapable of reputation management (Izuma et al., 2011). However, children with 
autism do not categorically fail ToM tests – many pass first and second order ToM 
tasks, although this may be dependent on verbal ability and age (Scheeren, de 
Rosnay, Koot, & Begeer, 2013) and different processing of the task (Begeer et al., 
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2010; Lind & Bowler, 2009). Therefore, individual differences in ToM ability may 
contribute to the propensity of reputation management in autism.  
An alternative explanation for reduced reputation management is that autistic 
individuals are not socially motivated, as a consequence of diminished motivation for 
social stimuli in infancy, which in turn leads to a failure to develop appropriate social 
cognitive skills – including being able to manage reputation (Chevallier et al,. 2012a, 
2012b). However, the diminished social motivation hypothesis of autism is not fully 
supported by research investigating autistic individuals’ friendships, which 
demonstrates that autistic individuals do display social desire. For example, many 
children with autism explicitly report a need for friendships (Bauminger et al., 2003; 
Calder et al., 2013; Locke et al., 2010) and a desire to fit in with other people 
(Carrington, Papinczak & Templeton, 2003a; Carrington et al., 2003b; Daniel & 
Billingsley, 2010; Portway & Johnson, 2003). However, some children with autism 
also prefer their own company (Calder et al., 2013). It may be the case, rather, that 
variation in the desire for friendships (and therefore social motivation) could 
contribute to whether or not autistic children manage their reputation.  
In addition to these two established theories, two novel accounts of the reduced 
reputation management seen autism were tested in the current study. The first relates 
to autistic children’s expectations of reciprocity. Reciprocity is a behavioural 
response contingent on another’s actions (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). Typical 
individuals highly value reciprocity (Kahneman, 2003), with those who are more 
reciprocal likely to be seen as more cooperative and thus have a better reputation 
(Hoffman et al., 1998; Millinski et al., 2002; Molleman et al., 2013; Nowak & 
Sigmund, 2005). Therefore, understanding the principles of reciprocity and having 
expectations that others will reciprocate with you could underlie whether or not 
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reputation is managed. A lack of social reciprocity is a definitive behaviour in 
autism, with autistic individuals demonstrating a reduced number of appropriate 
social responses such as conversational turn-taking (APA, 2013). Economic games, 
which enable us to experimentally test how children respond to others’ behaviour 
(Gummerum et al., 2008), can be used to test for social decision-making in children 
with autism. For example, in the prisoners’ dilemma game, where children can make 
decisions about cooperating or competing, Sally and Hill (2006; see also Downs and 
Smith, 2004) found that autistic children were just as cooperative as typical children. 
This finding suggests that autistic children behave in a similar way in economic 
games to typical children. However, to the best of my knowledge, autistic children’s 
understanding and expectations of reciprocity have not specifically been tested. In 
Chapter Four, it was suggested that expectations of reciprocity are likely based on 
experiences of reciprocity (Hoffman et al., 1994, 1996, 2008). In terms of social 
experiences, typical children often do not tend to reciprocate autistic children’s 
friendships (Rotheram-Fuller, Kasari, Chamberlain, & Locke, 2010) and may 
frequently neglect and ignore autistic children in the playground (Kasari, Locke, 
Gulsrud, & Rotheram-Fuller, 2011). This research may lend itself to a reduced 
expectation of reciprocity in autistic children, which was previously noted in autistic 
adults (Chapter Two).   
The second unexamined factor that may contribute to the variability in reputation 
management in autism concerns inhibitory control. To effectively manage reputation 
one needs to suppress behaviours that are detrimental to a good reputation but may 
be beneficial in the short term. There is currently mixed evidence as to whether 
children with autism have difficulties with inhibition (Christ et al., 2007). For 
example, Corbett et al. (2009) found poorer performance by children with autism on 
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a colour-word interference task, while others have found comparable performance on 
this task (Hill, 2004b). Variability in inhibitory control could therefore contribute to 
reputation management in autism.  
6.1.1. The current study 
Chapter Five showed that autistic children did not implicitly manage their reputation, 
but some could explicitly do so. Chapter Four indicated that ToM and social 
motivation contributed to the typical development of explicit reputation 
management, although no mechanisms could explain implicit reputation 
management. The current study measured the same four proposed mechanisms of 
reputation management – ToM, social motivation, expectations of reciprocity, and 
inhibitory control – in children with autism and a group of typical children matched 
for chronological age and verbal mental age. This study aimed to identify between-
group differences on these measures, and whether these measures related to implicit 
and explicit reputation management using correlation analyses.   
6.2. Method 
This study used the same battery of tasks detailed in Chapter Four, designed to 
measure the four putative mechanisms underpinning reputation management. These 
measures were also related to tests of explicit and implicit reputation management, as 
detailed in Chapters Three and Five. The same participants as reported in Chapter 
Five took part in this study: 33 children with autism and 33 typical children (see 
section 5.2.1) and they completed the same procedure as detailed in section 4.2.3. 
Specifically, ToM was measured using the Strange Stories task (Happé, 1994; White 
et al., 2009a), and social motivation was measured using the Friendship Motivation 
Questionnaire (Richards & Schneider, 2005) and by offering children a choice 
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between playing a game on their own or with another child. Reciprocity, including 
expectations of reciprocity, was measured using the dictator game and manipulating 
the conditions in which children could reciprocate. Inhibitory control was measured 
using the go/no-go task in which children have to inhibit a prepotent response (Cragg 
& Nation, 2008). 
6.3. Results  
First, data from the current study were analysed to identify differences between the 
performance of typical and autistic children on the tasks designed to measure the 
proposed mechanisms of reputation management. Second, I tested for relationships 
between scores on the measures of ToM, social motivation, expectations of 
reciprocity, and inhibitory control, and between these scores and developmental 
variables (age and verbal ability). Finally, I considered how these scores relate to 
both implicit and explicit reputation management in autism using correlation 
analyses.  
6.3.1. Between-participants analyses 
Table 20 below shows the scores for ToM, social motivation, expectations of 
reciprocity, and inhibitory control tasks, for both autistic and typical children. 
Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) controlling for gender and verbal mental age is 
reported where significant changes to results occur.   
Table 20. 
Mean (standard deviation) results for the theory of mind, social motivation, 
understanding and expectations of reciprocity, and inhibitory control tasks for 
autistic (n = 33) and typical children (n = 33), including chronological and verbal 
mental age.  
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Measure  Autism Typical 
Chronological age M (SD) 10.96 (2.11) 10.24 (2.00) 
Range 7.18 – 14.32  6.92 – 14.21 
Verbal mental age M (SD) 10.31 (2.35) 10.52 (2.28) 
Range 6.16 – 15.31 5.74 – 14.50 
Theory of Mind    
Mental state Strange 
Stories 
M (SD) 6.79 (3.19) 8.58 (1.94) 
Range 0 – 11  2 – 12  
Nature Strange 
Stories 
M (SD) 6.88 (3.04) 8.12 (2.43) 
Range 1 – 11 2 – 12  
Social motivation    
Points spent to play 
with someone 
M (SD) 5.67 (3.15) 4.85 (1.76) 
Range 0 – 10  0 – 8  
Points spent to play 
alone 
M (SD) 3.00 (2.80) 3.46 (2.99) 
Range 0 – 7  0 – 10  
Friendship 
Motivation score 
M (SD) 37.03 (5.38) 35.82 (4.81) 
Range 21 – 44  23 – 44   
Direct reciprocity    
First move M (SD) 4.85 (2.38) 4.13 (1.61) 
Range 0 – 9.40 0 – 6.20 
Second move M (SD) 4.79 (2.13) 4.11 (1.50) 
Range 0 – 8.80 0 – 6.80   
Inhibitory control    
Hit rate M (SD) 92.3% (8.24%) 93.9% (6.59%) 
Range 61 – 100% 80 – 100% 
False alarm rate M (SD) 39.6% (21.1%) 34.9% (19.6%) 
Range 4 – 92%  8 – 85%  
d’ M (SD) 1.89 (.95) 2.03 (.89) 
Range .08 – 3.87 -.27 – 3.73  
 
Theory of mind. A 2 (group: typical or autism) x 2 (story type: mental state and 
nature) mixed ANOVA was conducted on Strange Stories task scores. This analysis 
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revealed a significant main effect of group, F(1, 64) = 6.71, p=.012, ηp
2 
=.095. 
Children with autism performed worse than typical children on both mental state and 
nature stories. All other main effects and interactions were not significant (ps>.41). 
An ANCOVA controlling for verbal mental age and gender did not change these 
results, although there was a significant main effect of verbal mental age, F(1, 62) = 
32.52, p<.001, ηp
2 
=.34, suggesting that verbal ability significantly contributed to the 
variability in performance on the Strange Stories task. 
Social motivation. Social motivation was first measured by asking children whether 
they would like to play a game with someone or alone. Table 21 below shows that 
the majority of children in each group preferred to play with someone, with few 
differences between the proportion of typical and autistic children choosing to do so. 
Chi-square analysis confirmed that there were no group differences on this measure, 
χ²(1) =.80, p=.80, φ =.11. 
Table 21. 
Number of children from each group who indicated whether they wanted to play a 
game with someone or alone. 
 Group  
 Typical Autism  
Play with someone 20 21 
Play alone 13 12 
 
Children were also asked to spend between 0 and 10 points in order to play with 
someone or play alone (Table 20). A 2 (group: typical or autism) x 2 (play decision: 
with someone or alone) between-participants ANOVA on the number of points 
children paid to play alone or with someone showed a significant main effect of play 
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decision, F(1, 62) = 8.78, p=.004, ηp
2 
=.12. Children across both groups spent more 
to play with someone. There was no other significant main effects or interactions (all 
ps>.80).  
The Friendship Motivation Questionnaire (Richard & Schneider, 2005) was also used 
as a measure of social motivation (see Table 20). There was no significant difference 
between autistic and typical children on this measure, t(64) =.96, p=.34, r=.12.  
Reciprocity. Direct reciprocity – how children directly respond to others’ behaviour 
– was indexed by examining both the offers children made to others before the other 
player took their move (first move), and how children responded to an offer (second 
move). On average, the other player had always given the child 5 points, which 
would be considered a fair offer. One sample t-tests were used to test whether typical 
and autistic children’s offers (Table 20) differed significantly from 5 points (and 
therefore deviating from a fair offer) during the second move. Typical children gave 
significantly less than 5 points, t(31) = 3.38, p =.002, r=.52, while children with 
autism did not differ from a fair offer, t(32) = .573, p =.57, r=.10. A 2 (group: typical 
or autism) x 2 (move: first and second) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the 
number of points offered during the first or second move. There were no significant 
main effects or interactions (all ps >.13), suggesting the two groups behaved 
similarly on both the first and second moves.  
I also considered how children responded to offers from the other player during the 
second move condition on a trial-by-trial basis, by calculating the number of trials 
(out of 5) in which the child responded by giving fewer points than they had been 
given (punished), matching the same amount they had been given (reciprocated) and 
giving more than the amount they had been given (rewarded; Figure 29).  
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Figure 29. Percentage of trials where children in each group either punished, 
rewarded or reciprocated during the second move.  
Chi-square was used to analyse the above data, and this analysis showed a significant 
association between group and response type, χ2(2) = 11.57, p=.003, φ =.42. As 
suggested by Figure 29, this association is driven by typical children tending to 
punish the other players offer, whereas autistic children either punished or rewarded 
the other.  
Children’s expectations of reciprocity were tested by giving children the opportunity 
to offer points to other players and to also guess how many points the other would 
give to them. These opportunities took place under two conditions – a baseline 
condition where the child was told that they were giving at the same time as the other 
player (thus there was no expectation of reciprocity, only predictions of others’ 
generosity), and when they were giving first to the other player (expectations of 
reciprocity condition). In the latter condition, children were told that the other player 
would find out how many points the child had given them before making their 
decision. If children have an expectation that others will reciprocate their offer, then 
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they should guess that the other would match their offer in this condition. Figure 30 
below displays the mean number of points offered and guessed in each of these 
conditions. 
 
Figure 30. Mean number of points (maximum 10) offered and guessed by both 
groups according to whether the child was giving at the same time (baseline) or 
giving first (expectations of reciprocity). Error bars indicate +/- one standard error of 
the mean. 
A 2 (group: typical or autism) x 2 (condition: baseline and expectations of 
reciprocity) x 2 (decision: offer and guess) mixed ANOVA on the number of points 
revealed a significant main effect of decision, F(1, 63) = 6.46, p=.014, ηp
2 
=.093, 
such that the number of points children guessed the other player would give them 
was higher than the number of points they offered. There was a significant condition 
x decision interaction, F(1, 63) = 5.25, p=.025, ηp
2 
=.077 but no other significant 
main effects or interactions (all ps>.06). To examine the interaction between 
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condition and decision, follow-up analyses using repeated-measures t-tests were run. 
These analyses revealed that there was no significant difference between offers at 
baseline and offers in the expectation of reciprocity condition, t(64) = 1.21, p=.23, 
r=.15, but there was a difference approaching significance between guesses at 
baseline and the expectation of reciprocity condition, t(64) = 1.95, p=.055, r=.24, 
such that guesses were higher at baseline. This result suggests that all children 
specifically reduced their guesses when there was an expectation of reciprocity. 
ANCOVA controlling for verbal mental age (since verbal ability could affect 
understanding of the concept of reciprocity) revealed only a significant main effect 
of group, F(1, 61) = 4.02, p=.05, ηp
2 
=.06, and verbal mental age, F(1, 61) = 5.87, 
p=.018, ηp
2 
=.09, such that autistic children tended to both offer and guess more 
points than typical children, and that variability in these results could be explained by 
verbal ability.  
Next, I tested to see whether there were any differences in behaviour from baseline 
and in the expectations of reciprocity condition in terms of responses by trial – that 
is, whether they expected the other to give them fewer points (punish), more points 
(reward) or match (reciprocate) the points that they gave to the other player (Figure 
31).  
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A. Baseline B. Expectations of reciprocity  
Figure 31. Percentage of trials at baseline (when giving at the same time; A) and in 
the expectations of reciprocity condition (when giving first to the other; B) where 
autistic and typical children predicted either punishment, reward or reciprocation. 
A three-way hierarchical loglinear analysis was conducted to assess the association 
between group (typical or autism), condition (baseline or expectations of 
reciprocity), and response type (punish, reward or reciprocate). This analysis 
produced a best-fit model, χ2(7) = 87.03, p<.001, which included a significant main 
effect of response type, χ2(2) = 71.46, p<.001, and a significant interaction between 
response and condition, χ2(2) = 87.50, p<.001. All other interactions and main effects 
were not significant (all ps>.55). Figure 32 below shows the interaction between 
condition and response type. This figure suggests that, across both groups, the 
interaction is driven by an increase in reciprocation and a reduction in expected 
reward in the condition designed to measure expectations of reciprocity.  
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Figure 32. Percentage of trials where children punished, rewarded or reciprocated 
when giving at the same time and when giving first, ignoring the effects of group.  
Inhibitory control. A MANOVA on the hit and false alarm rates (see Table 20) 
showed that there were no significant differences between groups in hit rate, F(1, 64) 
= .10, p=.75, ηp
2
=.002, or false alarm rate, F(1, 64) = .86, p=.34, ηp
2 
=.013. Hit and 
false alarm rates were utilised to calculate d’. There were no significant difference 
between groups on d’ scores, t(64) = .63, p=.53, r=.08.  
6.3.2. Relationships between mechanisms and reputation management  
This section tested whether there were any relationships between performance on 
each of the tasks, between task performance and chronological or verbal mental age, 
and whether task performance related to reputation management in autism. Table 22 
below shows the correlations and partial correlations (after controlling for verbal 
mental age) between all of the tasks for autistic children. Given the number of 
correlations conducted, a more conservative p value of .01 rather than .05 was used 
to identify significant correlations. 
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Table 22. 
Raw correlations (partial correlations after controlling for verbal mental age in parentheses) between all of the variables designed to tap 
different mechanisms, reputation management, and chronological age and verbal mental age, for autistic children (n = 33). 
 Chronological 
age 
Verbal 
mental age 
Implicit RM Explicit RM Theory of 
Mind 
Friendship 
motivation 
Social 
reward 
choice 
Inhibitory 
control 
Direct 
reciprocity 
Verbal mental 
age 
 
.76**         
Implicit 
reputation 
management 
.24 .27        
Explicit 
reputation 
management 
.19 .28 -.13 
(-.22) 
 
      
Theory of Mind 
 
 
.20 .64** .014 
(-.21) 
.27 
(.12) 
     
Friendship 
motivation 
 
.067 -.20 -.13 
(-.078) 
-.25 
(-.20) 
-.40 
(-.35) 
    
Social reward 
choice 
 
.045 .16 .10 
(.061) 
.34 
(.32) 
.11 
(.008) 
-.004 
(.030) 
   
Inhibitory 
control 
 
.41 .18 .075 
(.029) 
.12 
(.08) 
.015 
(-.13) 
.071 
(.11) 
.17 
(.14) 
  
Direct 
reciprocity 
 
-.056 -.044 -.005 
(.007) 
.09 
(.10) 
.068 
(.13) 
-.058 
(-.069) 
-.075 
(-.069) 
.029 
(.038) 
 
Reciprocity 
expectations 
-.35 -.36 -.14 
(-.048) 
-.26 
(-.17) 
-.32 
(-.13) 
.039 
(-.039) 
-.21 
(-.16) 
-.37 
(-.33) 
.43* 
(.44*) 
          
Note: *p<.01, **p<.001 
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There were few inter-correlations between measures. There was, however, a 
significant correlation between direct reciprocity and expectations of reciprocity, 
which remained significant after controlling for the effects of verbal mental age. This 
correlation suggests that these measures were tapping an underlying principle of 
reciprocity, and that autistic children’s reciprocal behaviour was related to their 
expectations of reciprocity. There were no significant correlations (raw or partial) 
between explicit or implicit reputation management and any of the tasks designed to 
measure the different mechanisms.  
Correlation analyses further revealed that there were few significant correlations 
between experimental and developmental variables. The exceptions to this were that 
autistic children’s chronological age correlated positively with verbal mental age, 
and verbal mental age also correlated positively with theory of mind scores, such that 
theory of mind performance improved with higher verbal mental age.   
Given the lack of correlations between measures, further exploratory analyses were 
conducted. Since explicit reputation management had a binary response as a 
dependent variable, I tested whether there were any differences between children 
who had decided to say “yes” or “no” to saving their position when bottom of the 
leader board, within each group on all of the tasks designed to measure the possible 
mechanisms. Such an analysis could inform whether results could distinguish 
between those who chose to protect their reputation and those who did not. There 
were only significant differences within the reciprocity tasks for autistic children 
(Table 23). Children with autism who said “yes” to saving when bottom of the leader 
board rewarded on more trials during the second move, t(29) = 2.01, p=.054, r=.35, 
made higher offers when giving first, t(29) = 3.17, p=.004, r=.51, and made higher 
offers when giving at the same time, t(29) = 2.18, p=.037, r=.38.  
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Table 23. 
Descriptive statistics for measures of reciprocity which significantly differ between 
autistic children who said “yes” or “no” to saving when they came bottom of the 
leader board. 
 Save when bottom of the leader board? 
Measure Yes No 
Second move – number 
of rewarded trials 
2.59 (1.58) 1.50 (1.40) 
Offer when giving at the 
same time 
6.12 (1.99)* 4.66 (1.67) 
Offer when giving first 6.65 (2.31)** 4.26 (1.78) 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01 for offers significantly different to 5 points  
One-sample t-tests were utilised to test whether participants significantly differed 
from an offer of 5 points, which would be considered a fair offer. Results revealed 
that autistic children who had said “yes” to saving when bottom of the leader board 
(those thought to be less concerned about their reputation) made offers higher than a 
fair offer both when giving at the same time, t(16) = 2.32, p=.034, r=.50, and when 
giving first, t(16) = 2.94, p=.01, r=.59. There was no difference from a fair offer for 
autistic children who had said “no” to saving when bottom of the leader board. These 
results suggest that autistic children who were considered to have protected their 
reputation were fairer during the reciprocity tasks.  
6.4. Discussion 
This study examined the relationships between autistic children’s reputation 
management and their performance on tasks designed to measure ToM, social 
motivation, expectations of reciprocity and inhibitory control. I discuss the results 
from each of the component tests in terms of (1) group differences, (2) their 
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interrelatedness and associations with chronological and verbal mental age, and (3) 
the degree to which they relate to reputation management.  
6.4.1. Group differences in the proposed mechanisms 
Interestingly, results showed there were no differences between typical and autistic 
children on tasks designed to measure social motivation or inhibition skills, but there 
were some group differences with regards to reciprocity and ToM.  
First, the findings concerning social motivation contradict the diminished social 
motivation hypothesis (Chevallier et al., 2012a). Children with autism in the current 
study chose to play with someone rather than alone as much as typical children, and 
they also expressed a similar motivation for friendships on a questionnaire measure 
(Richard & Schneider, 2005). These results indicate that autistic children can be 
socially motivated, supporting other research that suggests that this is the case 
(Calder et al, 2013; Deckers et al., 2014; Ewing et al., 2013; Locke et al., 2010). 
Second, previous studies have found mixed and inconsistent results on inhibitory 
control in autism (Christ et al., 2007; Hill, 2004a, 2004b; Ozonoff & Strayer, 1997), 
and the current study found no difference in performance between autistic children 
and typical children in the go/no-go task, supporting the claim that autistic 
individuals do not have difficulties with response inhibition (Adams & Jarrold, 
2012).  
In the reciprocity tasks, similar to Sally and Hill (2006), children with autism 
behaved in a manner akin to typical children. However, the autistic children in our 
sample were fairer than typical children when responding to another player’s move 
during direct reciprocity, and they also rewarded the other player on significantly 
more trials. It may be the case that the autistic children were abiding more to rules or 
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norms concerning fairness (Schmitz et al., 2014), while typical children instead 
deviated from reciprocity. Previous research has noted that while typical children are 
able to report understanding of norms, such as fairness, they do not behave according 
to these norms and instead tend to maximise their own benefits (Blake et al., in press; 
Sheskin et al., 2014; van den Bos et al., 2010). Autistic children’s tendency to stick 
more to norms may reflect the rigid and repetitive thinking characteristic of autism 
(APA, 2013).  
The tasks also attempted to tap children’s expectations of reciprocity by asking 
children to guess other’s offers under two different conditions: when they were 
giving at the same time as the other (baseline condition – when the other player 
would not know the offer the child was making and there was no reciprocal element), 
and when they were giving first to the other (such that the other player would know 
how many points they had been given before making their decision), where 
reciprocal principles come into play. Whether we expect others to reciprocate could 
be an important mediator for decisions related to reputation management, for 
example, when deciding to trust someone (Tanis & Postmes, 2005). Initial analyses 
suggested that there were no differences in expectations of reciprocity between 
autistic and typical children, with both groups tending to have high predictions of 
generosity at baseline (such that they guessed the other would give them more points 
than they themselves were prepared to give) and then adjusting this when the 
possibility of reciprocity was introduced, suggesting that they were aware that the 
other’s response would be contingent on their own offer. However, after controlling 
for verbal ability, autistic children gave significantly more points overall, and verbal 
mental age accounted for a significant amount of variance in the number of points 
given, suggesting that verbal ability may impact on expectations of reciprocity. It 
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may be the case that those with better verbal ability are also better at understanding 
social norms (such as reciprocity) which are thought to have evolved precisely 
because of language (Smith, 2010), and thus expectations could be related to the 
knowledge and experience of these norms (Hoffman et al., 2008).  
Notably, there was a significant group difference on the Strange Stories task (Happé, 
1994; White et al., 2009a). However, this group difference was not specific to stories 
related to mental state understanding, as performance on nature stories was also 
comparatively poorer than typical children’s performance. Performance on the 
Strange Stories task also correlated significantly with verbal ability, as expected 
(Happé, 1995; Scheeren et al., 2013). These results suggest that children’s 
performance was more contingent on verbal ability and story comprehension rather 
than a specific difficulty with ToM. Regardless of these data, any difficulties in ToM 
in autism may be insufficient to explain the social difficulties found in autism 
(Bennett, Szatmari, Bryson, Duku, Vaccarella & Tuff, 2013; Pellicano, 2012). 
Indeed, in a recent review of interventions based on ToM there was little evidence 
that such interventions had an impact on real-life social skills (Fletcher-Watson, 
McConnell, Manola & McConachie, 2014).    
6.4.2. Relationships between mechanisms and reputation management 
The relatively wide age range (from 7 to 14) of participants allowed performance to 
be analysed as a function of chronological age and verbal ability (as assessed by 
verbal mental age), such that any developmental changes could be identified. 
However, only verbal mental age correlated positively with ToM, further suggesting 
that performance on this task is related to verbal ability.  
205 
 
After controlling for the potentially confounding effects of verbal mental age, 
relationships between performance on each of the tasks were tested. There was a 
significant positive correlation between direct reciprocity (i.e. directly responding to 
another’s offer) and expectations of reciprocity (i.e., predicting how another will 
respond to your offer), suggesting that these tasks were assessing the same construct, 
and that experiences of reciprocity could link to expectations of reciprocity in autism, 
similar to typical children (Hoffman et al., 2008). 
A number of mechanisms were identified which might determine the degree to which 
children with autism engage in reputation management. Scores on tasks designed to 
measure individual differences in the candidate mechanisms, however, were not 
related to individual differences in implicit reputation management, even after 
controlling for verbal mental age. Chapter Five showed that both typical and autistic 
children showed a remarkably low amount of implicit reputation management 
overall. Even within a larger sample of typical children, there was no evidence of 
implicit reputation management until 12 to 14 years of age, and the degree of 
reputation management was not predicted by any of the possible mechanisms 
(Chapters Three and Four). In terms of explicit reputation management, there were 
no correlations between explicit reputation management and any of the mechanisms 
for autistic children. 
Further exploratory analyses, however, revealed potentially interesting differences 
between autistic children who had said “yes” to saving when bottom of the leader 
board and those who had said “no”. Specifically, autistic children who said “no” 
made fairer offers and rewarded on fewer trials during the second move. It may be 
the case that those with a more sensitive appreciation of reciprocity are also more 
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sensitive to their reputation when it is explicitly at risk. Autistic children who chose 
to protect their reputation seem to prefer fairness, suggesting that these children, like 
their typical peers, may use fairness as a signal to others (Shaw, 2013). Fairness is an 
important motivator of behaviour, especially in economic games (Fehr & Gächter, 
2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999)  and the current findings support recent research which 
notes that autistic children have explicit awareness of social norms such as equality 
or fairness (Schmitz et al., 2014). Indeed, Scheeren et al. (2010) claim that autistic 
individuals may be less effective in self-presentation (a form of explicit reputation 
management) due to an increased likelihood of sticking to norms – and thus they 
avoid self-presentational techniques such as lying or boasting to boost their 
reputation. Thus, learning about norms and social rules may contribute to variability 
in explicit reputation management in autism. However, caution is advised in the 
interpretation of this result since these analyses were prompted by the lack of 
correlations between any of the tasks; however, they do highlight interesting 
hypotheses for future research. 
Considering the results from Chapter Four with typical children, the current study 
showed that different mechanisms may contribute to explicit reputation management 
in autism. For typical children, ToM and social motivation were related to explicit 
reputation management, such that those with better ToM ability were more likely to 
protect their reputation, and those who were more socially motivated were less 
concerned about their reputation. Neither of these mechanisms impacted upon 
reputation management for autistic children in the current study – instead, reciprocity 
was the only mechanism which appeared to have some relationship with explicit 
reputation management. These findings suggest that how autistic children come to 
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manage their reputation is likely to be different to how typical children manage 
reputation.   
6.4.3. Limitations and future directions 
It may be the case that some of the proposed mechanisms do contribute to implicit 
reputation management, but that the right tasks were not used to measure them. 
Social motivation, for example, is particularly difficult to measure (Demurie, 
Roeyers, Baeyens & Sonuga-Barke, 2012). As noted in Chapter Four, previous 
attempts to measure social motivation have used relatively static stimuli (e.g. faces) 
that may not be ecologically valid in estimating motivation for real social interaction 
(Risko et al., 2012). Thus, the current study employed a simple binary response to 
test children’s preferences for social interaction. This binary response does not 
provide a fine-grain measure. For this reason, children could also ‘spend’ points after 
making their choice, under the assumption that a greater spend reflects greater 
motivation. Within both groups, children who wanted to play with someone spent 
more points than those who wanted to play alone, which confirms the validity of this 
measure. Nonetheless, future research should aim to develop measures which can 
reliably measure a child’s social motivation. 
There were a number of theoretical reasons to assume that the suggested mechanisms 
could play a role in reputation management (Chapter One). Perhaps, then, the tasks 
used were not sufficiently sensitive to detect potential differences between children 
with and without autism. The Strange Stories task (Happé, 1994) is frequently used 
to measure second-order ToM (e.g. White et al., 2009a), yet could only detect 
differences in language ability, as discussed above. Previous research utilising 
economic games to test social decision-making in autistic children have also shown 
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little difference between typical and autistic children (Downs & Smith, 2010; Sally & 
Hill, 2008), although some recent research suggests that children with autism may 
have different norm preferences (Schmitz et al., 2014). Finally, the go/no-go task has 
previously found mixed results (Adams & Jarrold, 2012; Christ et al., 2007; Hill, 
2004a). Therefore, one would expect to find variability in performance on these tasks 
that could, theoretically, have contributed to reputation management. The fact that 
ToM and social motivation contributed to explicit reputation management in typical 
children (Chapter Four), suggests that these tasks are sensitive and developmentally 
appropriate, at least in typical development. The current study suggests that autistic 
children come to manage their reputation explicitly through alternative means. 
Rather than generating hypotheses based on preconceived notions of typicality, 
Chapter Seven will attempt to generate hypotheses from the “bottom up” by utilising 
qualitative methods to examine reputation management in autistic adolescents.  
Overall, the current findings highlight that the ability to manage reputation explicitly 
may be underpinned by different mechanisms in typical and in autistic children. It 
remains unclear, however, why neither group of children appeared to implicitly 
manage their reputation. Future research, perhaps with older adolescents, is clearly 
needed to examine this issue further. In terms of explicit reputation management, 
autistic children who protected their reputation were also fairer. However, since this 
finding was obtained through exploratory analyses, further research is required to 
strengthen our understanding of reputation management in autism, and to examine 
alternative hypotheses. One method to further examine this issue is to adopt 
qualitative methods, by asking autistic adolescents to discuss issues surrounding 
reputation management.  
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Chapter Seven 
‘I am who I am’: Reputational concerns in adolescents with autism 
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7.1. Introduction 
Adolescence marks a number of social changes that may lead to increased concern 
for reputation. For example, during adolescence, intimate peer relationships tend to 
become increasingly important and valuable for typical individuals (Jankowski et al., 
2014) and there is an enhanced desire to avoid social exclusion (Blakemore & Mills, 
2014). Therefore, concern for what others – especially peers – think of oneself is of 
particular import during adolescence (Sebastian et al., 2008). Indeed, the reward 
systems of typical adolescents’ brains have been found to be especially sensitive to 
the presence of peers in fMRI studies (Albert, Chein & Steinberg, 2013; Chein, 
Albert, O’Brien, Uckert & Steinberg, 2011). A change in behaviour when peers are 
present often occurs, such as increased risk-taking for immediate rewards (Chein et 
al., 2011; Gardner & Steinberg, 2005). Accordingly, behaviour in adolescence may 
be driven by a need to manage reputation in front of peers.  
Adolescence, which appears to be a particularly “social” time, is likely to pose 
particular problems for individuals with autism, as autistic adolescents may struggle 
with the increased social complexities and demands of daily life (Carrington et al., 
2003a) that the high school environment in particular presents (Adreon & Stella, 
2001). Indeed, cognitively-able autistic adolescents have reported an increasing 
awareness that they are different to other people and report more concerns about their 
friendships than during the period prior to adolescence (Carrington et al., 2003b; 
Stoddart, 1999). They also report that they would like to fit in and have friends 
(Daniel & Billingsley, 2010), although they often feel like they simply do not fit in 
(Portway & Johnson, 2003), and lack the skills to successfully obtain desired 
friendships (Locke et al., 2010; Bauminger et al., 2003).  
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Young people with autism therefore have qualitatively different social experiences 
compared to their typical counterparts. As Damian Milton (2013), an autistic scholar, 
notes, although the social experiences of autistic individuals are different to that of 
typical individuals, there is not necessarily a lack of social experiences. For example, 
Carrington et al. (2003b) found that adolescents with autism reported using 
“masquerading” – pretending to know how social situations work – in order to hide 
their social difficulties from their typical peers. Carrington et al. (2003b) also noted 
that the autistic adolescents in their sample reported that encounters with peers could 
be frequently hostile. Williamson, Craig and Slinger (2008) found that compared to 
typical adolescents, adolescents with Asperger’s perceived that they received less 
approval from their peers. Thus, despite friendship research (e.g. Daniel & 
Billingsley, 2010) suggesting autistic adolescents do desire friendships, how they 
experience these friendships (particularly those from typical peers) appears to be 
different, and perhaps more negative, than those experienced by typical adolescents.  
For typical adolescents, being able to appreciate peers’ perspectives may be one of 
the key skills for maintaining friendships (Blakemore & Mills, 2014). Autistic 
individuals are known to struggle with automatically figuring out others’ 
perspectives (Ruffman, Garnham & Rideout, 2001; Senju et al., 2009), but they may 
learn to master some perspective-taking skills (Bowler, 1992; Happé, 1995; Scheeren 
et al., 2013) and are also capable of self-promotion (Begeer et al., 2008; Scheeren et 
al., 2010) – an ability that suggests that autistic individuals may be at least somewhat 
concerned by how they are viewed by others. Furthermore, autistic adolescents are 
sensitive to social rejection: following ostracism in a cyber ball game, autistic 
adolescents were negatively affected in terms of anxiety, self-esteem and belonging, 
much like their typical peers (Sebastian, Blakemore, & Charman, 2009).  
212 
 
7.1.1. The current study. 
Chapter Two suggested that autistic adults are capable of managing their reputation, 
although their propensity for reputation management was reduced by lowered 
expectations of reciprocity. Furthermore, Chapter Five presented experimental 
evidence that some autistic children – like their typical counterparts – can be 
concerned about what other people think of them when it is explicitly clear that they 
may be judged by others. Despite these findings, autistic individuals continue to have 
difficulties with everyday social experiences, and there remains to be variation in the 
ability to manage reputation in autism. The main aim of the current study was to 
examine potential sources of this variability, given that previous chapters suggested 
that the proposed mechanisms could not sufficiently explain this variability. 
Exploratory qualitative methods were used to gain insight into autistic adolescents’ 
social experiences, which could highlight previously unconsidered mechanisms 
contributing to reputation management in autism that other “top down” methods are 
too constrained to reveal. 
I addressed this aim by examining autistic adolescents’ friendships, their worries, 
their self-concept, and their perceptions of being “cool”. Given the suggested 
importance of friends during adolescence (Jankowski et al., 2014), reputation 
specifically amongst friends may be of great importance, and the current study 
examined whether this suggestion is also true for adolescents with autism. 
Discussion of worries could also highlight concerns for reputation if autistic 
adolescents were to express concern over what others think. Examining autistic 
adolescents’ self concepts, by asking them to describe themselves and to consider 
how others would describe them, tested their awareness that others can view them 
differently to how they view the self. The concept of being “cool” was examined 
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since young people can relate to this concept, and a reputation for being “cool” could 
be particularly pertinent in adolescence. For example, adolescents like to be seen as 
“cool” (Danesi, 1994), and “coolness” is used for proving masculinity in adolescent 
boys (Martino, 2000). Qualitatively examining whether autistic adolescents are 
concerned about having a reputation for being “cool” could elucidate potential 
explanations for variability in reputation management in autism.   
Eliciting the social experiences of autistic adolescents by utilising qualitative 
methods is important in enhancing our understanding of their experiences 
(Carrington & Graham, 2001; Humphrey & Parkinson, 2006), which ultimately has 
implications for how autism is understood and perceived (Humphrey & Lewis, 2008; 
Molloy & Vasil, 2002). Semi-structured interviews are a key method to achieve this 
study’s aim, by delving deeper into autistic adolescents’ social experiences in order 
to develop further hypotheses concerning the underpinnings of reputation 
management. To the best of my knowledge, previous research examining autistic 
adolescent’s social experiences have not done so in this context. Qualitative methods 
are therefore imperative in deepening our understanding of reputation management 
in autism, from the perspective of autistic individuals themselves (Bölte, 2014). 
To this end, the current study involved semi-structured interviews with autistic 
adolescents to examine their potential concern for reputation. School staff supporting 
these adolescents were also interviewed to triangulate viewpoints and provide 
perspectives from individuals who witness the students’ social lives within school. 
School staff are uniquely positioned by being able to report experiences of multiple 
students’ social lives within the school environment, and are able to support and add 
to students’ self-reports.  
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7.2. Method 
7.2.1. Participants 
Twelve autistic adolescents took part in this study (one female), aged between 12 and 
15 years. Two participants were non-identical twin brothers (ID105 and ID106). The 
mean age of the autistic adolescents was 13 years 9 months (range: 12 years 9 
months to 15 years 9 months). The adolescents were consider to be cognitively-able, 
with intellectual ability measured using the WASI-II (Wechsler, 2011; full scale IQ 
M = 92.25 (SD = 20.29), verbal IQ M = 91.42 (SD = 20.17) and performance IQ M = 
94.08 (SD = 17.69)).  Verbal IQ was used to calculate verbal mental age. Parents 
were asked to complete the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; Rutter et al., 
2003) to confirm that the students met the cut-off (a score above 15) for autism, 
which all students did. All students also had an independent clinical diagnosis of 
autism and a statement of Special Educational Needs. Individual characteristics of 
each autistic adolescent, including gender, chronological age, verbal mental age, 
SCQ scores, diagnoses (as reported by parents) and ethnicity, can be seen below in 
Table 24. 
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Table 24.  
Individual characteristics of each participant, including gender, chronological age, verbal mental age, and Social Communication 
Questionnaire (SCQ) scores, diagnosis, age of autism diagnosis, and ethnic group.  
ID Gender Chronological 
age (years: 
months)  
Verbal 
mental 
age 
SCQ Diagnosis Age of autism 
diagnosis 
(months) 
Ethnic group 
101 Female 12: 9 8: 3 33 Autism Spectrum Disorder 40  White – British 
102 Male 13: 4 15: 9 32 Asperger’s 118 White – other 
103 Male 14: 11 13: 0 20 Autism Spectrum Disorder 48  White & Black African 
104 Male 12: 10 9: 10 27 Autism 59  British Asian & East African 
105 Male 13: 10 15: 10 25 Autism, ADHD 58 White – British  
106 Male 13: 10 13: 0 21 Autism Spectrum Disorder, Dyspraxia 43 White – British  
107 Male 13: 2 10: 2 32 Autism 60 White – British 
108 Male 15: 9 14: 10 31 Autism, ADHD 84  White – British  
109 Male 15: 0 10: 0 25 Autism Spectrum Disorder 36  White/Asian 
110 Male 12: 11 12: 11 29 Autism, Dyspraxia 84 White – British/Asian 
111 Male 12: 11 9: 7 28 Autism Spectrum Disorder 24  White – British 
112 Male 13: 9 16: 10 28 Asperger’s, ADHD, depression, 
anxiety disorder 
87 White – British 
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The autistic adolescents were recruited through autism provisions attached to 
mainstream secondary schools in the London area and participation in previous 
research. Parental consent was obtained as well as written consent from each student 
before the interview commenced. Five members of school staff (Learning Support 
Assistants (LSA); one male, four female) from the same school who worked directly 
with of some of the interviewed autistic adolescents were also interviewed. These 
LSAs were all employed as part of an autism provision attached to a mainstream 
school in North London. They thus spend their time supporting students with autism, 
both one-to-one and as a year group (Table 25). All LSAs gave written informed 
consent to participate.  
Table 25. 
Individual characteristics of the school staff interviewed, including a description of 
their work with autistic students. 
ID Gender  Description of work  
T101 Male Has main responsibility for the group of year 8 students
*
, 
supports less in lessons but students frequently come to his 
office for support. 
T102 Female Works with “nurture group”ᶲ, has worked one-to-one with 
other students who spend more time in the mainstream school. 
T103 Female Works with year 10 students, one afternoon a week with year 
8 students, and one-to-one with a year 7 student. 
T104 Female Works with year 9 students, six students of whom are in the 
“nurture group”, and three students who spend more time in 
mainstream school.  
T105 Female Works with a variety of students in years 7, 8 and 10, has main 
responsibility for the group of year 7 students. 
Notes. *English secondary school years with the following age groups: Year 7 = 11-year-olds, year 8 
= 12-year-olds, year 9 = 13-year-olds, year 10 = 14-15 year-olds. ᶲ The “nurture group” consists of 
students with more severe autism who spend most of their time receiving specialist education in the 
autism provision. 
Ethical approval was obtained from the Faculty of Policy and Society’s Research 
Ethics Committee at the Institute of Education, London. 
 217 
 
 
7.2.2. Procedure  
Development and content of interview schedules. The semi-structured interviews 
for autistic adolescents were guided by the study’s aim and developed in consultation 
with a senior LSA at one of the participating schools to ensure that the questions 
would be suitable for the autistic adolescents. These interviews included questions 
about friends (e.g., “what does being a friend mean to you?”), being “cool” (e.g. 
“what makes someone cool at your school?”), and worries (e.g. “can you tell me 
about things that make you feel worried?”).  Autistic adolescents’ self-concepts were 
examined in order to test whether they were explicitly aware that others could 
describe them in a different way to how they described themselves. To this end, 
adolescents were asked to describe themselves and to describe how they believed 
other people would describe them. The full interview schedule can be seen in 
Appendix A. Following the recommendations of  Harrington, Foster, Rodger, and 
Ashburner (2013), the participating adolescents were given the opportunity to view 
the questions prior to the interview. They also had access to a visual schedule which 
detailed the four main topics of the questions (school, friends, worries and “you”), 
and could use sign cards to communicate to the researcher if they wanted the 
interview to stop, to take a break, or if they did not understand the questions. 
However, none of the autistic adolescents elected to use these cards during the 
interview.  
The questions for LSAs focussed on everyday working life (e.g. “how would you 
describe the students you work most with?”), students’ friendships (e.g. “can you tell 
me about the friendships you witness?”), students’ worries (e.g. “what kinds of things 
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concern or worry the students you work with?”), and attitudes from mainstream non-
autistic students toward the autistic students (e.g. “how do you think the other 
students, without autism, in the mainstream school view the students with autism?”). 
The full schedule can be seen in Appendix B. 
General procedure. After parental consent was granted, consent was obtained from 
the autistic adolescents themselves. Prior to obtaining consent, the primary 
researcher spent a considerable amount of time building rapport with the autistic 
adolescents. Five participants had previously participated in other research with the 
researcher (Chapters Five and Six) but the other participants had not previously been 
involved. These students were thus visited at school every week over four weeks, the 
researcher spending time with them in lessons and during break time. Such rapport 
building was deemed necessary in order to prepare the student for the interview 
experience and reduce any anxiety that could have arisen from participating in an 
unfamiliar situation with an unfamiliar adult (Harrington et al., 2013). The week 
before the interviews were due to take place, the researcher described the interview 
process in detail, ensured that the student understood what the research would 
involve, and then obtained written informed consent from the student. Two 
additional autistic adolescents whose parents gave consent for them to take part in 
the study withdrew from the research at this point.  
The interviews took place at school in a quiet place during school hours, and were 
recorded and later transcribed verbatim. The length of the interviews with the autistic 
adolescents ranged from 9 minutes to 26 minutes (mean = 15 minutes). After 
completing the interview, the students completed the WASI-II (Wechsler, 2011).  
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For the LSA interviews, these interviews were conducted at a time convenient to the 
LSA, and all interviews took place within school hours. The LSAs were aware that 
some of their students had also been interviewed. Interview length for LSAs ranged 
from 16 minutes to 25 minutes, with an average length of 20 minutes.  
7.2.3. Data analysis 
Interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim and NVivo was used to collate 
and organise the data. Thematic analysis was used to examine and identify themes 
within the interviews. A deductive approach was used, with data analysed at the 
semantic level, that is, themes were directed by existing ideas, and the identified 
themes reflected the actual content of the data. A realist framework was also used 
whereby one assumed that reality was evident in the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
The thematic analysis was guided by the recommendations of Braun and Clarke 
(2006), which dictates six steps for the analysis: data familiarisation, generation of 
codes, searching for themes, reviewing themes, defining and naming themes, and 
producing the report. The interviews were coded independently by two researchers 
and themes were agreed upon between the researchers.  
7.3. Results  
7.3.1. Interviews with autistic adolescents 
The interviews involved questions surrounding four main topics: reputation 
concerns, friendships, worries, and self-concepts. In response to questions about 
these topics, several themes were identified, as described below. The overall themes 
and their sub-themes can be seen in Figure 33.  
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Figure 33. Themes and sub-themes discussed by autistic adolescents.  
Reputation concerns. Considering the theme of reputation concerns, two sub-
themes were identified when autistic adolescents discussed concerns about what 
others think: first, autistic adolescents discussed explicit reputation management, that 
is, whether they had changed their behaviour to make other people like them, and 
second, they discussed their understanding and attitudes toward the notion of being 
“cool”. 
Changing behaviour to make others like them (explicit reputation management). 
Five adolescents recalled a time where they had deliberately changed their behaviour 
to make others like them. For example, some adolescents reported that they had 
focussed on learning more about a particular topic in order to make others like them: 
“Well I did try to look up more about games ‘cause my friends were always making 
funny references to games, so I tried to look up and find references to make as well, 
[so I could] make everyone laugh” (ID105). Another participant reported how he 
tried to control his temper in order to make sure others liked him;  “when [a new 
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student] came in [I] tried to be very calm, friendly, slick, not too aggressive, ‘cause I 
didn’t want to scare him”, and how he had misbehaved to impress others in the past: 
“I just was kind of a bad boy back then y'know, I used to do not good stuff, stuff I 
wasn’t proud of, like always used to try and act big to other students” (ID103). 
Another participant noted that he did change his behaviour – “well sometimes, 
sometimes I don’t really want to” (ID104) – but could not explain how he changed 
his behaviour or why he did not want to change.  
Six of the autistic adolescents said that they had not changed their behaviour to make 
others like them. Two adolescents spontaneously expanded on this by describing 
how they were happy with how they were: “I’m fine the way I am” (ID107) and “I 
don’t change myself, like, you know, go like dude or anything like that. I just be who 
I am really” (ID106). 
Understanding and attitudes toward being “cool”. When discussing the notion of 
being “cool”, a theme was identified relating to autistic adolescents’ understanding 
and their attitudes toward being “cool”. Many autistic adolescents (n = 7) reported 
that they did not want to be “cool” – first, because many did not understand the point 
of being “cool” and were not impressed by the notion of “coolness”: 
“I don’t really think much of it. When I say that I mean... not very impressed 
by it pretty much. I don’t see the point.” (ID102); 
 “They’re just like all “look at me” and I’m just thinking what a bunch of 
idiots. You look at them, you just think “what’s the point?”, ‘cause you’re 
making yourself look good yeah, but it’s not really helping you in any 
situations in life. There’s no point really ‘cause it might help you for a day or 
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two but after that everyone’s just like “oh he’s just doing the same thing”” 
(ID108). 
Further, other participants took pride in not being “cool” and instead preferred being 
different and not following the crowd:  
“If I was ever seen as a person who likes popular music and who likes to talk 
about sport I would be devastated, and I would do everything within my 
power to make myself seem uncool, no matter what that does, because I’m not 
one of those people who likes to be popular and modern. 
EC: Do you know why you’re not interested in that? 
Student: Well because I’m not like - people seem to follow people around all 
because it’ll make them popular or because they like certain things. Well I 
think I am who I am, and think what you want, and do what you want, but 
you’re not going to change me. And if you have a problem with that, that is 
your own problem” (ID112). 
Accordingly, being true to one’s self was one of the most common explanations for 
why autistic adolescents did not want to be seen as “cool”: 
“I just feel uncomfortable with this, like this cool stuff going on anyway. I’m 
not interested at all. It’s good to be who you are I say.” (ID106); 
“I just feel like people should just be themselves, not act like somebody you’re 
not. ‘Cause my friend, the group, have been trying to act like they’re twenty 
years old and I’m not buying that. I’m going if you’re going to act like that, I 
want to tell them that “guys I like you for who you actually are, not ‘cause 
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you do all these stuff, not ‘cause of how you look, just ‘cause of who you 
are”” (ID103); 
“Just ‘cause [some people are] different doesn’t mean they’re not cool. Like 
what people see as trendy and hip whatnot, that’s where the theory is at and 
that’s fine, but if they don’t like someone because they’re different, well that 
to me isn’t necessarily cool” (ID112). 
Another reason that autistic adolescents did not try to be “cool” was due to the fact 
that they did not understand the rules behind being “cool”; “I don’t even know the 
rules. I just didn’t care, I just ignore it. I just don’t concentrate about the rules. I just 
don’t really care about being cool”(ID106), “I’m not sure how you would describe it 
but they just try and act in a way that you’d describe as cool and that way changes 
every day apparently”(ID102). 
Many autistic adolescents could identify that there were certain rules that surrounded 
the concept of being “cool”. For example, several adolescents equated that being 
“cool” involved being stylish or fashionable: “’cause I want to wear some fancy 
clothes and... wear everything, whatever they want”(ID101), “they’ve all got, like, 
cool hairstyles and stuff, and you know they’re always trying to just, like, look like 
cool”(ID110). Bad behaviour was also commonly discussed as a trait of “cool 
people”, for example:  “I don’t like them all, they’re really, really, naughty. Some of 
them get external exclusions. Really it can get quite annoying sometimes”(ID110). 
Finally, some autistic adolescents noted positive benefits to being “cool”, including 
being able to make friends, “just so you can get more friends and stuff, even though 
I’ve got lots you know”(ID107), “I want to go out in the playground and play with 
them”(ID109). Also, some adolescents felt that being “cool” was to be nice, “well 
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someone who’s nice, who’s willing to be friends with everyone, likes someone for 
who you are not because of how you look and your money”(ID103), or to have a 
special talent, “[other student] is cool; he is a computer genius”(ID111). 
Friendship. All autistic adolescents stated that they had friends. The number of 
friends that the autistic adolescents had varied widely: five of the adolescents stated 
that they had lots of friends (e.g. “I’ve got tonnes of friends”(ID107)). Three 
adolescents distinguished between having close friends and those who were more 
casual acquaintances: “I’ve got two proper, proper, proper friends and I’ve got other 
friends, but a bit, you know, just I’m really cool with them”(ID106); “I’m happy with 
[the friends I have] ‘cause there’s the friends what you’re with a lot and there's some 
people you like sometimes chat to”(ID108). One autistic adolescent stated that he 
preferred his own company: “Most of the time I like to be myself, like if I’m with 
someone and I’m having fun and I’m talking to them that’s good, but afterwards I 
tend to block it out”(ID112). 
Two sub-themes were identified following autistic adolescents’ discussion of their 
friendships: their understanding of friendship and their awareness of their social 
challenges. 
Understanding of friendship. All of the autistic adolescents reported understanding 
of what friendship meant to them, although there were times when many of the 
adolescents struggled to define exactly what friendship meant: “I don’t know really 
how to explain a friend really properly”(ID108), “I understand that I have friends 
but it’s quite hard to understand the concept of it”(ID112). Friendship was mostly 
equated with companionship, such as spending time with friends (e.g. “they always 
hang out with me”(ID104)), sharing interests with friends (e.g. “it’s very easy to talk 
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to each other because we like very similar things”(ID106)), and helping one another 
(e.g. “it’s good to have lots of people to talk to and to help you”(ID110)). Half of the 
students also reported that having friends gave them some kind of emotional support, 
for example: “you can rely on each other, you can cheer each other up, and there’s 
just someone there to help you and be friends with you, someone who cares”(ID105). 
On the whole, the autistic adolescents appeared to be satisfied with their friendships, 
with several adolescents claiming that if they had too many friends, difficulties could 
arise; 
“There’s lots of people that I’m not particularly friends with, but I talk to. 
The thing is if I became proper friends [it’s] just going to lead to lots of 
problems ‘cause there’s too many people. [...] Someone [will] be all this 
thing like “oh this guy said this, and this guy said that yeah” and then that 
apparently “that’s really rude, that’s really rude, you swore at me” or 
something like that, and that’s not really what I want. It’s not exactly what 
I’m interested in. 
EC: Why aren’t you interested in that? 
Student: Well I don’t know, it just confuses me”(ID110). 
Awareness of social challenges. Ten autistic adolescents identified specific social 
challenges that they had faced. Some autistic adolescents explained how making 
friends could be difficult, particularly when starting at secondary school: “Well it’s 
actually tough to get your friends at first, so it’s going to be tough to like to talk to 
them and stuff you know. Like when you start secondary school, it’s going to be like 
really hard to make friends” (ID107). Other autistic adolescents found having to 
interact with strangers particularly challenging: “I like being with my friends and 
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sometimes all by myself. I don’t like working with new people” (ID105); “I dodge 
working with strangers as much as possible, like other kids in classes” (ID106).  
Two autistic adolescents expressed that they particularly disliked it when they were 
observed by others, for example: “when I’m playing cricket I hate it, I hate when I 
just go in and then you see there’s two of you and there’s eleven fielders and they’re 
all staring at you, and then all the people on the side are staring at you. Sometimes I 
stand there and my legs start shaking” (ID108). Two autistic adolescents also noted 
that they worried about others disliking them, such as: “[I worry about] people liking 
me, and like my friends never invite me to places. They always use the excuse that 
I’m not allowed” (ID103). Finally, one adolescent discussed how he had found the 
internet useful in being able to find others who went through similar social 
challenges to himself: “[online there is] stuff that’s relatable, because like a lot of 
things on there I can relate to, like struggling with things socially, [such as] having 
to act like you understand something when you don’t” (ID112). 
Non-social challenges. Aside from social challenges, two themes relating to non-
social challenges were identified, including challenges at school and coping with 
unpredictability.  
Challenges at school. Eight autistic adolescents reported challenges related to 
school. For the most part, these challenges related to exams, tests, or homework: 
“family make me worried, [there is] pressure on to do well in your exams” (ID108); 
“When I’m close to like a deadline for something, like having work to do, and I’ve 
kind of already started on it but I haven’t had the time to do much on it - that kind of 
things worry me” (ID112). One autistic adolescent reported finding coping with 
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noise in the classroom challenging: “It’s very distracting [when] the class is being a 
bit noisy. [I] really don’t like that at all” (ID101). 
Coping with unpredictability. Five autistic adolescents reported that they struggled 
when things in everyday life were unpredictable, such as when teachers or Learning 
Support Assistants changed: “[I worry] about the LSAs get changed again” (ID101); 
“I don’t like people leaving and then coming. It kind of confuses me - I just like [it] 
being all the same people, the same always” (ID110). One autistic adolescent 
described in detail how he coped with unpredictability by ensuring all of his 
belongings were organised in a certain way: “I like being in the same chair, with my 
diary, with my pencil case, neatly – ruler, pencil, pen, book, in front of me, any extra 
books on the side here like that, straight line, and then here my bag. I don’t like it 
flopping around, I like it at the side nice and straight” (ID105). 
Self concept: Direct and reflected self-evaluation. Autistic adolescents were asked 
to describe themselves (direct self-evaluation) and to report how they thought other 
people would describe them (reflected self-evaluation). All autistic adolescents were 
able to describe themselves under both of these conditions. Table 26 below compares 
direct and reflected self-evaluations from each student, showing that ten students 
gave descriptions with considerable overlap between direct and reflected self-
evaluation.  
Direct self-evaluation. Four types of direct self-evaluation were identified and 
categorised: physical, personality, behavioural and identity descriptions (Table 27). 
Eight autistic adolescents described themselves in terms of personality traits, such as 
being friendly, and six autistic adolescents described themselves by referring to 
physical traits, such as height or weight. Four autistic adolescents described 
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behaviours that they felt defined them, such as their ability to do work. Finally, four 
autistic adolescents reported some form of identity, for example, as just being 
themselves. 
Reflected self-evaluations. As with direct self-evaluations, physical, personality, 
behavioural, and identity descriptions were identified when autistic adolescents were 
asked to consider how others would describe them (Table 26). Eight autistic 
adolescents referred to personality traits and four autistic adolescents referred to 
behavioural traits. Only two autistic adolescents said that others would describe them 
with reference to physical traits. Two autistic adolescents referred to identity. Finally, 
several adolescents reported that they did not know how someone else would 
describe them, for example:  
“See I don’t know, because when I’m asked that kind of question ‘how would 
someone else describe them’ I can never know, ‘cause I’ve no idea what 
they're thinking. I can assume but...  
EC: What about someone who’s really close to you, like a good friend or 
your parents, what might they say about you? 
Student: I think, well, the same thing. No matter how close they are, I 
wouldn’t be able to know how they would describe me” (ID112). 
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Table 26. 
Direct (“how would you describe yourself”) and reflected (“how would other people describe you”) self-evaluations made by all of the autistic 
students. 
ID Direct self-evaluation Category Reflected self-evaluation Category 
101 “I say that I look more beautiful than you” 
“Not wearing nail varnish” 
Physical 
 
“They say I look more lovely than any other children” 
“I think my best friend would describe me... like... look very 
beautiful with this blazers and your school trousers” 
 
Physical 
102 “Average height, I think... not very strong”  
“Smart”, “Cheeky” 
 
Physical 
Personality 
 
“I’ll go for smart again” 
“Pretty much ... um in the geek group”  
Personality 
Identity 
103 “I’m slick, very nice, quick, fiery, loyal” 
 
 
Personality 
 
“Well people describe me as nice, but sometimes I can a be a 
little bit of a jerk-off”  
“Arrogant, only care about myself”  
“Very vain. I’m always concerned about my looks” 
 
Personality 
104 “Just a regular, regular kid” 
 
Identity  “Popular maybe [...] you know, cool” Personality  
105 “I’m jolly and sometimes I’m a bit negative I have to 
admit... a bit nervous, shy” 
“Not very good at work” 
“A bit overweight” 
Personality 
 
Behavioural 
Physical 
“I honestly don’t know” 
“Some people would say jolly or happy and caring and now 
then someone might say I’m a bit too negative”  
“He’s fine, he’s quite funny”  
“He’s alright at gaming” 
 
 
Personality 
 
 
Behavioural 
106 “I’m funny” 
“I’m kind to my friends sometimes” 
“I’m just I just be who I am really” 
“I’m not very good describing myself too. I just don’t really 
like describing myself, it’s better to know someone in 
person think what does he look like”  
Personality 
Behavioural 
Identity 
“Usually my friends say I’m funny” 
“I’m trust and very good to be trusted. I don’t lie often”  
 
Personality  
Behavioural 
107 “I’m getting big as well” 
“I’m friendly and sometimes funny” 
“I’m a teenager” 
Physical 
Personality 
Identity 
“You know friendly, maybe funny” 
 
Personality  
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108 “I’d say I would have some rugby build I would say” 
“I’d like to say quite friendly to people” 
“I can joke around” 
 
Physical 
Personality 
Behavioural 
“Sometimes we always like annoy each other, so people 
would say I’m annoying”  
“Mum mostly she would say that you’ve got a big build for 
rugby, and I just I just go with it” 
 
Behavioural 
 
Physical 
109 “[Own name] is good” 
“I like having conversations” 
 
Behavioural “Good” 
 
Behavioural 
110 “Quite friendly and like a nice person, kind and like 
accommodating. I’m friendly and like good friend to have 
maybe” 
“I’m not sure about height because I’m not fully grown” 
“I don’t really know” 
 
Personality  
 
 
Physical 
 
“I don’t know it’s confusing. I don’t know  how other people 
would describe me because I’m like- there are a few people 
who don’t like me and they obviously wont describe me in 
the best way but like there’s only few people who sort of like 
me. I don’t even know they don’t really know much about 
me so they’re not really going to describe me anyway”  
“I mean [friend] might say I’m a nice person and stuff” 
“ My old school friends they let people be themselves and 
stuff” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Personality  
Identity 
111 “I am... good, I’m never a bully” Personality “Like a very nice friend, good friend” 
 
Personality  
112 “When people ask me to like describe myself I tend to 
shudder ‘cause I can’t really think of anything specific. One 
thing I’d say would be I am who I am, and I do what I do, 
and I like what I like” 
Identity “See I don’t know because when I’m asked that kind of 
question “how would someone else describe them” I can 
never know ‘cause I’ve no idea what they're thinking I can 
assume [...] No matter how close they are I’m I wouldn’t be 
able to know how they would describe me” 
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7.3.2. Interviews with LSAs 
Four main themes were discussed by LSAs, specifically a desire to fit in, friendships, 
non-social challenges, and the challenge of living with autism in a neurotypical
4
 
world. These themes and their sub-themes can be seen in Figure 34 below. 
 
Figure 34. Themes and sub-themes discussed by Learning Support Assistants. 
Reputation concerns: Students have the desire to fit in. All five LSAs reported 
that they believed that the autistic adolescents they worked with were concerned 
about their reputation at times. My analysis identified a theme relating to the desire 
to fit in. For example, LSAs noted that their students did not appear to want to be 
seen as autistic by other students:  
“He still prefers to be in his main school form than come back here [to the 
autism provision] for form time. Which is fantastic and it’s great, but he sees 
                                                          
4
 Those considered to have developed typically are said to be “neurotypical”. 
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it as more of a stigma coming back here. He wants to be seen as everyone 
else.” (T101);  
 “The one who has asked me before “why am I autistic”, she gets very upset 
and very stressed, and she’s like “you know to be one of the cool kids you 
have to wear this”, and it’s like “okay that’s interesting where did you get 
that perception from?”. And she will do anything to be like one of the cool 
kids, including covering her face in makeup, which - it might be dripping - 
but it’s the logic of the “you have to put make up on in order to look like, in 
order to be like this”” (T102); 
 “[A challenge for students is] how they’re by perceived in the main school as 
well, do they look different, are they different, do they act differently. They try 
to blend in with everybody else, but there are times when you can see that 
that child just isn’t blending as well as they could do, and that they do know 
when that happens - especially the girl, she really does know” (T104). 
Friendship. All of the LSAs could identify specific friendships between the autistic 
adolescents, both within the autism provision and with non-autistic students in the 
mainstream school. Two themes were identified in LSAs discussion of friendship: 
differences in friendship quality and difficulties in the understanding of social rules. 
Differences in quality of friendships. LSAs discussed how they believed there to be 
a difference in quality in autistic adolescents’ friendships compared to those of 
typical adolescents. For example: 
“They also have their friendships, so the two boys in our class who like 
London transport and buses, there is some form of friendship you can see 
there. It’s not in the typical form of playing together but they have a shared 
 233 
 
interest. If you were to look at it in typical children you would see it as, for 
want of a better word, you might see it as them being in a relationship more 
than kind of a friendship, because it’s the way they perceive friendship in 
autism is very by the book, but they try their best.” (T102); 
 “I don’t know about deep meaningful friendships, where you go around to 
each other’s house for tea, don’t think it’s on that level. So it’s a case of, 
yeah, we’ll sit with you at lunchtime, you can talk to us, we’ll answer, but we 
might not go out of our way” (T105). 
Difficulties in understanding social rules. Four LSAs described how the autistic 
adolescents they worked with found friendships difficult due to struggles in 
understanding the complex rules of social life:  
“I think that some of them are very aware of the fact that they find socialising 
very baffling, and it has to be learnt, and quite nerve-wracking because 
socialising is very unpredictable. There’s lots of facial expressions to read, 
there’s social cues, there’s jokes, there’s games that they might not see the 
point in [and] not enjoy doing, not really understand the need to sometimes 
to go with the flow” (T103); 
“They find it very hard to start off a conversation some of them, and when 
they’re in a conversation they don’t know sometimes the right way for the 
conversation to go, or how to answer the conversation. Occasionally they will 
start it but it fizzles out” (T104).  
The challenge of living with autism in a neurotypical world. A theme was 
identified amongst all LSAs relating to what they believed it was like to have autism 
in a neurotypical world. Within this theme, there were three sub-themes that 
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contributed to how the LSAs believed their students experienced the world, 
specifically, the fact that their autistic students were all unique, how autism was 
perceived in the mainstream school, and how autistic students experienced being a 
teenager. Together, these themes suggested that the LSAs believed that their autistic 
students experienced the world differently to those without autism. 
Autistic students are all unique. When describing their students, all of the LSAs 
expressed that there was much variability amongst the students that they worked 
with, for example: 
 “You see, I think I think “normal” is sort of the key word. That it’s not 
normal, because autism is - there no normal, what is normal? You could get 
fifty kids with the same diagnosis and they’re all completely different. [...] 
What might be normal for one kid is the complete opposite for another kid” 
(T103).  
Perceptions of autism in the mainstream school. All of the LSAs also noted several 
challenges that their autistic students faced in a mainstream school setting, 
specifically with reference to how the non-autistic students perceived and understood 
the autistic students:  
“I think they [the mainstream students] would say that, yes, they’re different 
but they’re quirky different. [...] I have picked up on a couple of students 
who’ve said “oh so-and-so’s not normal” and I’ve said to them “actually, 
what is normal, you tell me what’s normal”, and when you ask a mainstream 
student that they’re like “well I don’t know”” (T104).  
Despite being perceived as different, all of the LSAs did believe that the autistic 
adolescents they worked with were largely accepted by the non-autistic students, for 
 235 
 
example: “You have got the handful, and it’s quite a large handful, of students that 
are very accepting and won’t even think of them being here as any different. They 
think of them as a [school] student not a [provision] student” (T101).  
How autistic students experience being a teenager. Four LSAs reported that despite 
all of their students being unique individuals, the students they worked with were 
nevertheless teenagers – an experience that all young people go through, regardless 
of whether or not they have autism: 
“They all demonstrate those insecurities in different ways, which is quite 
normal really. Oh there’s that word again, “normal”, but that’s something 
that you know is regardless as to whether somebody’s neurotypical or not 
neurotypical” (T103);  
“They worry about friends, they worry about socialising, they worry about 
exams, tests - just the normal things that a teenage child would worry about, 
whether they’ve got special needs or not, they all worry about the same 
things” (T104).   
Nonetheless, LSAs noted having autism could make the experience of being a 
teenager more challenging: “[you are] generally wanting to fit in with your peers, 
but you have the added stress of being autistic” (T102); “You’re not dealing with 
anything different, you’re just dealing with children that have a slightly different 
outlook upon life, that just find things a little more chaotic and they just need to make 
sense of the world. And that’s all you do, you just, you know, you’re just helping 
them get through dealing with a very complex world” (T105). 
Non-social challenges: Coping with unpredictability in everyday life. Aside from 
social challenges, coping with unpredictability emerged as a key theme amongst 
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LSAs. For example, one LSA felt that the greatest challenge her students faced on a 
day-to-day basis was “dealing with everyday life and the unpredictability of everyday 
life” (T102). The LSAs described specific incidents of students struggling to cope 
with unpredictability:  
“If someone’s sitting in his seat he’ll find it quite difficult, and he won’t really 
want to stand out as saying it’s an issue, but he’ll want to sit in his seat and 
he won’t really take a compromise of sitting somewhere near or elsewhere” 
(T102);  
 “[They struggle with] transition, moving from one place to another, 
movement along the corridors, assemblies, lunch times, how are they going to 
occupy themselves. So they tend to really stick rigidly to what they always do 
and they will not bend” (T105). 
7.4. Discussion 
The main aim of the current study was to examine potential sources of variability in 
reputation management in autism. Adolescents’ responses and those of their LSAs 
showed that the autistic adolescents were aware of their reputation and several 
students reported that they had explicitly attempted to manage their reputation in the 
past. Nonetheless, variability in reputation management was affected by (a) a desire 
to be true to oneself and (b) less understanding of social rules and their purpose. 
Autistic adolescents’ friendships and their self concepts were also examined, and 
further suggested that autistic adolescents could be aware of their reputation. These 
results will now be discussed in turn.  
Thematic analysis revealed that many of the autistic adolescents were aware of and at 
times concerned for their reputation, with some discussing specific changes in 
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behaviour they had deliberately made to impress others (i.e., explicit reputation 
management). This result was further supported by reports from the autistic 
adolescents’ LSAs, and is also in line with experimental research evidencing self-
presentation skills in autism (Begeer et al., 2008; Scheeren et al., 2010). Further, this 
result suggests that, like typical adolescents (Happé & Frith, 2013; Sebastian et al., 
2008), autistic adolescents’ behaviour could be driven by reputational concerns. 
These findings speak against a strict version of the theory of mind hypothesis, which 
claims that autistic individuals cannot think about what other people are thinking 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). Although the current study did not measure ToM, the 
autistic adolescents’ discussions evidenced that they could think about other’s 
thoughts and be aware of their reputation, which is defined as a construct based on 
what other people think (Emler, 1990; Izuma, 2012). This result could support the 
idea that autistic individuals come to have an explicit ToM, but do not automatically 
think about others’ thoughts and beliefs (Frith, 2004; Senju et al., 2009).  
As discussed by the LSAs, the students, despite their autism, are still teenagers, who 
are exposed to a similar social context as their typical counterparts within the school, 
and that they worried about many of the same things, such as exams and friendships. 
However, having autism appears to result in the social environment being 
experienced or processed differently. The current study examined reputation 
management by focussing on the topic of being “cool”, as many adolescents attempt 
to have a reputation for being “cool” (Danesi, 1994; Martino, 2000; Martino & 
Pallotta-Chiarolli, 2005). The autistic students could identify what it meant to be 
“cool”, for example, by noting how “cool” people often had “style” and could be 
badly behaved. However, more than half of the students expressed that they did not 
want to be “cool” themselves. The results suggested that this reduced desire to be 
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seen as “cool” could be due, first, to a preference to being true to oneself, and, 
second, to difficulties in understanding social rules, or their purpose.  
First, autistic adolescents reported that they would rather be true to themselves than 
be seen as “cool”, with several students taking pride in their differences and being 
“who I am”. Previous qualitative research has noted that some autistic individuals 
take pride in their differences (Humphrey & Lewis, 2008; Hurlbutt & Chalmers, 
2002), and appreciating these differences, rather than attempting to fit autistic people 
into a conception of “normality”, is perhaps key to enhancing understanding of how 
autistic individuals experience the social world (Milton, 2012). Other researchers 
(Frith & Frith, 2011; Schereen et al., 2010) have also previously suggested that 
reputation management may not occur due to a lack of hypocrisy and a preference 
for honesty. Together with the current findings, I suggest that some autistic 
adolescents may approach social experiences with a preference for being true to 
themselves, rather than to be seen as someone who they are not, thus striving for a 
reputation for being honest.  
Interestingly, while autistic adolescents reported that they preferred to be true to 
themselves, their LSAs reported that they felt that their students had a desire to fit in. 
Previous research has also noted that some autistic adolescents report a desire to fit 
in (Daniel & Billingsley, 2010), and Carrington et al. (2003b) found that autistic 
adolescents reported using masquerading as a technique they used to fit in with other 
students. Consolidating these findings, it may be the case that autistic adolescents do 
have a desire to fit in with their peers, but they do not wish to fit in by conforming. 
Rather, as one student noted, they would like to be accepted for being different: “if 
they don’t like someone because they’re different, well that to me isn’t necessarily 
cool”. There may be conflicts between wanting to fit in with others and wanting to be 
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accepted for being different. In the current study, LSAs reported that they felt that 
the autistic students were largely accepted by their peers, although their non-autistic 
peers often perceived the autistic students as being different. Previous research has 
suggested that autistic adolescents often feel that their differences are viewed 
negatively by typical peers (Humphrey & Lewis, 2008) and typical adolescents 
acknowledge that being seen as normal is a key aspect of secondary school social life 
(Martino & Pallotta-Chiarolli, 2005) – suggesting that having a reputation for being 
different may be less accepted by typical adolescents.  
Second, the autistic adolescents reported an inherent difficultly in understanding 
social rules, in particular the rules surrounding being “cool”, and LSAs also 
described how their students were often “baffled” by social rules. Understanding of 
social rules could be related to explicit ToM (Frith & Frith, 2008a). The current 
findings imply, however, that something more than ToM is needed to explain 
variability in reputation management. Even if social rules can be explicitly learnt, the 
constant changing of these unwritten rules makes it difficult for autistic adolescents 
to keep track of what may constitute a good or “cool” reputation. Previous research 
suggests that autistic children are less flexible than typical children in applying social 
rules during moral reasoning (Shulman, Guberman, Shiling & Bauminger, 2012). 
Although they may be able to learn social rules, it appears that the flexible and 
unpredictable nature of social rules causes difficulties for autistic individuals. 
Autistic adolescents and LSAs reported that coping with unpredictability was a 
particularly challenging aspect of everyday life. Autistic individuals are known to 
have rigid and repetitive ways of behaving (APA, 2013), which could impact upon 
the ability to cope with unpredictability in the environment (Pellicano, 2013). This 
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difficulty could contribute to difficulties in understanding social rules, and 
ultimately, reputation management.  
The current study also examined the autistic adolescents’ friendships. All of the 
autistic adolescents reported that they had friends and had an understanding of 
different aspects of friendship, such as companionship and emotional support. 
Nonetheless, they were aware of the social challenges that they faced when it came 
to making friends. For example, several autistic adolescents noted how they found it 
difficult to make new friends, how strangers and observation could cause anxiety, 
and reported worries over others liking them. LSAs further reported that their autistic 
students’ friendships had a different quality to typical students’ friendships. Previous 
research has noted similar aspects of friendship in autism (Bauminger et al., 2003; 
Calder et al., 2013; Carrington et al., 2003b; Daniel & Billingsley, 2010; Locke et al., 
2010). This evidence could support the idea that friendships may be a reputational 
incentive for those with autism, such that some autistic adolescents do want to and 
enjoy having friends, and thus may be motivated to manage their reputation for these 
friends. Indeed, some of the autistic adolescents did mention that they had, for 
example, researched computer games more to make their friends like them. It is 
important to note that some students expressed that they preferred their own 
company (see also Calder et al., 2013), and found social situations anxiety 
provoking.  High social anxiety is frequently co-morbid in autism (Kuusikko et al., 
2008; White et al., 2009b). Understanding precisely how social anxiety impacts upon 
reputation management is a potential avenue for future research.  
Finally, autistic adolescents’ direct and reflected self-evaluations were also 
considered, in an attempt to establish the autistic adolescents’ self-concepts. In 
adolescence, how the self is defined is thought to be heavily dependent upon how we 
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believe others define us (Sebastian et al., 2008). According to this definition, one 
would expect considerable overlap between direct and reflected self-evaluations 
(Felson, 1993; Pfeifer, Masten, Borofsky, Dapretto, Fuligni & Lieberman, 2009). 
When asked to describe themselves, autistic adolescents tended to give overlapping 
direct and reflected self-evaluations. There did appear to be a shift, though, from 
describing the self in terms of personality (e.g., being nice) and physical (e.g., height 
or weight) traits when giving direct self-evaluations, to referring to personality and 
behavioural traits (e.g., being good at playing video games) when asked how others 
would describe them. These differences in self-evaluations suggest that autistic 
adolescents are aware that others could describe them differently to how they 
describe themselves. Some students found it particularly difficult to even guess how 
other people would describe them, which could relate to ToM or language ability. 
Nonetheless, autistic adolescents do have a self-concept (Lee & Hobson, 1998), 
which appears to have some relation to how they are seen by others. They are aware 
that other people can view them differently, which suggests that they are aware that 
they could have a reputation held by others. Future research, though, requires direct 
comparison between typical adolescents to further support this suggestion.   
7.4.1. Limitations and future directions  
The adolescents in the current sample were all part of autism provisions attached to a 
mainstream school, meaning that they spend portions of their time in the classroom 
with typical students (often with the support of school staff) and they also have 
separate lessons without the typical students (for example, some receive social skills 
lessons). This school environment is not the same for all autistic adolescents: for 
example, 55% of autistic individuals are estimated to have an IQ lower than 70 
(Knapp, Romeo & Beecham, 2009) which results in more specialist education for 
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these individuals. Additionally, the school staff in this study all reported how their 
school delivered autism awareness training to school pupils, which is likely to impact 
on typical adolescents’ knowledge and understanding of autism. Other schools in the 
UK may not deliver such training, and there is certainly no legislation that they have 
to (cf. Autism Act, 2009). Thus, the findings reported in this study may differ 
significantly in different schools. Future research should examine autistic 
adolescent’s social experiences within a wider range of school settings, and perhaps 
the impact of autism awareness training upon typical adolescents’ attitudes toward 
autism is also an area that requires further investigation.  
Another point for future research could examine whether the reported desire to be 
accepted for being different has been taught. It could be the case that the adolescents 
with autism in this sample have explicitly been told (for example by parents or by 
teachers) that, although they are different to others, they should take pride in this 
fact. Qualitative research examining this concept of “being different” with autistic 
adolescents, parents, teachers and perhaps typical adolescents too, could be useful in 
identifying whether this is a concept that (a) is taught, (b) autistic adolescents 
identify with and (c) whether typical adolescents accept difference.  
Overall, the current study provides further evidence for reputation management in 
autism – although variability in reputation management could be due to a preference 
for being true to oneself and difficulties with understanding social rules. The 
contribution of these factors to reputation management in autism has not previously 
been considered, and goes beyond the proposed mechanisms that were tested 
experimentally in previous chapters and were shown to have little contribution to 
reputation management. The current study therefore enables the development of new 
hypotheses for future research. The results also suggested that some autistic 
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adolescents are subject to the same social environment as their typical peers – but 
how they approach or process the social environment is likely to be different. 
Notably, autistic adolescents in the current sample found coping with the 
unpredictability of everyday life, in particular dealing with the unpredictably of 
social rules, as a substantial challenge. Additionally, being seen as different was a 
key theme – and these results have implications for acceptance and inclusion by 
challenging what most typical adolescents consider “normal”. Finally, the current 
study demonstrates the importance of enabling young people on the autistic spectrum 
to speak out about their social experiences, in this instance by revealing new insights 
into reputation management in autistic adolescents. 
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8.1. Introduction  
This thesis examined reputation management in typical and autistic individuals, in 
order to enhance our understanding of how those with and without autism are 
influenced by other people. Specifically, I aimed to test whether individuals with 
autism manage their reputation, and to identify the mechanisms underpinning 
reputation management. Several experimental studies were conducted with the aim 
of directly testing reputation management in autistic adults (Chapter Two), typical 
children (Chapter Three) and autistic children (Chapter Five). Further experimental 
studies considered the possible mechanisms underpinning reputation management in 
typical children (Chapter Four) and autistic children (Chapter Six). Since Chapter Six 
could not identify mechanisms contributing to reputation management in autism, a 
further qualitative study (Chapter Seven) was conducted to develop further 
hypotheses concerning reputation management in autistic adolescents. I will now 
consider the main findings of each study and reflect upon their contribution to (1) 
theory surrounding reputation management, (2) our understanding of the mechanisms 
underpinning reputation management and (3) to theory surrounding social influence. 
I will also take into account the limitations of this thesis and avenues for further 
research.  
8.2. Contribution to theoretical accounts of reputation management  
First, Chapter Two demonstrated that adults with autism have the ability to manage 
their reputation, in contrast to conclusions reached by Izuma et al. (2011), who 
claimed that autistic adults were unable to manage their reputation. Although I 
showed that the ability to manage reputation was present in autism, the degree of 
reputation management demonstrated by autistic adults was significantly attenuated 
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in comparison to typical adults. The results of this study lent support for a distinction 
between implicit reputation management and explicit reputation management 
(Amodio & Frith, 2006; Shaw et al., 2013). Implicit reputation management involves 
automatically and subconsciously altering one’s behaviour to manage reputation. 
Explicit reputation management involves deliberate and conscious altering of 
behaviour to maintain or obtain a certain reputation. Autistic adults did not appear to 
implicitly manage their reputation, but did show evidence for explicit reputation 
management.   
Relatively little is known about reputation management during typical development. 
Thus, the proposed distinction between explicit and implicit reputation management 
was examined throughout typical development in Chapter Three, as this distinction 
had not previously been tested within the same group of children. Results showed 
that there were distinct developmental trajectories for the two aspects of reputation 
management. In accordance with previous self-presentation research (e.g. Aloise-
Young, 1993; Banerjee, 2002a, 2002b) and research showing that 8-year-old children 
can explicitly report an understanding of reputation management (Hill & Pillow, 
2006), evidence for explicit reputation management from 8 years was observed. 
Implicit reputation management, however, was not evident until later, as children 
entered adolescence, at 12 to 14 years of age. I propose that implicit reputation 
management is in fact learned, with an automaticity that develops over time, in 
particular during the adolescent years. Previous studies which claim reputation 
management is possible at 5-years-old (Engelmann et al., 2013; Leimgruber et al., 
2012) do not test automatic, implicit reputation management – rather, they evidence 
a regulation of behaviour in fear of punishment or tattling from peers. Although this 
change in behaviour likely contributes to the development of implicit reputation 
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management, I argue that it is not until adolescence that individuals automatically 
regulate behaviour for the precise purpose of upholding their reputation (rather than 
to avoid punishment).   
Adolescence is a milestone period, where social relationships with peers become of 
utmost importance (Jankowski et al., 2014) and friendships are particularly 
rewarding for adolescents (Albert et al., 2013; Chein et al., 2011; Hartup, 1993). As 
such, adolescents are known to take more risks in front of peers (Gardner & 
Steinberg, 2005; Chein et al., 2011) and to strive for an image of “coolness” (Danesi, 
1994). Reputation, then, is of great importance to adolescents (Happé & Frith, 2013; 
Sebastian et al., 2008). During adolescence, skills in implicit reputation management 
are practiced, refined, internalised and, as a result, become automatic. This 
suggestion is related to the proposition that prosocial behaviour does not become 
automatic and less egocentric until mid-adolescence (van den Bos et al., 2011). 
Automaticity in prosocial behaviour could be linked to reputation, since adolescents 
who are more prosocial could also be better at managing reputation.  
In Chapter Five, the same methods employed in Chapter Three were used to test 
reputation management in children with autism aged 7 to 14, with the findings of 
Chapter Three serving to inform our knowledge of reputation management in typical 
development. This study showed that children with autism did not implicitly manage 
their reputation, but that some were able to explicitly do so. Interestingly, a group of 
typically developing children matched to the autistic children on chronological age 
and verbal mental age behaved in a similar manner. This study further supports the 
notion that explicit and implicit forms of reputation management are distinct, and 
that some autistic individuals have the ability to explicitly manage their reputation.   
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There was no evidence for an automatic or implicit form of reputation management 
in either autistic adults or children. However, the reasons for this lack of implicit 
reputation management are likely to be different to those proposed for the lack of 
implicit reputation management noted in typical children (i.e. a protracted 
development), especially given the fact that typical, but not autistic, adults did 
implicitly manage reputation in Chapter Two. It may be the case that autistic 
individuals cannot automatically manage reputation. Missing this automatic ability 
could explain, in part, why autistic individuals continue to have pervasive social 
difficulties in everyday life. Limitations of the implicit reputation management task 
are discussed further in section 8.5. Nonetheless, autistic individuals do appear to be 
consciously aware that they can have a reputation. 
Further qualitative analysis was conducted to identify new hypotheses for future 
research. Chapter Seven used semi-structured interviews to examine the concern for 
reputation in autistic adolescents. Autistic adolescents did report concerns for their 
reputation and could discuss times where they had deliberately attempted to manage 
their reputation, and this finding was supported by interviews with school staff. 
However, when asked about the concept of being “cool”, it appeared that many of 
the autistic adolescents had little desire to be seen as “cool”. Two particular themes 
were identified that could explain this reduced desire: (1) a desire to be true to 
oneself, and (2) a difficulty in understanding social rules and their purpose. I contend 
that difficulties in understanding social rules are driven in turn by autistic adolescents 
finding unpredictability particularly challenging. Given the inherently flexible and 
unpredictable nature of social life, this makes it difficult for autistic adolescents to 
figure out what constitutes a “cool” reputation.  
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Together, these studies have enhanced our understanding of reputation management 
in both typical and autistic individuals. This thesis contributes to our understanding 
of reputation management by demonstrating, across a number of studies, that the 
ability to manage reputation is possible in autism – whereas other studies on 
reputation management in autism have claimed that it simply is not (Chevallier et al., 
2012b; Izuma et al., 2011). Testing for reputation management under a number of 
different experimental conditions, and qualitatively examining autistic individual’s 
social experiences, clearly evidenced reputation management in autism.  
8.3. Contribution to theory: mechanisms of reputation management.  
Other studies have examined reputation management in autism (e.g. Chevallier et al., 
2012b; Izuma et al., 2011), however these studies have only tested for the presence 
of the ability to manage reputation in autism – they did not attempt to directly test 
why this phenomenon may be less likely to occur in autistic individuals. The current 
thesis directly tested a number of possible mechanisms, which could potentially 
explain individual differences in reputation management. 
Chapter Four attempted to identify the underlying mechanisms that may contribute to 
the developmental trajectories of implicit and explicit reputation management in 
typical development. Four mechanisms were proposed: ToM, social motivation, 
expectations of reciprocity, and inhibitory control. Analyses revealed that ToM was 
consistently related to explicit reputation management – suggesting that the ability to 
know the contents of others’ minds is necessary for typical children to consciously 
manage reputation. This finding makes sense, given that our reputation is constructed 
of what other people think about us (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Banerjee and Yuill, 
1999; Izuma, 2012; Izuma et al., 2010, 2011). Social motivation also contributed to 
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explicit reputation management, but not as predicted – that those with increased 
social motivation would be more likely to protect their reputation (Chevallier et al., 
2012a). Instead, children who exhibited more social motivation (by deciding to play 
with someone rather than on their own) were more likely not to protect their 
reputation when it was explicitly at risk. This finding could reflect a general social 
desire to share information with others. Interestingly, there was little evidence that 
any of the proposed mechanisms could explain implicit reputation management, the 
reasons for which are considered in section 8.5. 
Chapter Six examined the contribution of the four putative mechanisms to both 
explicit and implicit reputation management in children with autism, in an attempt to 
explain the variability in reputation management previously noted in this population. 
Previous hypotheses have focused on difficulties in social motivation and ToM as 
explanations for a lack of reputation management in autism (Chevallier et al., 2012a; 
Izuma et al., 2011). First, the diminished social motivation hypothesis of autism 
(Chevallier et al., 2012a) claims that autistic individuals lack social motivation, and 
as a result are unable to manage their reputation (Chevallier et al., 2012b). In Chapter 
Six, I directly tested social motivation, with a binary choice between playing alone or 
with another person, and with a friendship motivation questionnaire (Richard & 
Schneider, 2005). Like their typical counterparts, autistic children wanted to play 
with other people more than they wanted to play alone, and there was no difference 
between groups in friendship motivation scores. Further, qualitative results showed 
that the autistic adolescents who were interviewed had friends, appeared satisfied 
with their friendships, and school staff reported that these autistic students had a 
desire to fit in with others. These results support previous research examining autistic 
individuals’ friendships (e.g. Bauminger et al., 2003; Calder et al., 2013; Carrington 
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et al., 2003b; Locke et al., 2010), and dispute the suggestion that autistic individuals 
lack social motivation, given this clear desire for friendships. 
The results of Chapter Seven suggested that autistic adolescents had a reduced desire 
to be seen as “cool”. Results further suggested that they (a) did not want to be “cool”, 
since many were not impressed by “coolness”, (b) they did not understand the rules 
of being “cool” and (c) they had difficulties in dealing with the unpredictability of 
these rules. It could be argued that these difficulties may be underpinned by reduced 
social motivation to learn these rules, however, it is worth noting that these same 
adolescents were motivated to have friends. Together, these quantitative and 
qualitative findings challenge the diminished social motivation hypothesis 
(Chevallier et al., 2012a). However, it is important to note that there is great variation 
in social motivation in autism, with some autistic adolescents in Chapter Seven 
describing how they ultimately preferred their own company, as other research has 
previously shown (Calder et al., 2013).  
Proponents of the theory of mind hypothesis claim that autistic individuals have a 
specific difficulty in being able to think about others’ thoughts (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1985). Since reputation is imbued with thinking about what others think of the self 
(Izuma, 2012), it has been assumed that autistic individuals would not be able to 
think about their reputation (Izuma et al., 2011). However, in this thesis difficulties 
in ToM did not contribute to the ability to explicitly manage reputation in autistic 
children, and only weakly contributed to this ability in autistic adults. Further, there 
was no evidence for a specific ToM difficulty in the sample of autistic children in 
Chapter Six. Rather, they appeared to have a specific difficulty with story 
comprehension, as performance on both mental state and nature stories in the Strange 
Stories task (Happé, 1994; White et al., 2009a) was poorer than typical children’s 
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performance, and performance was correlated with verbal ability. This finding could 
support the suggestion that language and the understanding of others’ minds are 
substantially inter-related (Happé, 1995; Tager-Flusberg, 2000). Individuals with 
autism may use language with a more limited range of functions (Tager-Flusberg, 
1997), have difficulties with grasping non-literal speech (Happé, 1993), and in 
following narratives (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1995) – skills which in typical 
development are thought to aid the understanding of others’ minds (Tager-Flusberg, 
2000). Language has also been suggested to be an important variable for reputation 
management. For example, language is essential for communicating social norms 
and spreading gossip (Smith, 2010), and for social competence by aiding relationship 
formation (McCabe & Meller, 2004) through consolidating social norm knowledge 
and social problem solving (Marshall, Hightower, Fritton, Russell & Meller, 1996). 
These findings also question the validity of the Strange Stories task (Happé, 1994). 
Autistic individuals may be able to solve the task by processing the task differently 
(Begeer et al., 2010; Brent et al., 2004; Kaland et al., 2008; Lind & Bowler, 2009), 
which would mean that scores on the Strange Stories task are not achieved using a 
theory of other minds. Given the contribution of ToM to reputation management in 
typical development, it cannot be discounted as a mechanism for reputation 
management – however, its contribution to reputation management in autism may be 
relatively weak.  
In Chapter One, reciprocity was identified as an important, but previously 
unexamined mechanism for reputation management. Theoretically, reciprocity could 
contribute to reputation management in a number of ways. First, it could be used as a 
rule or metric by which individuals can judge the behaviour of others: those who are 
seen to act more reciprocally are more likely to be selected as partners in future 
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interactions (Phan et al., 2010). Second, individuals may manage their reputation 
because they expect others to reciprocate their efforts in some way, such as through 
indirect reciprocity where reputational information is passed to others (Engelmann & 
Fischbacher, 2009; Molleman et al., 2013). In this thesis, I found that reciprocity 
particularly contributed to the variation in autistic individuals’ ability to manage 
reputation.   
In Chapter Two, autistic adults expected others not to act reciprocally towards them 
(e.g. by returning favours), despite having high beliefs in the norm of reciprocity 
(e.g. that people really should return favours). These lowered expectations of 
reciprocity could reduce the degree of reputation management as they do not 
anticipate others will reciprocate their efforts. In Chapter Six, autistic children who 
were fairer during the reciprocity tasks were more likely to explicitly manage their 
reputation. These findings lead to the suggestion that the learning of social rules or 
norms, such as reciprocity and fairness, links to the ability to manage reputation in 
autism. Autistic individuals who are more likely to attempt to manage their 
reputation could be more aware of social norms and the fact that others could judge 
them on this basis (such as “nice” people being fair). Further, results from the 
qualitative study suggested that difficulties in dealing with the unpredictability of 
social norms could contribute to variability in reputation management in autism. As 
such, I suggest that autistic individuals can learn specific social norms (see also 
Schmitz et al., 2014), but due to the flexible and therefore unpredictable nature of 
these rules – for example, the fact that typical children acknowledge social norms but 
often do not abide by these (Sheskin et al., 2014; van den Bos et al., 2010) – the 
social world can be a very difficult place to navigate.  
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Inhibitory control was also suggested to be an important mechanism underlying 
reputation management, by inhibiting behaviours that could be detrimental to 
successful reputation management. However, no relationship between inhibitory 
control and reputation management was found for either typical or autistic children. 
Inhibitory control may not be necessary for reputation management to occur. 
However, further testing of this possible relationship is required before inhibitory 
control can be ruled out completely, since inhibitory control could be particularly 
important during adolescence (Crone, 2013; Steinberg, 2010), a time which I have 
suggested to be particularly relevant for the development of reputation management. 
It may also be the case that the use of only one task to measure inhibitory control, the 
go/no-go task, is not enough to describe an individual’s ability to exhibit self-control. 
Although the go/no-go task is a standard task used in both the typical (e.g. Tamm, 
Menon & Reiss, 2002) and atypical (e.g. Happé, Booth, Charlton & Hughes, 2006) 
literature, executive function is multi-faceted, consisting of a multitude of abilities 
which are measured by numerous tasks (Huizinga et al., 2006). Other tasks designed 
to test self-control, such as the delayed gratification task (Mischel, Shoda & 
Rodriguez, 1989), or the colour-word interference task (Stroop, 1935), could also be 
tested and related to reputation management. Using a wider range of tasks to test 
self-control could provide more complete insight into its contribution to reputation 
management. 
One issue that requires discussion is the developmental context in which the 
proposed mechanisms operate. Karmiloff-Smith (2009) notes that processes that are 
important at one, earlier, stage of development may no longer be important at a later 
stage. In terms of reputation management, it may be the case that ToM contributes to 
the early stages of typical reputation management development, by contributing to 
 255 
 
understanding of reputation, but other abilities may also contribute to reputation 
management in later childhood and adolescence. Considering development within a 
dynamic context is of particular importance when examining developmental 
disorders, such as autism (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998). In particular, it is important to 
consider whether or not an apparent ability is underpinned by the same processes as 
in typical development (Karmiloff-Smith, 2009). Indeed, in the current thesis, my 
research suggested that the ability to explicitly manage reputation was underpinned 
by different mechanisms in typical and autistic children. The processes by which 
typical and autistic children come to manage their reputation are therefore different, 
and how these processes develop over time is also likely to be different. Theories of 
reputation management (e.g. Izuma, 2012) tend not to consider this ability in a 
developmental framework, despite the importance of this framework particularly in 
the study of autism (Burack et al., 2001). Although the current thesis was limited by 
sample size, thus preventing the testing of developmental trajectories (Karmiloff-
Smith, 2009; Thomas, Annaz, Ansari, Scerif, Jarrold & Karmiloff-Smith, 2009), it 
did examine three stages of development  – childhood, adolescence and adulthood – 
in  an attempt to direct future hypotheses concerning reputation management in 
autism and typical individuals.  
8.4. Social influence 
Other people influence behaviour in a way that causes many individuals to attempt to 
manage their reputation, with concerns for reputation significantly underlying 
susceptibility to social influence. Social behaviour is thus determined to a large 
extent by reputation, across many different areas of life, such as at work or on the 
internet (Tennie et al., 2010). Reputation is therefore an important and relevant topic 
to research, and can inform theory surrounding social influence.  
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This thesis began with a question of “what does it mean to be social?” noting that a 
shared social world is thought to make humans unique (Frith & Frith, 2007). 
Reputation plays an important role in this social world – with some theorists arguing 
that reputation is “everything” (Shaw et al., 2013). Indeed, reputation is thought to 
have aided the evolution of cooperation (Barclay & Willer, 2007; Sylwester & 
Roberts, 2010) by encouraging individuals to cooperate and share with others in 
order to survive (Rand & Nowak, 2013; Tomasello et al., 2012; Tomasello & Vaish, 
2013). This thesis examined the question of what it means to be social by considering 
the underlying mechanisms that contribute to the propensity for reputation 
management and by examining how autistic individuals manage reputation.  
As previously discussed, I showed that typical children who are better at theorising 
about the contents of others’ minds are more likely to explicitly manage their 
reputation. Being social therefore involves being able to think about others’ minds. 
Second, many autistic individuals are exposed to a similar social context as typical 
individuals (such as the school classroom), however, the way in which they process 
and experience the social world is different to typical individuals (Milton, 2014). For 
example, if autistic individuals find that others do not reliably act in accordance with 
social norms (despite learning that people should do so) then this could lower their 
expectations that others will act according to social norms. In this way, the degree of 
social influence is, in part, determined by social experiences. Autistic individuals do 
appear to be capable of learning an expectancy of others’ behaviour. This idea fits 
with Cottrell et al.’s (1968) social evaluation theory, which suggested that social 
influence occurs due to a learned expectancy that others will judge one’s behaviour. I 
suggest that individuals with autism are not immune from learning this expectancy – 
but their expectancies likely differ to those held by typical individuals. Indeed, even 
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non-verbal children with autism have been shown to be capable of building social 
expectations (Nadel et al., 2000).   
8.5. Limitations 
I will now address several key areas of limitation in this thesis, including issues 
concerning the implicit reputation management task and validity. Further limitations 
within each of the studies are discussed in their corresponding chapter.  
The implicit reputation management task did not highlight differences between a 
wide age range of typical children (aged 6 to 14), or between typical and autistic 
children, nor did any of the proposed mechanisms correlate with this task. There are 
two possible explanations for this result: either implicit reputation management is not 
evident in children of this age range, or that the task was not sensitive enough to 
detect group or individual differences. Considering the first suggestion, I have 
previously discussed (section 3.4) the proposition that implicit reputation 
management is a skill that becomes attuned and truly automatic in adolescence. 
Indeed, the results of Chapter Three did show a trend towards early adolescents 
automatically managing their reputation. Chapters Three to Six were conducted 
concurrently and informed by the limited current research examining reputation 
management in children (i.e. Engelmann et al., 2012; Leimgruber et al., 2012) which 
noted a form of implicit reputation management in 5-year-olds. I argue that this 
previous research taps some of the precursors to implicit reputation management – 
awareness that others could punish or reward the behaviour they witness. 
Considering the suggestion that the task used may not have been sensitive enough, I 
argue that the task was designed to be developmentally-appropriate and to test the 
automatic, subtle behaviour changes noted in the adult literature, such as observation 
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causing an increase in charity donations in dictator games (Izuma et al., 2010, 2011). 
Economic games, such as the dictator game, were used throughout the quantitative 
studies of this thesis, and are frequently used as an experimental paradigm 
(Gummerum et al., 2008). However, the external validity of these games has 
previously been questioned (see below). Nonetheless, I argue that controlling the 
context in which the economic games occur enables the testing of experimental 
hypotheses: in this thesis, comparing behaviour in a situation with and without an 
observer directly tests whether changes in behaviour are related to the presence of an 
observer. By taking into account potential mechanisms of reputation management, 
one could also attempt to explain behaviour changes under observation.  
Levitt and List (2007) express caution against generalising from economic games to 
the real world, with factors such as moral considerations, fear of scrutiny, and social 
context all affecting prosocial behaviour to varying degrees. Benz and Meier (2008) 
also note that prosocial behaviour is more accentuated in economic games, although 
behaviour in experiments is correlated with behaviour in real life. The dictator game 
has also been tested for validity in other non-Western cultures. Thomae et al. (2012) 
modified the dictator game for Cameroonian villagers by asking them to allocate rice 
resources. The villagers’ behaviour was determined by gender and the amount of 
interaction between different groups of villagers, demonstrating the ability of the 
dictator game to be used in a range of settings. Gurven and Winking (2008), 
however, found no correlation between prosocial behaviour in economic games and 
real life prosocial behaviour in Amazonian villagers, finding instead that the villagers 
tended to act in the rational manner predicted by economic game theory (Thaler, 
2000). Nonetheless, they note that economic games are still of value in providing 
novel insights into behaviour and social norms in different populations.  
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Economic games are important precisely because people do not act in an 
economically rational way (Ben-Ner, Putterman, Kong & Magan, 2004; Fehr & 
Gächter, 2000; Gintis, 2000; Kahneman, 2003), and how they depart from rationality 
is of key interest when it comes to social influence. Gummerum et al. (2008) also 
describe how economic games can be useful when examining the development of 
social preferences and norms, such as reciprocity. Benenson, Pascoe and Radmore 
(2007) note several strengths of the dictator game, including its simplicity and 
uniform procedure. The mixed methods approach of this thesis also enhances the 
validity of using economic games and an experimental approach in general.  
It could be argued that some of the results may be limited in their application to real 
life, in particular to the life of an autistic person. Autism is a highly heterogeneous 
condition (APA, 2013), and the participants across the studies of this thesis may 
represent only a small part of the autistic spectrum, in that they were mostly male 
and of relatively high verbal ability and general intellectual functioning: despite the 
fact that over 50% of individuals on the autism spectrum also have an additional 
learning disability (Emerson & Baines, 2010). Nonetheless, this thesis does have real 
life applications, by showing that reputation can constitute part of some autistic 
people’s social lives: they can be concerned for their reputation, and they can make 
efforts to manage it. Given the suggestion that reputation management may have a 
certain peak in adolescence (Sebastian et al., 2008), the qualitative results of this 
thesis are of particular pertinence. One in every 270 students in a mainstream school 
have an autism spectrum condition (Humphrey, 2008). Since education takes place in 
a social environment, it is important to consider how this social environment impacts 
upon learning. In particular, social expectations increase and peer relationships are 
considerably more important and complex in mainstream secondary schools (Adreon 
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& Stella, 2001). Therefore, this thesis does have results that could be generalised for 
autistic individuals who receive mainstream education.  
Finally, it should also be noted that there can be a degree of circularity in attempts to 
explain social difficulties in autism, in which one aspect of social difficulty (for 
example, implicit reputation management) is explained by another aspect of social 
difficulty (for example, social norm learning). Causal explanations of the 
development of social difficulties in autism may well need to appeal to other, non-
social mechanisms to reduce the risk of circularity. Future work could test such 
mechanisms by examining whether difficulties with implicit reputation management 
could be underpinned by non-social learning mechanisms, for example. 
8.6. Future directions 
The current thesis highlights a number of interesting avenues for future research. 
First, the study of reputation management in adolescence is of utmost importance in 
order to understand behaviour during this time, given the suggestion that this is a key 
period for the development of reputation management (Hepach et al., 2012; 
Sebastian et al., 2008). For example, peers are known to have a significant influence 
on alcohol use (Borsari & Carey, 2001; Osgood, Ragan, Wallace, Gest, Feinberg & 
Moody, 2013), smoking (Kobus, 2003), and non-suicidal self-injury (Prinstein et al., 
2010; You, Lin, Fu & Leung, 2013). Brain-imaging research shows that adolescents’ 
brains are especially sensitive to evaluation from peers (Somerville, 2013) and this 
evaluation is thought to affect how adolescents define the self (Sebastian et al., 
2008). Adolescents are also thought to find social exclusion particularly aversive 
(Sebastian, Viding, Williams & Blakemore, 2010) – therefore, adolescence is 
considered a particularly sensitive time for social processing (Blakemore & Mills, 
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2014). Thus, examining reputation management during this time is of theoretical 
import, yet there is a lack of research experimentally testing the hypothesis that 
adolescents would be highly motivated by reputation. Some studies have noted that 
when observed by peers, increases in risk-taking can occur (Chein et al., 2011; 
Gardner & Steinberg, 2005), although the degree to which risk-taking behaviours are 
motivated by reputation is currently unclear.  
Another potential avenue of research could examine reputational concerns 
specifically in girls with autism. Girls with autism are under-represented in research, 
perhaps due to girls being “missed” when it comes to diagnosis (Dworzynski, 
Ronald, Bolton & Happé, 2012).  In the current thesis, girls with autism were in the 
minority, with no female adults in Chapter Two, six girls in the experimental studies 
(Chapter Five and Six) and one in the qualitative study. Considering the suggestion 
that girls may be better at “camouflaging” their autism, this ability could contribute 
to the difficulties in detecting autism in girls (Hiller, Young & Weber, 2014). If 
autistic girls are better at “camouflaging”, then it would follow that they may be 
better at managing reputation. Indeed, Hiller et al. (2014) noted that girls in their 
sample were more likely to control their behaviour in public than boys. Recent 
research has suggested that girls with autism may have different social experiences: 
while autistic boys tend to be excluded from friendships, autistic girls are more likely 
to be simply overlooked by their peers (Dean et al., in press). Qualitative methods 
could be of use to examine this topic in autistic girls. Interestingly, in Chapter Seven 
several members of school staff described how one girl in particular (who did not 
take part in the research) appeared to be extremely concerned for her reputation. 
Whether this concern then manifests itself in subsequent reputation management is a 
matter for further investigation.  
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8.7. Conclusion  
In conclusion, this thesis contributes to the field in a number of key ways, by 
enhancing our understanding of how both typical and autistic individuals are 
influenced by others in the context of reputation management. First, I showed that 
autistic adults do have the ability to manage reputation, although the propensity for 
reputation management was reduced in comparison to typical individuals. It appeared 
that this reduced propensity was related to expectations of reciprocity. Second, I 
showed that in typical development, a distinction between implicit and explicit 
reputation management does exist, with implicit reputation management having a 
protracted development and explicit reputation management appearing around 8-
years-old. Further, the ability to explicitly manage reputation in typical development 
was underpinned by theory of mind and social motivation. These mechanisms had 
not previously been tested and directly related to reputation management. I further 
demonstrated that autistic children also had the ability to explicitly manage their 
reputation, and this ability was underpinned by reciprocal principles. Finally, 
qualitative methods further highlighted a concern for reputation in autistic 
adolescents – although variability in reputation management could also be 
underpinned by difficulties in understanding social rules.  
Autistic adolescents struggled to see the point in being seen as “cool” by others, 
instead preferring to be true to themselves. In many ways, this preference to be 
honest – rather than deliberately manipulating others for reputational self-gain – 
leads to question whether typical individuals are in fact too concerned with their 
reputation (Frith & Frith, 2011). After all, reputation has been suggested to be 
“everything” (Shaw et al., 2013), and although it does have benefits in terms of 
encouraging cooperation and prosocial behaviour (Benabou & Tirole, 2005; 
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Semmann et al., 2005; Tennie et al., 2010), changing one’s behaviour to impress 
others could have deceptive elements (Yu & Singh, 2003). The social difficulties and 
challenges faced by autistic individuals, however, cannot be downplayed. For 
example, autistic adults report a daily struggle of living with autism, including 
difficulties with employment and receiving support (Griffith, Totsika, Nash & 
Hastings, 2012), and autistic adolescents report that encounters with peers are 
frequently negative and hostile (Carrington et al., 2003a; Humphrey & Symes, 2010). 
Autistic individuals may not reap the benefits of being able to effectively manage 
reputation – for example, this reduced effectiveness could contribute to the ability to 
maintain friendships and to present one’s self most effectively in job interviews. 
Reputation management is therefore of relevance to autistic individual’s everyday 
lives. Overall, the current thesis demonstrates that individuals with autism are not 
completely immune to the effects of social influence.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Interview schedule for autistic adolescents 
Thank you for speaking to me right now. We are going to have a chat about a few 
different things, just like we discussed a moment ago. I’d like to know more about 
you and your friends, and your time at school. I’ll be recording our chat, but only the 
researchers on this project will hear this recording. If you don’t want to answer any 
of my questions, you can tell me that, and you can also ask to stop at any time. Don’t 
forget that I won’t tell anyone else the answers you give, and your real name will be 
removed from everything later on when I write up your answers. Do you have any 
questions for me before we start? 
There are four things we will be talking about. We’ll tick off on this sheet when 
we’ve finished talking about each thing. First of all we’ll have a chat about your 
school and what you get up to during your time at school and after school.  
Questions in italics are additional prompts  
School (warm-up Qs to build rapport) 
- What year are you in? How are you finding it? 
- What’s your favourite subject?  
- Do you go to any after school/lunch-time clubs? 
- What’s your favourite thing to do after school or on the weekend? 
Friendship 
That’s great. Let’s tick off that you have talked about your school. Now we are going 
to have chat about you and your friends.  
- To start off with, I’d like to know more about your friends. Tell me about 
them. 
o What are their names? 
o How did you meet them? 
o What do you like to do together? 
o What do you talk about with your friends? 
o Do you have any friends online? Can you tell me about them? 
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- Let’s talk more about your friends. What does being a friend mean to you?  
o How do you know if someone is your friend? 
o How is a friend different from, say, a stranger in the street? 
o How do you know if your friends like you?  
o Would you like to have more friends?  
- If you wanted someone to be your friend, what would you do? 
o Imagine there is a new person in your class. How would you make 
friends with them? 
o Let’s think about people who are not your friends at the moment, for 
example, maybe there is someone in your class who you’ve never 
spoken to before. Would you like to be friends with them? Why/not?  
- Have you ever tried to change something so that other people will like you?  
o Some people might change what they’re doing or change what they’re 
wearing to impress someone else. Have you done something like this? 
What was it?  
- Lots of people your age like to look or act ‘cool’. Do you know what I mean 
by ‘cool’? 
o So I’m talking about people who are maybe popular or would like to 
be popular, they might be seen as ‘cool’  
- What makes someone cool in your school?  
o How do you know they’re cool?  
- Do you want to be one of the cool people? Why/not?  
Social anxieties  
You’re doing brilliantly. Let’s tick off that we’ve finished talking about your friends. 
I’ve got a few more questions about things that might make you feel a bit worried or 
anxious.   
- Can you tell me about the things that make you feel worried or anxious?  
o Is there anything that makes you feel nervous? 
o How do you feel when you are around other people?  
o What about things that worry you in social situations?  
o How do you feel when you are working in a group? 
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OK, that’s great. Let’s tick to say we’ve finished talking about that. I’ve got a few 
more questions to go. These one’s are all about you.  
- If someone asked me to describe myself, I might say that I am [2 personality 
traits and 1 physical trait]. If I asked you the same question, ‘how would you 
describe yourself’, what would you say? 
o What kind of person would you say you are? 
- How do you think other people at your school would describe you?  
o So I would guess that other people I know would describe me as [...]. 
How would you guess people you know would describe you? 
o How would your best friend/parents describe you?  
Appendix B: Interview schedule for school staff 
Thanks so much for taking the time to talk to me today. I will be recording our chat, 
but only the other researchers on this project will hear the recording, and your real 
name will be changed when I write about your answers. If you don’t want to answer 
any of my questions, you can tell me that, and we can also stop this interview at any 
time.  
As you are aware, I’ve been talking with some of your students, and asking them 
questions about their friendships and their worries. I now have a few questions for 
you, about the students that you work with.  
I’ll just start by asking a few questions about your work. Warm-up 
- So, can you talk me through what a typical day at work would involve for 
you? 
o Do you work one-to-one with certain students? 
That’s great. I’m now going to ask you a few questions about the students that you 
work with.  
- How would you describe the students that you work most with?  
o What kinds of things do they like doing? 
o How do they get along in class? 
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- From your perspective, what kinds of things concern or worry the students 
you work with?  
- What are the major challenges that your students have to face on a day-to-day 
basis? 
o What about any social challenges?  
- Do any of your students appear to be worried about what others think about 
them? 
o Can you think of an example?  
- Can you think of a time where a student has really struggled with getting 
along with their peers?  
o Why do you think this happened?  
- Can you tell me a bit about the friendships you witness between your students 
and other students at the provision? 
o Can you think of a particular friendship between two or three 
students? 
o How would you describe their friendship? 
- What about friendships between your students and other students outside of 
the provision, in the mainstream school? 
o What about other students that they don’t get along with? 
- How do you think the other students, without autism, in the mainstream 
school view the students with autism that you work with?  
o Do you think that the other students accept them?  
 
 
